927 F.3d 1150
11th Cir.2019Background
- In 1995 Frederick Whatley committed an armed robbery in Georgia during which the storeowner was shot and later died; Whatley was convicted of malice murder and sentenced to death.
- Trial counsel presented limited mitigation at penalty phase (family witnesses, Whatley’s testimony, a caseworker), and did not present extensive childhood-abuse or later mental-health expert evidence.
- During the penalty-phase testimony Whatley appeared before the jury in visible leg shackles while re-enacting events; counsel did not object.
- On direct appeal the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and treated the visible-shackles substantive claim as invited/procedurally defaulted.
- In state habeas proceedings Whatley produced 1988 YRA evaluation reports, lay affidavits alleging childhood abuse, and two later expert affidavits diagnosing psychotic/depressive disorders; the state rebutted with pretrial mental evaluations (Drs. Bailey-Smith and Fahey) and challenged credibility.
- The state habeas court and then the Georgia Supreme Court denied relief (assuming deficient performance but finding no Strickland prejudice); the federal district court granted habeas relief on mitigation but denied relief on the shackles claim. The Eleventh Circuit reverses the mitigation grant and affirms denial on shackles.
Issues
| Issue | Whatley’s Argument | State/Respondent Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate/present extensive mitigation (childhood abuse, major mental illness) | Counsel failed to obtain/use 1988 YRA reports, lay witnesses, and mental-health experts; a reasonable investigation would have produced mitigating proof creating a reasonable probability at least one juror would impose life | State courts: new evidence had limited credibility, some material was potentially aggravating, pretrial experts would have rebutted; no reasonable probability of different outcome | Reversed District Court: Eleventh Circuit holds Georgia Supreme Court reasonably found no Strickland prejudice under AEDPA (state courts’ credibility and factual findings presumed correct) and vacates federal grant of relief |
| Trial counsel ineffective for failing to object when Whatley testified visibly shackled during penalty phase | Shackling is inherently prejudicial; Deck and Eleventh Circuit precedent support a presumption of prejudice; counsel’s failure deprived Whatley of a fair sentencing | State: substantive shackling claim was procedurally defaulted; for IAC on collateral review the proper standard is Strickland actual-prejudice (no presumption); given overwhelming aggravation shackles were not outcome-determinative | Affirmed: Eleventh Circuit applies Strickland actual-prejudice, declines to ‘‘borrow’’ direct-appeal presumption for a procedurally defaulted substantive claim, and finds state courts’ conclusion (no reasonable probability of different outcome) reasonable under AEDPA |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) (visible shackling during sentencing is inherently prejudicial and permissible only for an essential state interest)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference: state-court decisions receive significant deference; federal habeas relief is barred unless state ruling is unreasonable)
- Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15 (2009) (when assessing Strickland prejudice in mitigation failures, courts must weigh all evidence—good and bad—and consider rebuttal and ‘‘opening the door’’)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (to show Strickland prejudice at sentencing, courts reweigh aggravating evidence against totality of available mitigation)
- Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439 (11th Cir. 1987) (shackling at sentencing raises serious due-process concerns; courts should scrutinize necessity and prejudice)