18 F.4th 516
6th Cir.2021Background
- Edmonson County deputies pursued a vehicle for ~12 minutes at speeds nearing 130 mph after a traffic stop attempt; occupants included minors M.S. and C.S.
- During the chase someone threw objects from the car; officers later received a radio report that ammunition had been found near where items were discarded.
- The fleeing car crashed in a T-bone collision; C.S. was unconscious/slumped in the backseat after the crash and did not respond to Deputy Jordan Jones’s repeated commands to show his hands.
- Jones broke a window, then deployed a taser against C.S.; both minors were injured and flown to hospital. Sheriff Shane Doyle was not actively involved in the pursuit but had written the ECSO pursuit policy.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force) and state-law battery, negligence, and gross negligence. The district court denied summary judgment on Jones’s § 1983 excessive-force claim and state battery claim, and denied qualified immunity on the negligence/gross negligence claims against Jones and Doyle.
- On interlocutory appeal the Sixth Circuit: affirmed denial of qualified immunity to Jones on the § 1983 excessive-force claim and state-law battery; reversed denial of qualified immunity for Jones and Doyle on the state negligence and gross negligence claims; and declined to reach the merits of the negligence claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jones is entitled to qualified immunity on C.S.’s § 1983 excessive-force claim for tasing an unresponsive backseat passenger | C.S.: tasing an unconscious/non-resisting passenger was excessive force and violated clearly established rights | Jones: based on ammunition reports, dangerous high-speed pursuit, and noncompliance, use of taser was reasonable | Denied immunity: jury could find C.S. nonresponsive/unconscious and not actively resisting; tasing under these facts violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights |
| Whether Jones is entitled to qualified official immunity on state-law battery for tasing C.S. | C.S.: taser use was intentional excessive force and thus battery; no good-faith defense | Jones: discretionary policing decision and statutory defense to use of force | Denied immunity / merits: discretionary act but not in good faith because constitutional right was violated; battery claim survives summary judgment |
| Whether Jones is entitled to qualified official immunity on negligence and gross negligence claims for initiating/continuing the high-speed pursuit | Plaintiffs: continuing pursuit was negligent/grossly negligent and proximately caused injuries | Jones: pursuit decisions are discretionary under ECSO policy, so state qualified immunity applies | Reversed: pursuit decisions were discretionary under Kentucky law and ECSO policy, so Jones entitled to qualified official immunity on negligence and gross negligence claims |
| Whether Sheriff Doyle is entitled to qualified official immunity on negligence/gross negligence for supervising/enforcing pursuit policy | Plaintiffs: Doyle negligently permitted/failed to supervise pursuit and enforce policy | Doyle: supervision and monitoring were discretionary; no ministerial duty to intervene | Reversed: Doyle’s oversight was discretionary; qualified official immunity applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (qualified immunity protects officials from burdens of trial; legal aspects reviewable)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts may decide qualified-immunity prongs in either order)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (court may disregard disputed facts blatantly contradicted by video evidence)
- Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) (limits on interlocutory appeals that challenge factual determinations at summary judgment)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive-force analysis—severity of crime, immediate threat, active resistance)
- Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001) (Kentucky qualified official immunity: discretionary act, good faith, within scope)
- Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2020) (taser use may be unreasonable when no objective basis to believe suspect armed)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015) (qualified immunity in high-risk use-of-force context; clearly established prong requires close analogy)
- Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati, [citation="468 F. App'x 491"] (6th Cir. 2012) (tasing non-resisting or already-detained persons can be excessive force)