Weyer v. State
333 Ga. App. 706
Ga. Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant Jamie Lee Weyer (49) was charged with two counts of sexual exploitation of children for allegedly enticing two 16‑year‑old girls (A.M. and H.M.) via text messages to produce nude photographs.
- On the night at issue Weyer sent repeated texts requesting nude photos, including a message reading “NAKED‑ i want to see your fine asses and tits naked,” and later offered his phone and made other solicitations; A.M. sent a bikini photo.
- The girls reported the texts to a school resource officer; police obtained the phones, a forensic printout of the messages and the bikini photo, and arrested Weyer the same day.
- Weyer admitted sending messages but denied remembering content; he deleted some messages from his phone but retained the bikini photo.
- The jury convicted Weyer on both counts; he moved for a new trial (denied) and appealed arguing (1) insufficient evidence (contending the State failed to prove intent to obtain images of genitals/pubic area and that no such images were produced) and (2) plain error in jury instruction because the court declined to define "entice."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Weyer) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency — Must production occur? | Conviction under OCGA §16‑12‑100(b)(1) requires proof only that enticement was for purpose of producing a visual medium, not that a visual medium was actually produced. | Weyer argued State had to show that lewd images of genitals/pubic area were produced and transmitted. | Held for State: statute criminalizes enticement aimed at producing images; actual production/transmission not required. |
| Sufficiency — Intent to obtain "sexually explicit conduct" (genitals/pubic area) | The totality of texts and circumstantial evidence support a rational inference he sought fully nude, explicit photos (not limited to breasts/buttocks). | Weyer argued texts reference only breasts/buttocks (not genitals/pubic area), so no proof of intent to obtain "sexually explicit conduct." | Held for State: jury could reasonably infer intent to obtain fully nude, explicitly sexual photos including genitals/pubic area. |
| Sufficiency — Whether texts "enticed" the minors | The messages solicited nude photos and, combined with evidence he later provided cigarettes/lighter, amounted to enticement. | Weyer contended he merely stated a desire and offered nothing in exchange, so did not "entice." | Held for State: evidence supported finding he solicited and tempted the minors, satisfying ordinary meaning of "entice." |
| Jury instruction — Failure to define "entice" / denial of dictionary | Court instructed jurors to use ordinary meaning; defense accepted proposed wording at bench; no objection to supplemental instruction. | Weyer argued trial court plainly erred by not defining "entice" for the jury and denied request for a dictionary. | Held for State: no plain error — "entice" is an ordinary‑meaning term and court acted within discretion in its supplemental instruction and denying dictionary. |
Key Cases Cited
- Copeny v. State, 316 Ga. App. 347 (discussing standard for sufficiency review)
- Craft v. State, 252 Ga. App. 834 (distinguishable; involved offenses requiring possession/creation of lewd images)
- Bolton v. State, 310 Ga. App. 801 (conviction can rest on solicitation intent even if underlying act not accomplished)
- Lasseter v. State, 197 Ga. App. 498 (enticement need not be proven to have culminated in the indecent act; intent suffices)
- Johnson v. State, 269 Ga. 632 (evaluate sufficiency by considering all evidence collectively)
- Wilson v. State, 291 Ga. 458 (plain‑error framework for jury charge review)
- Holloman v. State, 291 Ga. 338 (trial court has discretion over supplemental jury instructions)
- Millsaps v. State, 310 Ga. App. 769 (terms of ordinary understanding need not be defined for jury)