Weaks v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7123

Weaks, an African-American DMV employee since 1994, sought promotion to Assistant Director-Emissions in 2008 but Keel, a Caucasian, was chosen instead.
The Assistant Director-Emissions position oversees DMV's Emissions Program; posting emphasized emissions knowledge and supervisory experience among other qualifications.
Weaks argued the interview panel and selection relied on subjective criteria and racial motivation; Defendants argued Keel was better qualified and the decision was nondiscriminatory.
Keel had extensive supervisory and emissions-related experience (27 years as an officer, years supervising others, district-level management, and training responsibilities) while Weaks had less supervisory history at the time.
Weaks later received a captain-level position (Law Enforcement Manager of Emissions), equivalent to Keel’s prior rank, while the promotion at issue remained with Keel.
The court granted summary judgment for Defendants, holding that §1983 claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and that Weaks failed to establish Title VII discrimination or pretext.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether NCDOT/DMV are immune from §1983 monetary claims.	Weaks argues §1983 applies to obtain damages from state actors.	State immunity bars §1983 actions against DMV as an arm of the state.	Section 1983 claims dismissed; Eleventh Amendment immunity applies.
Whether Weaks proves a prima facie Title VII failure-to-promote claim.	Weaks was more qualified and discriminated against due to race.	Keel's qualifications and job posting criteria justify the promotion decision.	Weaks fails to establish a prima facie case that Defendants refused promotion on racial grounds.
Whether Defendants' stated reason for promotion is pretextual.	Defendants relied on subjective criteria; Weaks was more qualified in emissions knowledge.	Keel had substantially greater supervisory and emissions experience justifying selection.	No triable issue on pretext; Defendants’ reasons are credible and tied to job requirements.
Whether circumstantial and statistical evidence supports discrimination.	There is evidence of disparate treatment and lack of minority promotions.	Evidence is too weak or improperly generalized without labor-pool data; no pattern shown.	Insufficient evidence to create a material fact issue; summary judgment for Defendants.

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state is not a 'person' under §1983; Eleventh Amendment immunity)
Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248 (4th Cir.2005) (prima facie case and pretext framework in Title VII)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (pretext framework; shifting burdens; ultimate burden on plaintiff)
Burdine v. Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (prima facie case and burden-shifting standard)
Hux v. City of Newport News, 451 F.3d 311 (4th Cir.2006) (pretext requires more than inconsequential discrepancies)
Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir.2005) (employer may rely on non-dispositive preferred criteria)
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Medical Center, Inc., 290 F.3d 639 (4th Cir.2002) (alternative path to prove pretext via qualifications and evidence)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing prima facie case and burden-shifting framework)
Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450 (4th Cir.1994) (pretext and comparative qualifications in promotions)
Heiko v. Colombo Savings Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249 (4th Cir.2006) (supervisory factors can be considered in promotion decisions)