Wells v. Rhodes, 928 F. Supp. 2d 920

Plaintiffs are African American family living in Marengo, Ohio; Rhodes is a white resident who participated with D.G. in burning a cross on Plaintiffs' front lawn in March 2011.
The cross burning was accompanied by messages written on the cross expressing racial hatred; Rhodes was aware Plaintiffs were African American and intended to intimidate.
Rhodes and D.G. transported and placed the cross on Plaintiffs' property and set it on fire; they dispute specific intent but acknowledge a general understanding of Ku Klux Klan symbolism.
Plaintiffs suffered emotional distress and fear, with some reporting trouble sleeping and changes in family dynamics; there was no physical injury or property damage.
A default judgment earlier awarded damages against other defendants; Rhodes moved for summary judgment while Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on liability.
The Court analyzes federal § 1982 and § 1985, the FHA § 3617, and Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.70 to determine liability.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rhodes violated § 1982	Wells asserts discrimination through intimidation of property due to race.	Rhodes argues lacks specific intent or injury required for § 1982.	Plaintiffs granted; Rhodes liable on § 1982.
Whether Rhodes and D.G. conspired under § 1985(3)	Conspiracy to deprive rights by targeting property based on race.	No evidence of a private conspiracy with requisite intent.	Plaintiffs granted; § 1985(3) liability established.
Whether Rhodes interfered with rights under the FHA § 3617	Cross burning and racial threats interfered with plaintiffs’ enjoyment of housing.	Not all neighbor disputes fall under FHA; need clear interference with housing rights.	Plaintiffs granted; § 3617 liability established.
Whether Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.70 supports emotional distress damages	Emotional distress damages recoverable; testimony shows fear and anxiety.	Emotional distress requires medical proof or stronger evidence.	Plaintiffs defeated on summary judgment; Ohio claim survives to fact-finder.

Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 504 U.S. 263 (1993) (private § 1985(3) rights limits; private conspiracy scope)
Novotny v. City of Dallas, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (§ 1985(3) pertains to constitutional rights; Title VII not remedy)
Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789 (3rd Cir. 2001) (limits private § 1985(3) rights to certain constitutional-like rights)
Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2009) ( § 1981/1982 claims analyzed together with § 1985(3) implications)
Hood v. Midwest Sav. Bank, 95 Fed.Appx. 768 (6th Cir. 2004) ( § 3617 elements require discriminatory animus and causal connection)