Westerman, John Dewayne, WR-89,032-01

Applicant John Dewayne Westerman sought habeas corpus relief after pleading guilty to aggravated robbery with an enhancement paragraph; he later alleged his plea was involuntary and counsel ineffective.
The trial court recommended relief based on the plea being involuntary because Applicant was misinformed about the availability of prior convictions for enhancement and thus the range of punishment.
The State’s original case file containing Applicant’s earlier confession was lost, but Applicant provided a new written confession and the sheriff’s office file (offense reports and interviews) remained available.
Trial counsel apparently is deceased, impairing the State’s ability to respond to the ineffective-assistance claim about whether counsel investigated or challenged the enhancement.
At the habeas hearing Applicant testified he would have rejected a 30‑year offer if he knew the enhancement was unavailable; the State did not cross-examine or oppose the involuntary-plea claim and later indicated it no longer materially opposed relief.

Issue	Westerman's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether laches bars habeas relief for Applicant’s delayed filing	Delay should not bar relief; prejudice to State is minimal or outweighed by equities	Laches should bar relief because delay prejudices the State’s ability to oppose claims	Laches does not bar relief; court finds no dispositive prejudice to prosecution or equitable bar
Whether delay prejudiced State’s ability to retry the case	New confession and remaining investigative file preserve prosecution’s position	Lost original file and witness fading memory cause prejudice	No material prejudice to retrial; State had new confession and sheriff’s reports
Whether delay prejudiced State’s ability to oppose ineffective-assistance claim (trial counsel dead)	Loss of counsel is acknowledged but does not determine outcome because relief is based on involuntary plea	Death of counsel prevents meaningful rebuttal of ineffective-assistance allegations; this is prejudicial	The court recognizes theoretical prejudice on ineffective-assistance claim but deems it immaterial to the grant of relief here
Whether Applicant’s guilty plea was voluntary given misinformation about enhancement/range of punishment	Plea was involuntary; Applicant would have rejected 30‑year offer if he knew enhancement was unavailable	Initially opposed; later did not contest the involuntary-plea finding at the hearing	Plea held involuntary; trial court’s finding supported relief (grant of habeas)

Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (defines laches as prejudice-focused and outlines factors for equitable balancing)
Ex parte Carrio, 992 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (discusses laches and that mere passage of time is insufficient)
Ex parte Saenz, 491 S.W.3d 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (explains laches addresses State’s ability to prosecute and respond due to lost evidence)
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (guilty plea must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent)
Davison v. State, 405 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (involuntary plea where defendant lacked awareness of charge and punishment)
Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976) (plea involuntariness where defendant ignorant of precise nature/range of punishment)
Ex parte Barnaby, 475 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (focus on whether misinformation had a reasonable likelihood of affecting decision to plead guilty)