534 F. App'x 516
6th Cir.2013Background
- AW, an autistic, nearly nonverbal minor, used facilitated communication (FC) at school; school staff (Miller, Scarsella) and coordinator Burke were involved in FC facilitation when AW produced allegations that her father Julian abused her.
- School staff reported allegations to DHS; social worker Robydek, police, and prosecutors (Dean, Carley) investigated; AW and her brother IW were removed from the home, IW was interrogated at a police station, and AW underwent a gynecological exam without court order or parental/guardian notification.
- Prosecutors continued interviews of AW using FC and prepared AW to testify; a court FC hearing produced a test showing AW could not answer questions when facilitators were excluded, and prosecutors later dismissed charges for lack of testimonial ability.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan tort law against school personnel, DHS, social workers, prosecutors, and the county; district court granted summary judgment in favor of some defendants and denied immunity for others; multiple interlocutory appeals followed and were consolidated.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part: it upheld prosecutorial absolute immunity for prosecutors’ handling of AW (advocacy function) but reversed as to prosecutors’ interview of IW (investigative/suspect context) and reversed dismissal of several state-law intentional-tort claims against prosecutors and school actors; it also affirmed denial of immunity for Robydek and denial of governmental immunity for Burke on gross-negligence claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DHS and its employee Robydek are immune from state-constitutional tort claims | Plaintiffs: DHS/customs/policies caused constitutional deprivations and immunity is inapplicable under Smith | DHS: claims fail as matter of law or rest on individual misconduct within policy, so immunity applies | Denied immunity for DHS on interlocutory review; factual questions whether Robydek acted within policy preclude immunity (affirmed denial) |
| Whether prosecutors (Dean, Carley) have absolute immunity for actions related to AW interviews and substantive due-process claims | Plaintiffs: prosecutors fabricated or perpetuated false evidence via FC; absolute immunity should not shield such misconduct | Dean/Carley: interviews were part of advocacy/judicial process and thus absolutely immune | Affirmed: absolute immunity applies to prosecutors’ actions toward AW because those acts were prosecutorial/advocacy in preparation for trial |
| Whether prosecutors have immunity (absolute or qualified) for interviewing IW at school (Fourth Amendment seizure/interrogation) | IW: he was a suspect; interview was investigative and a seizure without probable cause/Miranda — immunity unavailable | Dean/Carley: interviews were witness-preparation (advocacy) and occurred after probable cause | Reversed dismissal: prosecutors not entitled to absolute immunity for IW interview; qualified immunity also denied as objectively unreasonable to seize/interrogate IW on school grounds without consent/warrant; triable fact issues remain |
| Whether Robydek is entitled to qualified/governmental immunity for: (a) removing children from home, (b) transporting IW for police interrogation, (c) arranging AW’s gynecological exam | Plaintiffs: Robydek acted outside scope, failed to follow FC authentication, ignored supervisor and experts, and lacked legal authority/consent for exam and IW interrogation | Robydek: actions were within statutory authority and in good faith under Child Protection Law | Affirmed denial of immunity: triable issues on scope/good faith; gynecological exam required court order absent exigency and transport/interrogation lacked authority |
| Whether school officials (Burke, Miller, Scarsella, Brown) are entitled to governmental immunity for gross negligence and intentional torts arising from FC use and investigatory cooperation | Plaintiffs: school staff failed to secure naïve facilitators, misled investigators, and may have falsified/“cleaned up” FC statements causing harm | Defendants: actions were within employment scope and part of cooperating with investigation; immunity applies | Denied immunity as to Burke for gross negligence (jury question); denial of governmental immunity to school defendants for intentional tort claims affirmed due to perfunctory immunity showing by defendants |
| Whether state-law intentional tort claims against prosecutors should survive governmental-immunity analysis | Plaintiffs: prosecutors acted with reckless indifference and outside good faith (fabrication, false statements, non-FC torts) | Dean/Carley: acted in good faith relying on FC and procedure; immunity applies | Reversed district court: factual disputes over prosecutors’ knowledge of FC reliability, failure to follow protocols, and non‑FC misconduct preclude immunity on intentional-tort claims; remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute prosecutorial immunity for actions intimately associated with judicial phase)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (absolute immunity does not cover investigative functions)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (qualified-immunity two-step analysis framework)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (standard for objectively reasonable belief under qualified immunity)
- Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (custodial interrogations as seizures requiring probable cause)
- Myers v. Potter, 422 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2005) (application of qualified immunity principles)
- Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2010) (functional approach to prosecutorial immunity)