Webster Williams, III v. Michael Carvajal, 63 F.4th 279

On Feb. 28, 2019, inmate Webster Williams (who takes a diuretic and has kidney disease) was accused of refusing an order to return to his cell after using the restroom; a UDC found him guilty and he lost phone privileges for one month.
Williams appealed through the BOP Administrative Remedy Program (ARP) and completed the final ARP step (General Counsel), then filed pro se in federal court alleging Rehabilitation Act discrimination and procedural due process violations.
The district court allowed only the Rehabilitation Act discrimination/retaliation claim to proceed against the BOP Director in his official capacity and dismissed other claims/defendants and damages as barred by sovereign immunity.
BOP moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust; the district court held Williams had to exhaust both the ARP and a separate DOJ EEO administrative process (28 C.F.R. § 39.170) for Rehabilitation Act claims, and that Williams had not shown the EEO process was unavailable; it dismissed without prejudice.
Williams appealed, arguing (1) the PLRA requires exhaustion only of internal prison grievance procedures (ARP), (2) the EEO process was unavailable to him, and (3) the district court erred in dismissing other defendants; the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for failure to exhaust.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the PLRA requires exhaustion only of internal prison grievance procedures or of all available administrative remedies (including DOJ EEO)	Williams: PLRA requires only exhaustion of internal prison grievance procedures (ARP)	Government: PLRA requires exhaustion of all available administrative remedies; Rehab Act claims trigger both ARP and DOJ EEO under 28 C.F.R. § 39.170	Court: PLRA requires exhaustion of all available remedies; for Rehabilitation Act claims inmates must exhaust both the ARP and DOJ EEO process
Whether the DOJ EEO process was "available" under Ross v. Blake	Williams: EEO was unavailable because he was not informed of it / was unaware	Government: EEO was available and discoverable via BOP program statements, regulations, and public resources	Court: EEO was "available"; mere unawareness is insufficient under Ross; Williams could have discovered and used the EEO procedures
Whether the district court erred by dismissing all defendants except the BOP Director and by barring damages	Williams: District court improperly dismissed other defendants and damages	Government: Rehab Act suits against prison officials are properly brought in official capacity; damages barred by sovereign immunity	Court: Did not reach merits of party/damages arguments because dismissal for failure to exhaust disposed of the appeal; affirmed dismissal without prejudice

Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (Supreme Court) (defines "available" in PLRA and limits exception to exhaustion to truly unavailable remedies)
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court) (exhaustion under PLRA is mandatory)
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court) (exhaustion must be "proper," following procedural rules)
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (Supreme Court) (PLRA exhaustion required regardless of relief offered in administrative process)
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court) (PLRA covers all suits about prison life under any federal law)
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court) (court must enforce plain statutory text)
McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court) (purposes of administrative exhaustion: agency correction and efficiency)
Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (Supreme Court) (exhaustion permits agency expertise and error correction)
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court) (exhaustion channels claims to appropriate administrative fora)
Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir.) (appellate jurisdiction to review dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust)
Griffin v. Bryant, 56 F.4th 328 (4th Cir.) (summary judgment standard and discussion of availability under Ross)