Where Do We Go Berkeley v. Caltrans
32 F.4th 852
| 9th Cir. | 2022Background
- Caltrans controls state highway property and uses an Interim Guidance to triage and clear homeless encampments by priority; Level 1 sites pose imminent safety risks and generally receive 72 hours' notice (or none if immediate hazard).
- Two Level 1 encampments along I-80 were targeted for clearance in mid-2021; Caltrans coordinated with local partners and delayed some actions to allow outreach and a construction lessee to begin work.
- Plaintiffs (Where Do We Go Berkeley and individual campers) sued after removal notices, alleging Title II ADA violations and obtaining a preliminary injunction that blocked clearing most of the property for six months while allowing removal of a leased portion.
- The district court found serious questions on the ADA merits and irreparable harm because the offered shelter (Horizon) was allegedly inaccessible to many plaintiffs; it balanced hardships in plaintiffs' favor and suggested reopening another Caltrans site (Seabreeze) could mitigate safety harms.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held the dispute was not moot (capable of repetition yet evading review) but vacated the six-month injunction, concluding the ADA did not clearly require such a lengthy delay and that the district court erred in its merits analysis and in balancing equities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of ADA "programs" regarding encampment removal | Caltrans' removal policy/Interim Guidance constitutes a public program that must reasonably accommodate disabled campers (e.g., more time). | Caltrans' level 1 clearing is an expedited safety/maintenance function, not a social-services program that requires providing housing or long delays. | Caltrans' Level 1 procedures are narrow, safety-driven programs; ADA does not require Caltrans to provide housing or extended delays. |
| Whether a six-month stay is a "reasonable modification" or a "fundamental alteration" | Six months is necessary to accommodate disabled persons who cannot use offered shelter and need time to obtain housing. | A six-month bar would fundamentally alter Caltrans' safety-driven clearing program and effectively force it to provide housing. | Six-month injunction is a fundamental alteration of Caltrans' Level 1 program and therefore not required by the ADA. |
| Viability of Title II discrimination claim (outputs vs inputs; second clause) | Even absent a defined "program," the second clause forbids subjecting disabled persons to discrimination and supports relief. | Title II requires plaintiffs be "qualified" for the service/program; Zimmerman limits the second clause and requires program-based analysis. | District court erred: plaintiffs did not raise a serious question under Title II absent a proper program-based showing; a plausible claim alone cannot support the injunction. |
| Balance of equities and mitigation (reopening Seabreeze) | Immediate injury to disabled campers outweighs temporary harms to Caltrans; reopening Seabreeze mitigates safety harms. | Injunction risks public-safety, infrastructure, electrical and fire hazards; court cannot compel Caltrans to provide alternate Caltrans property or housing. | District court abused discretion: improperly treated reopening Seabreeze as mitigation and misweighed harms over time, supporting an invalid six-month injunction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (standard for preliminary injunctions).
- Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011) (sliding-scale "serious questions" test for injunctions).
- Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (ADA does not require reasonable modifications that fundamentally alter a program).
- Zimmerman v. Oregon Dep't of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999) (defining scope of Title II "programs" and distinguishing outputs from inputs).
- Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1996) (fundamental-alteration inquiry is fact-specific, especially for public-safety programs).
- Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2003) (public entities are not required to create new programs to assist disabled persons).
- Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, 815 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2016) (mootness exception: capable of repetition yet evading review).
- Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 698 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2012) (timing considerations for appeals and mootness).