Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hazel
2016 Ohio 305
Ohio Ct. App.2016Background
- Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure complaint alleging generally that it "has complied with all conditions precedent" and attached the note and mortgage; the note/mortgage referenced HUD regulations but did not spell out the regulatory conditions.
- Hazel answered pro se with a general denial ("without information sufficient to form a belief") and asserted affirmative defenses but did not specifically deny performance of conditions precedent under Civ.R. 9(C).
- The trial court entered summary judgment for Wells Fargo; Hazel moved to vacate under Civ.R. 60(B), asserting Wells Fargo failed to comply with HUD notice/acceleration requirements (24 C.F.R. provisions).
- A magistrate granted Hazel’s motion to set aside judgment, finding excusable neglect and a plausible meritorious defense (failure to serve certified-mail notice of acceleration); trial court adopted magistrate initially, then this court reversed in a prior opinion directing the trial court to consider objections and whether Hazel complied with Civ.R. 9(C).
- On remand the trial court held Hazel’s general denial did not satisfy Civ.R. 9(C), deemed the conditions precedent admitted, sustained Wells Fargo’s objections, and denied Hazel’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion; this appeal affirms that ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hazel’s general denial and failure to specifically plead under Civ.R. 9(C) waived challenge to plaintiff’s allegation that "all conditions precedent" were satisfied | Wells Fargo: Its general allegation that it complied with all conditions precedent is sufficient; under Civ.R. 9(C) a defendant must specifically and particularly deny nonoccurrence or be deemed to have admitted it | Hazel: She lacked notice of what unnamed conditions (HUD regulations) required; a general denial was all that was possible before discovery, so she did not waive the defense | Court: Affirmed trial court — Hazel’s general denial was insufficient under Civ.R. 9(C), so conditions were deemed admitted and 60(B) relief was properly denied |
| Whether Civ.R. 9(C) should be applied when conditions precedent arise from external regulations not spelled out in attached instruments | Wells Fargo: Civ.R. 9(C) permits general pleading of performance; defendant must specifically deny whatever conditions are alleged | Hazel: Civ.R. 9(C) historically addresses contract conditions; where the complaint lacks factual detail (Civ.R. 8) or fails to attach operative documents (Civ.R.10(D)), plaintiff cannot invoke the 9(C) shortcut | Court: Majority applied law-of-the-case and affirmed that 9(C) controls here; dissent argued 9(C) should not be used to deem admissions where plaintiff’s pleading provided no notice (would reverse) |
Key Cases Cited
- Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75 (1987) (standard: Civ.R. 60(B) rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1 (1984) (explaining the law-of-the-case doctrine)
- State ex rel. Potain v. Mathews, 59 Ohio St.2d 29 (1979) (purpose of law-of-the-case: consistency and finality)
- State ex rel. Hickman v. Capots, 45 Ohio St.3d 324 (1989) (unsupported legal conclusions in pleadings are not deemed admitted)
- Natl. City Mtge. Co. v. Richards, 182 Ohio App.3d 534 (10th Dist. 2009) (conditions precedent in note or mortgage may be subject to Civ.R. 9(C) when the instrument itself requires prior notice)