Wesley Eugene Dollar v. Coweta County Sheriff Office
446 F. App'x 248
11th Cir.2011Background
- Dollar, a pro se Georgia prisoner, filed a § 1983 action in 2010 alleging jail conditions and medical treatment violations.
- The district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for frivolousness and failure to state a claim.
- The court held unlawful confinement claims must be pursued in a habeas petition, and monetary claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
- Dollar’s claims included lack of Miranda warnings, excessive handcuffing injuring his hand, sleeping on the floor, poor water access, sewage leaks and infections, and inadequate medical care.
- Dollar alleged Coweta County Jail had no grievance procedures and that jail officials prevented him from exhausting administrative remedies there.
- On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the dismissal of the jail conditions, force, and medical treatment claims and remanded for further exhaustion analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether unlawful confinement claims were improperly dismissed | Dollar's release claims belong in § 1983, and monetary claims should not be barred by Heck. | Unlawful confinement challenges are habeas; monetary damages are barred by Heck unless invalidated. | Unlawful confinement claims require habeas relief; monetary claims barred by Heck. |
| Whether Miranda and related claims are cognizable under § 1983 | Miranda violation and related injunctive relief are actionable in § 1983. | Miranda claims are not cognizable under § 1983; pending state proceedings affect exhaustion. | Miranda claims are not cognizable under § 1983; district court properly declined habeas conversion pending exhaustion. |
| Whether the district court properly dismissed jail-condition claims for lack of exhaustion | Dollar tried to exhaust and alleged abuse prevented filing; remedies may have been unavailable. | Exhaustion required and clearly absent on the face of the complaint. | The district court erred in sua sponte dismissing jail-condition, force, and medical claims on exhaustion grounds; remanded to resolve exhaustion issue. |
| Whether exhaustion was available to Dollar at Coweta County Jail | Coweta officials refused to apply grievance procedures; Dollar could not exhaust there. | If a remedy exists and is available, it must be exhausted. | Remand to determine availability and whether exhaustion was proper; no clear on-face exhaustion failure. |
Key Cases Cited
- Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court 1973) (habeas corpus is exclusive remedy for challenging confinement)
- Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (Supreme Court 2005) (§ 1983 claims cannot undermine validity of conviction or confinement)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court 1994) (damages claims must be barred if they would imply invalidity of conviction)
- Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (Miranda violations not cognizable under § 1983)
- Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2008) (exhaustion under PLRA requires available remedies)
- Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2007) (administrative remedy available only if inmate knows about it and can discover it)
- Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court 2007) (exhaustion is an affirmative defense; not required to be pleaded in complaint)
- Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corrs., 254 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2001) (de novo review of § 1915A dismissal; accept pleadings as true)