Webb v. Carter's Inc.
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12597
C.D. Cal.2011Background
- Plaintiffs allege Carter’s, Avery, PCI USA, and PCI Hong Kong sold Fall 2007 tagless infant garments with chemically-laden labels and failed to warn adequately.
- Tagless labels were supplied primarily by Avery (about 90%) with thousands of label combinations due to multiple vendors and production factors.
- Testing showed phthalates and other chemicals; NAMSA testing reportedly flagged toxicity in one sample, but defendants dispute the result and public disclosure.
- Consumer complaints arose in 2007–2008; Carter’s redesigned labels, conducted internal tests, and implemented a refunds policy for affected consumers.
- CPSC involvement followed, with a September 2008 warning statement about rare infant rashes; Carter’s later issued public statements and refunds were offered for purchases and medical costs.
- Plaintiffs move for nationwide class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3); the court denies, finding standing and predominance issues defeat certification.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing of unnamed class members | Absent members have injury in fact from paying for defective clothing. | Many class members did not suffer injury or notice disclosures; standing requires actual injury and proof varies by consumer. | Absent class members lack Article III standing; certification denied on standing grounds. |
| Predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) | Common questions (misrepresentation, omissions, safety standards) predominate across the class. | Materiality, reliance, and harm vary by consumer; individualized inquiries predominate. | Predominance not satisfied; individualized issues predominate across CLRA, UCL, FAL, fraudulent concealment, and warranty claims. |
| Materiality and reliance for CLRA class treatment | Materiality and reliance can be shown class-wide via reasonable consumer standard. | Materiality and reliance would vary by consumer; cannot be proven class-wide. | Materiality/reliance vary by consumer; CLRA claims not suitable for class treatment. |
| UCL unfair prong and injury to unnamed class members | Common proof of unfairness should support liability for the class. | Unnamed plaintiffs lack standing; injury must be shown on a class-wide basis, which is not possible here. | Unfair prong liability cannot be turned into class-wide recovery due to standing/injury limitations. |
| Superiority under Rule 23(b)(3) | Class action is superior to individual suits to provide broad relief. | Carter’s refunds program already provides relief; class action is unnecessary and improper given low take-up and alternative remedies. | Class action not superior; refunds program and medical reimbursements render class treatment inappropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Renee v. Duncan, 623 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 2010) (standing elements for injury, causation, redressability)
- In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298 (Cal. 2009) (Prop. 64 limits standing for UCL claims; affects class standing in California)
- Birdsong v. Apple, Inc., 590 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2009) (economic harm relying on inherent risk not cognizable for standing)
- Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (U.S. 1997) (class certification standards; predominance and typicality considerations)
- Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (standing considerations for class actions; define proper class)
- Hart v. Massey Chevrolet, not provided (not provided) (placeholder to indicate absence of non-official citation)