West Virginia Automobile and Truck Dealers' Association v. Ford Motor Company, 23-683

Plaintiffs, West Virginia Ford and Lincoln dealers, renovated their dealerships between 2013 and 2016 to meet Ford’s “Trustmark 3” facility standards, with Ford’s required and approved elements, receiving matching funds.
In 2020, Ford expanded its Lincoln Commitment Program (LCP) to incentivize exclusive "Vitrine" Lincoln facilities, offering higher payments to participating dealers.
Plaintiffs did not build Vitrine-exclusive facilities and were therefore denied the higher LCP incentives (2.75% of MSRP) but received lower incentives (1%) for each Lincoln sold.
Plaintiffs sued Ford in federal court, alleging that Ford’s new LCP incentive violated West Virginia Code § 17A-6A-10(1)(i) by requiring substantial changes to facilities improved within 10 years and thus falling within the statute’s ten-year “grandfather clause.”
The federal court certified to the West Virginia Supreme Court the question whether completion of manufacturer-required image elements under a voluntary incentive program (like the Trustmark renovations) triggers the ten-year statutory protection for such dealers.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does voluntary completion of manufacturer "required and approved" renovations under an incentive provision trigger the ten-year grandfather clause of W. Va. Code § 17A-6A-10(1)(i)?	The statute protects dealers if they completed renovations or image elements required/approved by the manufacturer within 10 years, even if done via voluntary participation in incentive programs.	Only facility improvements that were actually required (not voluntarily undertaken) by the manufacturer trigger the statute’s protection; plaintiffs’ renovations were not “required.”	Affirmed; the ten-year grandfather clause applies regardless of voluntariness, as long as elements were "required and approved" by the manufacturer under the optional program.

Light v. Allstate Ins. Co., 203 W. Va. 27, 506 S.E.2d 64 (W. Va. 1998) (sets standard of review for certified questions as de novo)
Ohio Cnty. Comm’n v. Manchin, 171 W. Va. 552, 301 S.E.2d 183 (W. Va. 1983) (statutory interpretation required only if ambiguity)
Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W. Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1970) (plain statutory language to be applied without interpretation)
State v. Gen. Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars, 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (W. Va. 1959) (statutory terms given ordinary meaning)
Meadows v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 207 W. Va. 203, 530 S.E.2d 676 (W. Va. 1999) (statutory construction must give effect to every word)
United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, CLC v. Tri-State Greyhound Park, 178 W. Va. 729, 364 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va. 1987) (legislation presumed not meaningless or useless)