Weldon v. Pacheco
17-8030
| 10th Cir. | Nov 6, 2017Background
- Petitioner Steve Weldon, a Wyoming inmate, pleaded guilty in 1990 to murder and other offenses and is serving life plus consecutive terms. He previously filed a federal habeas petition raising competency and involuntary-plea claims; most claims were dismissed as procedurally barred and the dismissal was summarily affirmed.
- Weldon later obtained state postconviction review on a substantive-competency claim (denied on the merits) and then filed additional federal filings challenging the prior federal habeas disposition.
- He filed two motions in his original federal habeas case: (1) a Rule 60(b)(4) motion asserting the prior judgment was void (challenging anticipatory procedural bar and denial of his substantive-competency claim), and (2) a declaratory-judgment motion seeking broad legal rulings about procedural bars and competency.
- The district court treated both motions as unauthorized second-or-successive habeas petitions and dismissed them for lack of circuit authorization; it alternatively denied Rule 60(b)(4) relief on the merits because the prior judgment was not "void."
- The Tenth Circuit granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) as to the Rule 60(b)(4) disposition, reviewed the merits, and also considered the declaratory-judgment motion. The panel affirmed: Rule 60(b)(4) relief was not warranted and the declaratory-judgment motion was procedurally barred under Calderon.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Weldon) | Defendant's Argument (State/District Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Rule 60(b)(4) motion asserting the prior habeas dismissal was void is a true Rule 60(b) motion or an unauthorized second/successive habeas petition | Motion challenged district court's use of anticipatory procedural bar and sought relief from a void judgment; relied on circuit authority that substantive-competency claims aren't procedurally barred | District court treated the motion as an unauthorized second/successive habeas petition and lacked jurisdiction; alternatively, even if Rule 60(b)(4), judgment was not void | Court: Under Spitznas/Gonzalez a true Rule 60(b) challenge to procedural-bar rulings can be a proper Rule 60(b) motion, but Weldon failed to show the earlier judgment was "void," so Rule 60(b)(4) relief denied |
| Whether the district court's application of an anticipatory procedural bar or other procedural rulings rendered the prior judgment "void" under Rule 60(b)(4) | Enforcement of conviction entered when incompetent violates due process; thus denying merits review on procedural grounds allegedly deprived him of due process and made judgment void | Legal error in applying procedural bar is not the same as a jurisdictional or due-process defect rendering a judgment void; Rule 60(b)(4) applies only to jurisdictional or true due-process (no notice/hearing) defects | Court: Procedural errors (exhaustion, statute of limitations, anticipatory bar) do not make the judgment void; no Rule 60(b)(4) relief granted |
| Whether the declaratory-judgment motion seeking broad legal rulings about procedural bars is cognizable under the Declaratory Judgment Act in this context | Seeks general declarations about applicability of procedural bars and competency as jurisdictional prerequisites—collateral to habeas and useful in reopening habeas | Declaratory relief is a disguised attempt to relitigate habeas procedural defenses; Calderon forbids collateral piecemeal declarations tied to habeas litigation | Court: Dismissed the declaratory-judgment motion as improper under Calderon (and as alternatively successive habeas if construed as a habeas challenge) |
| Whether a COA was required and should be granted for appeal of these rulings | COA required for appeal of Rule 60(b) disposition; contended COA not needed for declaratory-judgment part | COA required for final orders in habeas proceedings and for appeals of dismissals treated as second/successive; but declaratory rulings collateral to habeas may not trigger COA | Court: Granted COA as threshold issue for the Rule 60(b)(4) disposition; proceeded to full review and affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010) (Rule 60(b)(4) applies only where judgment is void due to jurisdictional error or denial of basic procedural due process)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (distinguishes true Rule 60(b) motions from successive habeas petitions)
- Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740 (1998) (Declaratory Judgment Act may not be used to adjudicate collateral legal issues that would affect habeas proceedings)
- Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (due process protects against conviction when defendant is incompetent)
- Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (valid guilty plea requires certain constitutional protections and voluntary, knowing waiver)
- Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (standard for granting a Certificate of Appealability)
- Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2006) (true Rule 60(b) motions challenging procedural dismissals may be treated as Rule 60(b) rather than successive petitions)
- Sena v. New Mexico State Prison, 109 F.3d 652 (10th Cir. 1997) (circuit precedent treating substantive-competency claims as not subject to procedural bar)
- Lay v. Royal, 860 F.3d 1307 (10th Cir. 2017) (distinguishing substantive-competency claim from procedural competency matters)
- United States v. Nelson, 465 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2006) (motions filed after judgment may be treated as Rule 60(b) matters)
- United States v. Harper, 545 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008) (dismissing appeals of unauthorized successive motions requires COA)
- Davis v. Roberts, 425 F.3d 830 (10th Cir. 2005) (appellate court may affirm on alternative procedural grounds)