West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697

Background

In 2015 EPA promulgated the Clean Power Plan (CPP) under Clean Air Act §111(d) to limit CO2 from existing coal- and gas-fired power plants by identifying a “best system of emission reduction” (BSER). The BSER included: (1) heat-rate efficiency improvements at individual plants, and (2–3) grid-level "generation shifting" (from coal to gas and to renewables), implementable via reduced output, investment/subsidies, or trading/credits.
CPP translated the BSER into stringent emissions performance rates based on modeled national shifts (coal share projected to fall from 38% to 27% by 2030); those rates would have required sector-wide generation changes and substantial costs.
The Supreme Court stayed the CPP in 2016; the rule was later repealed by the Trump Administration, which adopted the ACE rule limiting BSER to at-source heat-rate measures.
The D.C. Circuit vacated EPA’s repeal, reasoning generation shifting could be a valid BSER and rejecting application of the major-questions doctrine; EPA sought and obtained a partial stay while it considered new rulemaking.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held (majority) that §111(d) does not authorize EPA to set emissions limits predicated on the CPP’s generation-shifting approach; the case was remanded. Justiciability (standing/mootness) and the scope of agency authority under the major-questions doctrine were central issues.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Justiciability / standing to appeal	States (petitioners) argued they are injured because the D.C. Circuit’s vacatur of the ACE repeal purported to reinstate the CPP, imposing new state regulatory obligations.	Government argued the case was moot or nonjusticiable because EPA said it would not enforce CPP while it engages in new rulemaking and the D.C. Circuit stayed its mandate.	Case remains justiciable—voluntary cessation by the Government does not moot the dispute; petitioners have injury fairly traceable to the judgment below.
Scope of §111(d): may BSER be grid-level generation shifting?	Petitioners (states, industry) argued CPP unlawfully claimed transformational authority beyond §111(d) by setting caps based on sector-wide generation shifting rather than measures applicable at individual facilities.	EPA/Government argued §111(d)’s BSER language is broad and permits systems (including cap-and-trade or generation shifting) that reduce emissions, and statutory context and precedents (use of trading in other programs) support CPP.	Held for petitioners: §111(d) does not clearly authorize the CPP’s generation-shifting BSER. The CPP exceeded EPA’s statutory authority.
Application of the Major Questions Doctrine	Petitioners contended courts should apply the major-questions doctrine and require clear congressional authorization before allowing EPA to exercise transformational economic/regulatory power.	Government argued ordinary statutory interpretation suffices and §111(d)’s text authorizes EPA’s chosen BSER.	Court applied the major-questions doctrine: CPP was an extraordinary, transformative assertion of regulatory power from a rarely used statute; EPA lacked clear congressional authorization.
Role of statutory history, agency practice, and other Clean Air provisions	Petitioners emphasized EPA’s four-decade course of source-focused, technology-based BSERs and Congress’s repeated rejection of economy-wide cap-and-trade as indicating §111(d) was not meant to authorize CPP-style restructuring.	Government pointed to other Clean Air Act provisions that contemplate trading/systems and to interpretive breadth and flexibility in §111(a)(1).	Court relied on the long history of EPA’s source-level approach, Congress’s rejection of cap-and-trade legislation, and the statutory scheme to conclude CPP’s approach was not within §111(d) authority.

Key Cases Cited

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (agency cannot claim sweeping regulatory power absent clear congressional authorization)
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) (apply skepticism when agency claims authority to regulate vast sectors without clear statutory authorization)
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gases as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act)
American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (Congress delegated the question whether and how to regulate CO2 emissions from power plants to EPA)
Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (administrative delegations must be read in statutory context; courts cannot infer sweeping delegations from vague text)
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (rejection of agency claim when the asserted power would effect a fundamental revision of the statutory scheme)
National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U.S. _ (2022) (per curiam) (applied major-questions skepticism to agency-imposed nationwide vaccine-or-test mandate)
Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. HHS, 594 U.S. _ (2021) (per curiam) (applied major-questions reasoning to invalidate CDC eviction moratorium)