Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv.
139 S. Ct. 361
| SCOTUS | 2018Background
- The Fish and Wildlife Service listed the dusky gopher frog (Rana sevosa) as endangered in 2001 and later proposed critical-habitat designations, including a 1,544-acre Louisiana site called Unit 1.
- Unit 1 contained high-quality ephemeral breeding ponds but was largely a closed-canopy timber plantation; no frogs had been observed there for decades. The Service concluded Unit 1 was "unoccupied" but "essential" for conservation because ponds were rare and the site is geographically distant from existing populations.
- The Service prepared an economic-impact report estimating that designation could limit development and deprive owners (including Weyerhaeuser) of up to $33.9 million; the Service determined costs were not disproportionate and declined to exclude Unit 1 from designation.
- Weyerhaeuser and other landowners challenged (1) that Unit 1 could not be designated because it is not currently "habitat" for the frog, and (2) the Service’s decision not to exclude Unit 1 as arbitrary and based on flawed cost‑benefit analysis and methodology.
- The District Court upheld the designation and the economic analysis; the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the ESA does not require a separate ‘‘habitability’’ threshold and that the Secretary’s decision not to exclude was committed to agency discretion and therefore unreviewable.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Fifth Circuit judgment, and remanded: (1) directing the court of appeals to address in the first instance whether "critical habitat" must also be "habitat" and whether Unit 1 qualifies; and (2) holding that the Secretary’s decision not to exclude is reviewable under the APA for abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a statutory "critical habitat" designation under 16 U.S.C. §1533(a)(3)(A)(i) is limited to areas that are also "habitat" (i.e., can the Secretary designate land that is not currently habitable without modification?) | Weyerhaeuser: "Critical habitat" must be a subset of "habitat"; areas that cannot currently support the species are not eligible. | Service: "Critical habitat" can include unoccupied areas that may require some modification to support the species; Unit 1 qualifies. | Vacated and remanded to the court of appeals to address in the first instance whether the term "habitat" in §1533(a)(3)(A)(i) excludes areas that cannot presently sustain the species. |
| Whether the Secretary’s decision under 16 U.S.C. §1533(b)(2) not to exclude an area from critical habitat (after considering economic and other impacts) is committed to agency discretion and therefore unreviewable by courts | Weyerhaeuser: Decision not to exclude is subject to judicial review; Service failed to properly consider costs and conflated benefits. | Service: The statute gives the Secretary discretion ("may exclude"), so courts lack a meaningful standard and the decision is unreviewable under 5 U.S.C. §701(a)(2). | Reversed: The APA presumes judicial review; §1533(b)(2) is not the rare statute committing decisions to agency discretion. Courts may review exclusion decisions for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit was remanded to evaluate the agency’s cost–benefit assessment. |
Key Cases Cited
- Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (establishes presumption of judicial review under APA)
- Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (narrow reading of §701(a)(2) "committed to agency discretion" exception)
- Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (agency decisions not to prosecute/act are presumptively unreviewable in limited contexts)
- Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (Section 4(b)(2) requires consideration of economic impacts and recognized reviewability for abuse of discretion)
- National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (describes consultation requirements and impacts of critical-habitat designations)
- Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (property-value diminution can be a concrete injury for standing)
- Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (review for consideration of relevant factors; arbitrary and capricious standard)
