556 S.W.3d 745
Tenn. Ct. App.2017Background
- Wells Fargo filed a detainer warrant in Shelby County General Sessions Court seeking possession of Dorris’s property; judgment for possession entered June 20, 2016 after Dorris did not appear.
- On June 21, 2016 Dorris timely filed a motion to set aside (pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §16-15-727(b)) and attached an answer and three counterclaims (wrongful foreclosure, TILA violation, fraudulent suppression).
- General sessions issued a writ of possession July 6, 2016; Dorris filed a notice of appeal to circuit court July 8, 2016 while the section 16-15-727(b) motion remained pending.
- General sessions denied the motion to set aside August 9, 2016 and indicated the appeal should proceed in circuit court. The case moved to Shelby County Circuit Court.
- Circuit court dismissed Dorris’s counterclaims under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). Later, the circuit court held Dorris’s de novo appeal from general sessions was untimely (because he did not file a second notice within ten days after the August 9 order) and enforced the general sessions judgment.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of the de novo appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (holding the July 8 premature notice tolled/perfected the appeal under §16-15-727(b)), but affirmed dismissal of the counterclaims for failure to plead actual damages from the alleged RESPA/acceleration-letter violation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wells Fargo) | Defendant's Argument (Dorris) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the July 8, 2016 notice of appeal divested general sessions and vested circuit court jurisdiction while a timely §16-15-727(b) motion was pending | The premature July 8 notice was of no effect while the motion to set aside remained undecided; Dorris had to file a new notice within 10 days after denial | The July 8 notice, though premature, tolled/perfected the appeal under §16-15-727(b) and vested circuit court jurisdiction | Court held the July 8 premature notice is effective: a timely §16-15-727(b) motion tolls appeal time and a notice filed while that motion is pending is treated as premature but sufficient to perfect the de novo appeal once the motion is adjudicated; reversal of circuit court’s jurisdictional dismissal |
| Whether §16-15-727(b) motions operate like Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 (divesting trial court on notice of appeal) | Implicit: if treated like Rule 60.02, a premature notice would divest the trial court | Dorris: §16-15-727(b) is statutorily distinct and tolls the appeal period; rules construing 59.04 are more apt | Court held §16-15-727(b) is distinct from Rule 60.02 and functions like post-judgment motions that toll appeal time (analogy to Rule 59.04); the general sessions court retained jurisdiction to rule on the motion despite the premature notice |
| Whether Dorris’s wrongful-foreclosure/RESPA counterclaim survived a Rule 12.02(6) motion | Wells Fargo: even assuming regulatory violation, Dorris failed to plead actual damages attributable to the alleged notice/timeliness defect | Dorris: alleged financial and emotional harm from the wrongful foreclosure and asserted the servicer’s notice was untimely under federal regs | Court held dismissal proper: counterclaim failed to plead specific actual damages causally linked to the alleged RESPA/notice violation; affirm dismissal |
| Whether Dorris may raise new theories on appeal (timeliness of acceleration letter) versus what was pleaded below | Wells Fargo: counterclaims stand/fall on what was pleaded; new theories cannot rescue them | Dorris: argued timeliness (June 16, 2014 letter) on appeal | Court held Dorris cannot change theories on appeal; cannot rely on unpleaded timeliness theory to avoid dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Chapman v. DaVita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2012) (subject-matter jurisdiction principles)
- Love v. Coll. Level Assessment Servs., Inc., 928 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn. 1996) (timely notice of appeal is mandatory for circuit court jurisdiction over general sessions judgments)
- Born Again Church & Christian Outreach Ministries, Inc. v. Myler Church Bldg. Sys. of the Midsouth, Inc., 266 S.W.3d 421 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (effect of a notice of appeal on trial court jurisdiction in the Rule 60.02 context)
- Johnson v. Johnson, 292 S.W.2d 472 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956) (trial court retains jurisdiction during statutory appeal period; rehearing practice)
- Perron v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 845 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2017) (RESPA claims require actual damages causally attributable to servicer’s failure)
- Marais v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 736 F.3d 711 (6th Cir. 2013) (RESPA damages pleaded sufficiently where plaintiff alleged interest and related financial losses that flowed from the servicer’s violation)