Wendy Osorio Martinez v. Attorney General United States
893 F.3d 153
3rd Cir.2018Background
- Four children from El Salvador and Honduras and their mothers were apprehended near the U.S.–Mexico border in 2015 and placed in expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).
- Initially denied asylum at credible-fear screenings and in immigration proceedings; petitioners sought habeas relief and were litigated in Castro v. DHS, where jurisdiction was found lacking.
- After Castro, the four minor children obtained Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) classification from USCIS based on state-court dependency findings that return to their home countries was not in their best interest.
- SIJ status confers statutory protections, eligibility to apply for adjustment to lawful permanent residence (LPR), exemptions from certain inadmissibility grounds, and procedural safeguards against revocation.
- The government continued to pursue expedited removal despite SIJ classification; petitioners sued again seeking habeas relief and a preliminary injunction to block removal and secure release.
- The Third Circuit held that § 1252(e)(2)’s jurisdictional bar applies generally but, as applied to SIJ designees with the statutory ties and protections described, it effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ; the denial of injunctive relief was reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1252(e)(2) bars judicial review of challenges to expedited removal as applied to SIJ designees | SIJ status makes the children "paroled"/otherwise exempt and creates statutory rights so courts retain jurisdiction to review removal | §1252(e)(2) narrowly limits review to whether an order was issued and to whom; petitioners’ claims challenge enforceability and thus are barred | §1252(e)(2) precludes statutory review of the merits of expedited removal orders; Castro controls that point |
| Whether petitioners may invoke the Suspension Clause (habeas) | SIJ classification and attendant statutory/procedural protections create sufficient ties to the U.S. to invoke habeas protections | Petitioners are recent entrants subject to plenary political-branch immigration power and thus may be excluded from invoking the Suspension Clause | SIJ designees may invoke the Suspension Clause because their statutory status and protections create substantial connections to the U.S.; Castro’s contrary holding limited to short-term entrants |
| Whether the INA’s procedures supply an adequate substitute for habeas (Boumediene step two) | Expedited removal’s narrow habeas-limited review is not an adequate substitute because it forecloses review of erroneous application of law that would negate SIJ rights | The statutory scheme and agency processes are sufficient substitutes for habeas | The expedited-removal framework is not an adequate substitute; as applied to SIJ designees it effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ |
| Whether injunctive relief (TRO/PI) was appropriate | Execution of expedited removal would irreparably strip SIJ statutory and due-process rights and block pending adjustment; public interest favors protecting those rights | Government interests in enforcing removal and immigration enforcement weigh against injunctive relief | Preliminary-injunction factors favor petitioners: likelihood on the merits (Suspension Clause violation), irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest; denial of injunction reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (prior Third Circuit decision on §1252(e)(2) jurisdiction and Suspension Clause analysis)
- Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (two-step test for Suspension Clause: who may invoke writ and adequacy of substitute procedures)
- Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (aliens seeking initial admission lack certain constitutional rights)
- United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (constitutional protections tied to substantial connections to the U.S.)
- Khouzam v. Attorney General, 549 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (statutory relief can place an alien outside initial-admission context)
- Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (constitutional limits on immigration detention and review)
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (habeas as means to test legality of executive detention)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) (factors for preliminary injunction in immigration context)
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (standard for preliminary injunction)
- Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (limited rights of aliens at the threshold of entry)
- United States ex rel. Knauff/Mezei cited precedent: Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (exclusion at the border context)