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Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.
406 F.3d 248
4th Cir.
2005
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 advisory. As with as guidelines treat ANDERSON, Virginia Plaintiff- claims, plain we review

Harp’s other Appellant, raise this issue Harp did not because error We conclude in the court. district error re- plain has not satisfied Harp

quirements. Payton; Lott; T. Vernelle Sherman Hawkins; Larry Coleman; Ava Cur failure to treat Although the Edwards, Jr.; Young; tis Clinton error,4 advisory plain was as guidelines Newman, Jr.; H. Samuel Francis that it affect has not demonstrated Harp Wade; Quiller; Bree Pamela Bennie rights. See United his ed substantial land; Stephenson; L. Kenneth Glenn 208, 222, White, States Reed; Sr.; Clyde Hol Brady, Robin Cir.2005) to a defen regard with (holding, Gwendolyn Naylor; man; H. L. John pending when appeal dant whose Hayward Watts; Barnes; Er Alton decided, it er plain that was Booker was Lewis; vin; Debra A. Alana J. to treat court ror for the district Turner; Williams; Jimmie Lee Wil mandatory, but that to satis as guidelines Jeffrey Jr.; Bonaparte, A. liam analysis a error fy prong plain the third Johnny Holmes; Myers; James J. actually that he was defendant must show III; Pope; Sherman, Debbie S.G. from the rec prejudiced). apparent It is Jones; Lottabney; B. Annie Charles treating guidelines as ord here Crawford; Gavin; Diane J. Olivia G. mandatory nothing to do had with White; Moore; Maxine Marvin S. by the district court. imposed sentence Reed; Legree; Irmagene Wil Bertha Rather, imposed was based the sentence Jeffrey Hightower, Jr.; Bai A. lar H. sentencing range on the recommended Ryson Carter; ley; Dorsey; Constance account for the sub Government to Tiller; Pollock; M. Peggy M. Rhonda Harp provided stantial assistance Collins; Cooks; L. Gloria J. Calvin prosecution of his codefendant. Langford; Myler; L. Patricia Danita therefore does not warrant forfeited error Beasley; Johnson; Mary L. Delores reversal.5 Bass; Myers; Linchie Benita Moses Simmons; Daise; H. Walter Wanda V. Nora; Carolyn Smith; Bernard W. Y. reasons, find no foregoing For the we Tommy Campbell; A. Donald Thorpe; affirm error and therefore reversible Brooks; Holston; M. Lewis Deitra F. Harp’s sentence. Phyllis Angela Holbrook; Pough; Y. Calhounhurley; Rouse; A. Norris V. AFFIRMED Gantt; Gay-Furse; Debra D. Ursula Hall; Johnson; R. William Elvira Campbell; M. But Winston Sharon Quitman White; Baker; ler; Leon Baker; Bush; Gary George B. Linda Carter; Coker, Jr.; Dianne L. Curtis challenges pro Harp in a se also raises criticism the dis- 4. We of course offer no carefully con- proce- supplemental brief. We judge, law have followed the trict who allegations find of error and Harp’s sentenc- these dure in at the time of sidered effect them be without merit. ing. *2 Davis; Harrison; Legal Charlotte NAACP Defense And T. Sandra Education Tyrone Davis; Fund, Inc., Johnson; Supporting B. Marinda Amicus Johnson; Johnny King; Appellant, Delores Mar McCalla; Douglas tin; Clinton L. Equal Employment Advisory Council; Mckenzie; Marilyn Mckie; Marlene Commerce, Chamber Of Amici Moore; Moton; L. James Goldie S. Supporting Appellee. Randle; Williams; Joseph Thomas Ryans; Rideaux; L. Dianne William 03-1150, Nos. 03-1151. Shaw; Scott; Michael S. Veronica Appeals, United States Court of Staley; Suber; George R. A. Calvin Fourth Circuit. Taylor; Vessel; Ellen M. Kenneth E. Vinson; Yarborough, Hope For Argued: Oct. 2003. Themselves And On Behalf Of All 4,May Decided: Situated, Similarly Plaintiffs, Others

v.

WESTINGHOUSE SAVANNAH RIVER

COMPANY; The Babcock & Wilcox Company, Incorporat River

Savannah

ed; British Nuclear Fuels Limited Sa Corporation;

vannah River Bechtel River, Incorporated, Defen

Savannah

dants-Appellees. Legal

NAACP Defense And Education

Fund, Inc., Supporting Amicus

Appellant,

Equal Advisory Council; Employment Commerce,

Chamber of Amici

Supporting Appellee.

Virginia Anderson, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Westinghouse River Savannah

Company Defendant-

Appellee, River, Incorporated;

Bechtel Savannah

The Babcock & Savannah Riv Wilcox Company, Incorporated;

er British Riv

Nuclear Fuels Limited Savannah Corporation,

er Defendants. *6 Smith, Vladeck, Ivan D.

ARGUED: Waldman, P.C., Engelhard, Elias & New York, York, Appellant. New for Glen Nager, Day, Washington, David Jones D.C., Appellees. for ON BRIEF: Julian Birnbaum, Vladeck, Waldman, R. Elias & P.C., York, York; New New Engelhard, McClain, McClain, Ray Ray P. P. Attor- P.A., Charleston, Carolina; ney, South Mulrain, L.L.P., York, Brown & New New York, Sudbury, for A. Appellant. Deborah Towns, Atlanta, Douglas Day, M. Jones Shay Dvoretzky, Day, Georgia; Jones York, York; Young, Kenneth E. New New Nelson, Mullins, Riley Scarborough, & Greenville, Carolina, Appellees. South Jones, Director, Elaine R. Norman J. River management in of the Savannah Le- Chachkin, Stroup, H. NAACP Robert Fund, Inc., with the De- to a contract pursuant Site Educational And gal Defense company is a York, Energy. Each York, partment Amicus Curiae New New in Bokat, defendant this action. A. Robin S. Stephen NAACP. National Conrad, Bryant, Dunham Ellen River Site past, In the the Savannah Inc., Center, Washing- Litigation Chamber materials needed for fabrica- produced Reesman, Kath-

ton, D.C.; Elizabeth Ann its current weapons, of nuclear but tion McGuiness, & Cheung, Norris Y.K. erine clean- is focused on environmental mission D.C., for Williams, L.L.P., Washington, radioactive materials. up processing and and Chamber. Amici Curiae Council covers 310 River Site Savannah Carolina, miles in western South square NIEMEYER, WIDENER, and Before and, 13,000 employees in over GREGORY, Judges. Circuit for the four defen- worked the sites 2765 were employees, dants. Of those part, in part, in vacated Affirmed black. by published instructions remanded with working at the Virginia began wrote Anderson opinion. Judge WIDENER in typist a in as a Judge NIEMEYER wrote River Site opinion. Savannah concurring part in Anderson became a separate opinion typing pool. Miss as part. Judge stenographer year in GREGORY later. She worked dissenting opinion dissenting depart- different separate stenographer wrote a several until at the Savannah River Site part. ments Miss Anderson became OPINION secretary administrative the materials from technology group. The transition WIDENER, Judge: Circuit secretary stenographer to administrative case, Virginia In this Title VII Anderson, and, promotion was a for Miss from the district court’s appeals secretary, she had as an administrative certification, denying granting class orders responsibilities. As an administra- more limine, motions defendants’ secretary, tive Miss Anderson received summary to the defen- granting judgment level. salary at the SGL 16 generally affirm the district dants. We the materials Anderson remained with *7 court, remand for consideration of but In technology group July until of 1998. class should be certified with a whether August promotion received a she plaintiff. new lead in to administrative assistant the universi- ty group relations within chemicals

I. group. her hydrogen technology With salary Anderson’s level Virginia promotion, Anderson is a black female em- Miss stands for Department Energy’s at the Sa- increased to SGL 28 SOP. SOP ployed and, positions, as a SGL vannah River Site. The Savannah River selective overtime employee, Anderson received managed Department of 28 SOP Miss Site is salary above her Energy by Westinghouse compensation Savannah River additional if worked a certain number of hours Company, (Westinghouse). LLC Bechtel she River, Inc., (Bechtel), working normal hours. Miss Babcox & above her Savannah (B W), university Anderson remained with the re- Company Savannah River & Wilcox group through lations the time she filed and British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. Savannah (BNFL) participate against her lawsuit the defendants. Corporation River also (if began working any). she the Savan- bent No preferred When candi- Site, higher Anderson’s system. nah River Miss dates exist this background educational was limited to an 2. HR posts in ShRINE secretary Augusta from diploma executive (sic) for working days. ten Tech, During which she received 1977. 3. hiring manager The establishes Site, her tenure at the River Savannah panel. interview pursued higher Miss further ed- degrees. In Miss Anderson ucation lead, the HR hiring manager With degree took bachelor of science individuals, appropriate selects based human management resources from South- job knowledge their and 6525 49 Wesleyan University. ern June of familiarity with position, to sit on 1998, Miss Anderson received her masters an interview panel. panel The consists in business from Nova administration members, of three one of whom must University. Southeastern always hiring manager. be the promotion from Anderson’s administrative Self-nominating 4. individuals submit secretary, pay with a level of SGL qualifications their to HR-Staffing. assistant, pay administrative with a level qualifications Submitted can include a SOP, just after SGL 28 came months she (OSR 27-13) History Personal form her M.B.A. received resume. and/or 1990’s, In the the Savannah River Site by Individuals nominated others programs, pro- instituted two one for qualifications submit their to HR- increases, pay motions and one for merit Staffing. litigation. that are at issue in this The Competency first is the Posting Based consent, With their candidates can be System, or Competency CBPS. The Based nominated others. Nominations System application promotion is an and are not managers. restricted to system employ- which Savannah River Site hiring manager cannot nominate. may apply positions ees use to for new History Candidates submit a Personal promotions. (OSR 27-13) system, exempt Under the or cop- form resume non-exempt employees may apply performance ies of their last three available, posted position that is with a few appraisals to HR-Staffing. exceptions. According description to the applicants 6. HR confirms that meet in Westinghouse contained Riv- Savannah posted position requirements. Manual, er Company hiring 5B Eligible candidates identified promotion process Competency under the requirements based on minimum list- System Based is as follows: position profile. ed *8 1.Open position to HR is submitted 7. HR-Equal Employment Opportuni- posting. for (EEO) appli- ties reviews the list of hiring posi- The manager ensures the consistency corporate cants for with description complete tion is and cor- planning. and affirmative action rect; adding, weighing and the values eligible HR-Staffing appli- 8. submits of, necessary HR competencies. hiring manager. cants to the Compensation salary the establishes

grade days at or position working below the 9. Within five of receiv- salary incum- grade previous ing HR-Staffing, of the the material from The re- can be shortened. time-frame selects candidates manager hiring exceed four time-frame cannot lease

for interviews. weeks. are informed All applicants 10. System, Competency Based Under application.

status their applicants can hiring managers evaluate inter- selected 11. Individuals teamwork, leader competencies: six core candidate information view receive results, communications, business ship, pro- the interview regarding package develop and self-management, employee cess. eval managers can also hiring ment. The and manager hiring schedules 12. The selected functional applicants using uate conducts, interviews panel, with the specific posi to the that are competencies candi- days working after within For manager hiring. is tion for which the their status. are notified of dates competen functional example, particular manager selects hiring heating, The ventila “[p]roficient 13. cy be could re- position best meets design,” candidate who and the air-conditioning tion and quirements. explains “[functional CBPS manual the re from competencies can be derived hir- by made decision is The final job description.” on the sponsibility section the other input from ing with manager weight, competency assigned is Each and af- panel members two interview five, in one to which using a number from HR lead. The next by the ter review to other important five relative is“[m]ost must review management also level impor “[l]east and one is competencies” candidate. the selected approve competencies.” The tant relative to other selec- review candidate 14. HR-EEO candidates for panel then selects interview consistency corporate with tion then each select interviews interviews planning. action and affirmative ed candidate. necessary, HR- is promotion 15. If a is who is interviewed applicant Each HREEO, and the divi- Compensation, using by panel the interview evaluated HR lead review decision sion competencies. functional the core and all relevant criteria ensure that weight- panel interview The determines met. applicant on each core ed for each score of- HR-Staffing prepares a 16. formal panel The competency. and functional extends hiring manager fer and the by multi- weighted determines the score the candidate. the offer to competen- weight given to plying the each five) (one applicant’s rating cy rejects accepts or 17. The candidate panel rates competency. for each The days. two the offer within calendar five, one to on a scale of applicant in- all hiring manager The informs 18. meaning ex- “[demonstrates with a five sending candidates terviewed meaning and a one ceptional competence” manager of the selected candidate level of expected not demonstrate “[d]id process outcome. the selection panel The competence.” determines candidate released selected by adding weighted total score applicant’s within weeks to the four new for each weighted scores together *9 acceptance. hiring manager then competency. The af- position, hir- selects the candidate manager the releasing If and the for weighted total scores noting ter the agree, release both ing manager candidate, ployees records the basis for or all employees; each and SGL 32 to 34 or (5) leads, candidate. selecting managers, professionals the chosen and by salary grade clusters. program second instituted at the The River was the Ranked Per- employee rankings Savannah Site for each division Process, Pay or RP3. The formance Site performance are then broken into catego- in 1997 to rank began using program consisting 15%, ries high the middle exempt 80%, and selected overtime em- percent. and the low five Final rank- ployees salary. for merit increases Two ings approved by are manager, division major factors are utilized under the RP3 salary and merit increases are awarded system employees to determine which based on each budget salary division’s and perform- receive merit should raises. Job guidechart. The Human Resources Com- ranking given ance constitutes 75% of the pensation department approve must an employee, remaining and the 25% is merit increases that are outside of the rankings Imperatives. derived from on Site salary guidechart. employees, All regard- Imperatives Site “are the basis of how we ranking less of their percentage, eligi- are employees] expected each are to ac- increases, [Site ble for top merit but the 15% complish objectives of our business may highest receive the merit increases. division, group, company- work as a Another factor that contributes the size Imperatives whole.” The five Site are of a merit increase is whether employ- safety, disciplined operations, cost effec- mid-point ee is above or below the of their tiveness, improvement, continuous and salary For if grade. example, employ- an Imperative teamwork. Each Site is ee is an A performer salary whose level is weighted percent ranking, five the total midpoint salary grade, below the of his he constituting with the total for all five increase, 25% eligible to receive a merit employee’s ranking. of an final may amount of which be different if he is an A performer salary whose level is above system, manager Under the RP3 each midpoint salary grade. of his must use the electronic RP3 evaluation employee worksheet to rate each job In ranking employees per- their for manager’s organization. formance, The evaluation accounts for of an which 75% process begins with the smallest unit of employee’s ranking, the RP3 manual in- organization, department or section. managers following structs to consider the rankings computed Once the initial factors: section, department employees or all expectations Job a single group

within work are ranked Quality quantity of work the next of management. level At the next scope (performance against po- Position division, step, rankings each divi- description) sition manager may integrate sion’s the work Support achieving commitments group rankings ranking to achieve a (managers, peers, Feedback from others employees within the division. The divi- customers) manager may all employees sion rank Awards, recognition Among various combinations. the combi- (leadership, Performance standards suggested by system nations the RP3 judgment) (1) ranking employ- manual are total of all (2) ees; job employee rank within work re separate groups; performance, For (3) (4) leads, “Low,” meaning managers, professionals; rating ceives a of either clusters, i.e., salary all at a grade “[c]onsistently performs SGL 16 em- level below *10 258 rating its lowest “Mid,” panel gave meaning interview “[consis- or

expectations,” employee. a white female score of 129.5 to expecta- the level of tently performs ” “consistently tions,” meaning “High, or for the applied Anderson In Miss expecta- that exceeds at a level performs in Assistant position of Administrative low, mid, or use the Managers also Community tions.” Development Business employees to evaluate their high rankings was Division. Miss Anderson Outreach The RP3 an interview on the basis Imperatives. in the five Site not selected for compe- the functional indicators of her low scores for performance manual lists the Only appli- two position. tencies of the use when determin- managers should in core com- higher scores cants received a employee should receive ing whether Anderson, eight but petencies than Miss mid, low, high imperative. rank for each in func- ratings applicants higher had lawsuit, Anderson com- In Miss her Anderson re- competencies. Miss tional in separate instances plains about three a rating possible a of 59 ceived out subsequently failed sought and which she rating out competencies and a of 9 for core In Miss promotion. a to receive competen- a 57 for functional possible of Ad- position for the applied Anderson contrast, cies, rating a total of 68. for in the Environmen- ministrative Assistant promotion, for the the individual chosen hiring The man- Restoration Division. tal (formerly Miss Brenda Pearson Mrs. Toddings, posted ager, Miss Gail woman, a a white received Boggs), Brenda CBPS, approxi- using the opening possible 72 for core rating of 60 out of posi- for the mately employees applied rating and a of 57 out of competencies Human Resources tion. After the Site’s possible competencies, 57 for functional applications, department evaluated of 117. Mrs. Pearson re- rating a total Tod- were sent to Miss to 40 resumes promotion, ceived the and Miss Anderson assis- outgoing The administrative dings. did not. tant, Miss Curry, Laboris assisted Miss that she alleges Anderson also was Miss evaluating the resumes Toddings from 28 SOP to promotion denied a SGL interview. Miss choosing people position while in her as adminis- SGL 30 the final decision on who Toddings made university in the relations trative assistant interviewed. Miss

would be complains that she told group. She interview, for an and she was selected position current she had to work for the on December interviewed t\yo years she could receive to four before 15, 1997, panel chaired before an interview place. She contends promotion Toddings. panel The interview by Miss promotions received employees white Toddings and Miss selected recommended posi- them place having without to work in Mrs. position. Linda for the Mrs. Clarke years. tions for two to four Clarke, woman, high- received the a white II. rating, a score of

est consensus in- among employees 31, 1997, all of the who were began on October This lawsuit Miss Anderson received fíled a class employees terviewed.1 when ten black Site against the defendants. The rating score of the second-lowest action lawsuit claims under plaintiffs brought ten given by the interview panel. score (JA among King, received scores of 190. highest rating the em- both 190 was the 11107-11108, 11115-11116) King Miss is a position. ployees Mrs. interviewed 11169) (JA Shirley employee, white woman. and another Clarke *11 evidentiary The district court held an alleging VII § 1981 and Title U.S.C. hearing ruling after on the motions for employees black denied the defendants hearing At in the class certification. issue equal basis with white on promotions proposed testimony of Dr. Edwin was discrepan salary maintained employees, Bradley, plaintiffs prospective L. ex- employees, and white cies between black testimony After pert listening witness. training employees access denied black argument, and the district court excluded with white equal on an basis opportunities Bradley’s proposed from evidence Dr. ex- on employees demoted black employees, testimony on the discriminato- pert opinion race, and discriminated the basis their system. ry impact of the RP3 The district by keeping them against employees black testimony court excluded this on the plain The ten .positions. in less desirable grounds that it on was based statistical individual claims for dis brought tiffs also analysis that not research and did have race. on the basis of parate treatment Bradley Dr. proper controls. had conduct- joined the lawsuit as Anderson later Miss regarding sys- l ed several studies the RP3 a tota of 99 individuals plaintiff, instances, Bradley’s tem. In several Dr. plaintiffs. became analysis compared statistical black and certify a sought to class plaintiffs The employees ranking white under the RP3 all current and former black consisting of any system taking without into account who worked employees of the defendants job position. differences their titles or subject will who had been or be the Site court excluded from evi- The district also by the defendants. -After to discrimination copy dence a draft of an assessment of held on the class certi- argument oral Westinghouse’s equal employment oppor- motion, court fication the district denied resources, tunity, employee human proposed the motion “as to the class programs concerns conducted the De- suggested by Plaintiffs.” sub-class Energy. partment of The district court determined that granted court the defen- The district challenges plaintiffs “across the board” summary judgment dants’ motion for as to employee practices the defendants’ did not disparate Miss Anderson’s individual im- satisfy requirements of Rule pact disparate treatment claims. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and were court denied the defendants’ mo- district supported by governing Supreme summary judgment tion for as to Miss and Fourth Circuit case law. Court claim, disparate pay treatment Anderson’s remaining but Miss Anderson had the denying After motion for plaintiffs’ prejudice claim with that she dismissed so certification, class the district court or- pursue appeal. could this plaintiffs pursue dered the their claims individually. Following the district court’s III. instruction, Anderson filed an amend- 26, July complaint ed grant review the district court’s We complaint, brings disparate she claims for summary judgment to the defendants de discrimination, relating novo, to the de- impact viewing the facts and all reasonable sys- and RP3 light fendants’ use of the CBPS therefrom in the inferences drawn pay practices, tems and to the defendants’ to Anderson. See most favorable treatment, Inc., 477 disparate Liberty Lobby, and claims for relat- Anderson v. U.S. 91 L.Ed.2d 202 ing promotions to the three she did not Inc., (1986); v. Giant Food receive. Williams Cir.2004). court’s Summary- for of the district reconsideration F.3d certification, class would be de- ruling on only granted be when should judgment *12 proposed of the failure of the nied because of material genuine no issues there are satisfy requirements of com- classes to moving party is dispute fact in typicality. monality and law. as a matter of judgment to entitled 56(c); v. Walton Green See Fed.R.Civ.P. motion for denying plaintiffs’ After (4th Ford, Inc., 446, 370 F.3d 449 brier certification, court held a class the district Cir.2004). evidentiary issues. At hearing to consider hearing, of the the district the conclusion

IV. defendants’ motion to granted court the mo court denied The district opinion plaintiffs’ of the ex- exclude the 19, July 2000. tion for class certification Bradley, L. about the RP3 pert, Dr. Edwin denying class opinion In its order rankings and about merit increases under certification, court directed the the district system. appeals Anderson the RP3 them cases on plaintiffs proceed with 99 ruling district court’s on the ad- from the The district court an individual basis. address missibility of this evidence. We found these contentions first. Plaintiff in the single

not one named involving asserts claims proposed class V. attacked; rather, programs all of the review a district court’s deci We pattern per- is one of combinations and expert sion to admit or exclude evidence mutations of some Plaintiffs on some v. Merrell Dow Pharma under Daubert and different combinations and claims ceuticals, Inc., 579, 509 U.S. 113 S.Ct. of Plaintiffs on other permutations 2786, (1993), for abuse of 125 L.Ed.2d 469 claims, etcetera. Joiner, v. 522 discretion. Gen. Elec. Co. cannot Slip op. at 48. The district court 136, 138-39, 512, 118 139 U.S. S.Ct. in which certify a class action the class (1997). L.Ed.2d 508 If the district court representative part is not of the class and deciding an evi makes an error law in “ ‘possess does not the same interest and dentiary “by that error is defini question, injury’ suffer the same as the class mem- tion an abuse of discretion.” See Hunter v. Meineke Discount bers.” Broussard Earthgrains Bakery, Co. 281 F.3d Inc., Shops, Muffler (4th Cir.2002). Daubert, the Su Cir.1998) E. (quoting Freight Tex. Motor explained previous that the preme Court Rodriguez, Sys. Inc. v. admissibility of “novel scienti test for the (1977)). 1891, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 Frye fic based on v. United evidence” appeal, argues On the States, (D.C.Cir.1923), 293 F. 1013 district court should have certified two superseded by adoption of the Federal employees dispa- subclasses black with Daubert, 509 Rules of Evidence. U.S. impact involving Compe- claims rate 585-589, 113 S.Ct. tency Posting System Based and the Rule 702 of the Federal Rules Pay Ranked Performance Process. In its provides: of Evidence opinion denying plaintiffs’ motion for technical, certification, scientific, special- If or other class the district court noted subclasses, plaintiffs’ proposed knowledge that the if ized will assist the trier of they timely had been raised fashion fact to understand the evidence or issue, part plaintiffs’ qual- instead of as motion determine a fact a witness skill, applied analyzing expert tors to be testi- expert by knowledge, ified as an education, mony). may or training, experience, opinion of an in the form

testify thereto sought Miss Anderson to introduce into (1) otherwise, testimony is if testimony Bradley’s evidence Dr. about (2) data, facts or upon sufficient based given ratings the differences RP3 product of rehable testimony is the given to those compared blacks as (3) methods, and the wit- principles and report upon whites. The which this testi- principles and applied has ness mony would be based showed that for the facts the case. reliably to the methods years the number of stan- *13 rankings dard between the RP3 deviations party 702. When a seeks Fed.R.Evid. given exempt employees to black and testimony, the district any expert admit - exempt employees white was -2.61 and “gatekeeping.” See obligation court’s 2.14, respectively. making compari- In the Carmichael, v. Kumho Tire Co. sons, Bradley analysis Dr. controlled the 137, 141, L.Ed.2d 238 119 S.Ct. words, job In other Dr. using groups. (1999). district gatekeeper, the the As that, Bradley’s analysis using showed the expert analyze proposed the court should job groups category as the which em- factors, including testimony using several grouped, high- that whites had ployees are can be tested expert opinion whether the than The dis- rankings er RP3 blacks.2 subjected peer it has been and whether analysis wanting. trict court found this 592-94, Daubert, 509 U.S. at review. court found that “the stud- court should also The district S.Ct. 2786. The district they are deficient because use the rate of error of the methods ies consider the job groupings.” During hearing, and employed by expert, the existence EEO job Bradley groups in the ex Dr. testified that could maintenance of standards used methods, occupations. expert’s contain numerous and diverse pert’s and whether Bradley accepted by example, For Dr. admitted under generally methods have been job community. questioning single group Dau that a could respective his or her 2786; bert, job individual separate see contain 147 titles 509 U.S. at separate pay grades. Dr. Crisp, up 324 F.3d and to seven also States v. United Cir.2003) (4th job Bradley single also testified that a (listing Daubert fac- 265-66 testimony Hajoca Corp., 321-22 Bradley's also would have In Herold 2. Dr. 1988), upheld relied on nine other studies that also failed to court’s Cir. we the district job properly compare employees in similar ruling evidence that did to exclude statistical Bradley's positions and Several of Dr. titles. plaintiff who compare the with others not to ensure studies did not have controls similarly plaintiff. were situated to the high rankings percentage of RP3 that the Herold, sought plaintiff to introduce statistical awarded to African-Ameri- merit increases employ of evidence derived from number by by other factors or cans was not influenced company's entire mid- ees terminated in the employees. comparing Other stud- dissimilar region to establish a viola Atlantic in order reviewing increases controlled for ies merit upheld We the district tion of the ADEA. ranking ranking but received or for race "region-wide sta court's to allow such refusal comprise the for the actual factors that Instead, the district tistics” to be admitted. job responsibilities ranking or for the different permitted to introduce sta court may have. that workers in different divisions only from the termi tistical evidence derived Bradley's involving studies RP3 Five of Dr. employees at the defendant’s nations division, rankings compared only by workers branch, plaintiff had been where Staunton division, but, many distinct within a there are employed. 864 F.2d at 321-22. responsibili- positions types of with different ties. job F.3d at 676. also following professors. ti- We group could contain counsel, physician, psy- explained optician, tles: Furthermore, guide- under the chologist. study fact that at issue is the [a]lso system managers using the RP3 lines for faculty included male members who had managers in- employees, to rate are higher positions in paying returned from single important most structed that “[t]he kept administration but VCU any employee’s per- overall component of higher salary. study did not ac completion of formance involves the their This, salary count for this differential. job-related responsibilities. individual to the leads to an according appellants, total weighted This factor is 75% the illogical comparison involving an inflated Those instructions also note evaluation.” members; pool faculty eighty-five job of each the“[r]equirements faculty percent of the whose salaries single is not a stan- unique often —there prior increased because of service were employees all can dard which be mea- administrators male. An inflat as were According to Savannah River sured.” Site validity of a pool ed can undermine the sys- employment policies, ranking the RP3 *14 study to imba statistical determine tem is to be utilized to determine merit lances. employees single within a divi- raises (footnote deleted). at 677 84 F.3d The sion. 1998 and the Savannah study by university upon relied was separate had at least 18 divi- River Site properly it to com- deficient because failed sions, system and the RP3 was to be used pare pro- the salaries of male female and within, employees to rank for merit raises using fessors criteria the universi- across, each and not division. Smith, ty utilized to award raises. See 84 Bradley’s Dr. studies utilized various at (noting F.3d 676-77 that VCU used controls, job group, job performance i.e. performance, productivity, and merit division, categories, job category, EEO ad prior award raises and these factors service, justed years group. of The FLSA salary equity were not considered in the however, studies, compare failed to simiar study). ly situated workers at the Savannah River study by attempted The used VCU Virginia Site. In Smith v. Commonwealth compare paid the salaries to male and University, 84 F.3d 676-77 Cir. professors. professors, female As whether 1996) (en banc), regression we noted that female, faculty male or at was VCU analysis employment utilized in the dis employed to teach and conduct research. crimination context “must include all the deficient, salary equity study, though The major factors” which chal influence the compared paid the salaries of members (em action, lenged ratings as or pay. such profession. Bradley’s the same Dr. stud- Smith in phasis original). plaintiffs The ies, however, ranking evaluate the RP3 professors Virginia were five male Com process by using single job not a title for University brought monwealth who a law comparison, professor, such as but us- challenge pay suit under Title VII to raises job ing groups. during As he admitted given faculty to female members after the evidentiary study hearing, his utilized re- university salary equity study. conducted a Smith, job group, sults from a which could at 674. In we include F.3d reversed the jobs counsel, optician, phy- diverse such as grant summary judg district court’s of sician, psychologist. ratings ment because the district court relied on and The regression analyses performance may that failed to include as counsel be different major all factors that influence the from for a if physician, salaries those even being compared are VI. physician counsel race. of the same Anderson challenges also of and hold that the opinion We are report district decision court’s to exclude did its court not abuse discretion district prepared by Department Energy. testimony excluding Bradley’s Dr. based We a district review court’s decision to analysis. analysis The on his statistical exclude such evidence for abuse of discre comparisons based on were tion. v. Gray, United States 852 F.2d to Miss claims. “The relevant Anderson’s (4th Cir.1988). above, As we noted depends of statistics the sur usefulness district court abuses if its discretion it rounding facts and circumstances.” Car makes law deciding an error of whether (4th Cir.1994) Ball, 450, 456 ter v. Hunter, to admit or exclude evidence. See Int’l Broth. Teamsters v. (citing United 281 F.3d at 150. States, 324, 340, (1977)). L.Ed.2d 396 sought introduce as evi- “Department dence an assessment entitled briefly district stated judge The Energy’s Westinghouse Assessment of decision, clearly the for her with reasons Company’s Equal Savannah River Em- agree: which we ployment Human Opportunity Resources right. THE COURT: All The court and Employee Programs.” Concerns The in limine. court grants motion Department Energy assessed Sa- that the be- finds studies deficient equal employment op- vannah River Site’s they job groupings. use EEO cause diversity portunity programs And the has conceded that the witness *15 and a draft of submitted its assessment to job forms the rating differ within EEO The not fi- Westinghouse. assessment is and groupings, analysis he made no of nal, stamped it “DRAFT” on and is the rating in for the difference the schemes Furthermore, page. first the contents job jobs groupings, within the EEO nor page first page and the of Section IX job purpose group- what the of the EEO Programs), which (Employee Concerns is from of its ings point was the view of uncompleted, that is state Section “to group job to certain kinds of IX decision 2002, together purpose. completed be later.” As of March categories not final ver- had received a Westinghouse purpose nothing That to have seems sion of the assessment. job actual job performance do with or in order to requirements. And evaluate court the de granted The district not disparate impact there is

whether the assessment fendants’ motion exclude ratings, similarly persons situated that it from multi grounds on the suffered being be compared. who are rated must hearsay not within ple levels of and was much simply disparity And there is too under Rule of Evi groups exception been Federal that have used 803(8). control, and an dence The district court also noted absence use of draft, control factor that would control for the was not a final the assessment job job actual title or the duties. val report, probative that the limited by “far outweighed ue of I the draft appear it does to me—and And believe ... numerous trustworthiness concerns has that that could the witness conceded prejudice coupled with the risk of unfair done not have been and was controlled for, allegations based of of events on inclusion grants that reason court given nothing do may have to with the motion. 264 803(8) of the Energy sought

Plaintiff or Defendant.”Rule ment of to document em- excepts from ployee perceptions equal opportunity Federal Rules of Evidence about hearsay reports compiled by “pub programs, rule but the only team interviewed agencies” compliance employees responded lic offices or with who open to an invi- agency’s duty by the office or under law “un tation sent email. Those who were less information or the sources of other interviewed constituted than per- less one indicate lack of trustworthi circumstances cent of the workforce at the Savannah 803(8). Distaff, ness.” Fed.R.Evid. River Site. The assessment team admitted Springfield Contracting Corp., Inc. v. report its that it “did attempt (4th Cir.1993), explained F.2d we verify perception employees” investigative report may that an be admis who were interviewed. In analyzing the 803(8) sible Rule if composition under its contents are racial panels, interview Enters., trustworthy. also Zeus See Inc. v. assessment team based its statistics on a Inc., Alphin Aircraft, 190 F.3d panels. review 30 interview During the (4th (“The Cir.1999) admissibility pub of a period pan- 21-month from which those 30 specified chosen, lic record in the rule is assumed els were the Savannah River Site course, as matter unless there panels utilized about 900 to select candi- negative sufficient factors to positions. indicate a dates for new Of those 900 trustworthiness, lack of in which panels, case it the assessment team thus reviewed admitted.”). should not be may composition Courts the racial of only 3.3% of the look to several factors to if panels. determine “(1) report is admissible: timeliness of admissibility report of a un (2) an investigation; special skill or 803(8) der Rule “permissive and not official; (3) experience of the possible mandatory.” Gray, United States v. problems.” motivational Ellis v. Int’l (4th Cir.1988). F.2d In Gray, we Inc., Playtex, 300-01 held that the district court did not abuse Cir.1984). The court noted several Distaff its refusing discretion to admit under may factors which reveal a lack of trust 803(8) Rule an internal report IRS which

worthiness, namely “unreliability, inade *16 was a “tentative report.” internal 852 quate investigation, inadequate foundation Furthermore, at F.2d 139. the risk of (and) conclusions, jury’s invasion of the unfair prejudice from information con province.” 111 (citing 984 F.2d at Wein report tained the IRS far outweighed its stein, 803(8)). Evidence, § Weinstein’s probative value. Based on the fact that Department A Energy’s review of the factors listed assessment only was a report above reveals that draft and noting district court did mentioned, not abuse its concerns which we have excluding discretion in which assessment. The evidence of the Department of assessment’s lack of Energy’s trustworthiness, investigation began in we opinion 2000 and are of was not hold that completed by March the district court of 2002. The did not abuse draft assessment its discretion in multiple excluding contains the assessment. levels of hearsay as well as referring complaint to a

from an plaintiff individual who is a in a VII. (one companion case this lawsuit Wil A. Hall).

liam The assessment does not have adequate foundation for its Following conclusions. the district court’s order de- certification, assessment team from the Depart- nying class Miss Anderson

265 brief, individually. have affirmed. In her we Miss with her lawsuit proceeded Miss that Complaint, acknowledges Anderson she cannot In Fourth Amended her ranking sys- impact RP3 on her claim in- prevail disparate claims impact disparate system have a Dr. volving and the CBPS the RP3 without Brad- tem race. on the basis of employees ley’s testimony. black Anderson did not Miss challenges Miss Anderson appeal, impact On her RP3 claim in disparate address summary granting decision court’s except district that she wishes to her brief note dispa- to the defendants on judgment if court’s the claim the district evi- pursue claims. impact rate dentiary ruling Bradley’s testimony on Dr. affirmed the district is reversed. We have first at Miss Anderson’s lookWe evidentiary and our affir- ruling, court’s has a ranking system RP3 claim that the admittedly mance forecloses Miss To impact employees. on black disparate chance for success on her RP3 Anderson’s disparate prima a facie case establish impact disparate claim.3 VII, a Title discrimination under impact facially neu “show that the plaintiff must B. significant a practice had employment

tral City discriminatory impact.” v. ly Walls address Anderson’s dispa- We next Miss 188, Petersburg, 895 F.2d Cir. impact involving claim the CBPS. rate On 1990) Teal, v. 457 U.S. (citing Connecticut argues she that the district court appeal, 440, 446, L.Ed.2d 130 102 S.Ct. that she had es- concluding erred (1982)). prima a If a establishes by requiring causation her to tablished case, dem employer “the must then facie instead of prove intentional discrimination ‘any given requirement [has] onstrate impact review de a claim. We disparate relationship employment to the manifest challenge district novo her to the court’s finding in order to avoid a question,’ summary judgment. granting order Teal, 446-47, 457 U.S. discrimination.” Williams, 370 F.3d at 428. Duke (quoting Griggs S.Ct. two Anderson contends as- Co., Power disparate impact pects of the CBPS have (1971)). “Even such L.Ed.2d First, employees. challenges she on black if case, however, plaintiff may prevail, applicants stage where CBPS employer using he that the shows interview, and, second, for an are selected pretext a mere discrimina practice as the inter- challenges stage she where Teal, 447, 102 S.Ct. tion.” 457 U.S. at candidate for the panel view chooses the steps after an These interview. establishing facie viola prima *17 9, 12, # 13 in as # # are listed VII, plaintiff may Title use statis tion of on pages found description CBPS Walls, 191 See F.2d at tical evidence. 895 opinion. this Miss Anderson 255-56 of City York Transit Auth. (citing New objects subjectivity inherent alleged 1355, Beazer, 568, 584, 59 440 U.S. 99 S.Ct. steps in in’these the CBPS. (1979)). case, the 587 In this L.Ed.2d of By her these Bradley’s excluded testi identification district court Dr. assume, CBPS, arguendo, in the we steps on statistical evidence which mony based disparate appeal, claim is RP3 sued this on Anderson withdrew her success Miss impact claim after the court excluded evidentiary district dependent on our on the decision Bradley’s testimony on his statisti- based Dr. issue. result, pur- although As a she cal evidence. 266 complied panel

that Miss Anderson has with the as to the candidate who received a And, that a a position being Court’s instruction that was filled. at the disparate impact identify must case stage, example, interview selection for edu- specific employment practice being that is experience cation and are two factors that challenged. v. Fort Worth See Watson Bradley’s analysis Dr. quantify. fails to Trust, 977, 994, Bank & Furthermore, at stages each of the two (1988) 2777, (plurality L.Ed.2d which challenges Miss Next, opinion). Miss Anderson must CBPS, person pan the discretion of the prove at causation. 487 U.S. making el the decision unfettered. S.Ct. 2777. must show that She At step, each the decision maker must look practices dispa- above-mentioned caused a to the competencies core listed in the impact rate at employees black the Site. CBPS manual and the specific functional causation, To establish competencies, specifically which are chosen pro Anderson relies on statistical evidence position. for each At the stage, interview Bradley vided Dr. about the CBPS. She panel of three interviewers must evalu argues Bradley’s that Dr. statistical evi ate the candidate and must address each possibility dence ruled out the that chance core competency. and functional disparate caused a impact on black em on which cases Miss Anderson relies to ployees. Bradley analyzed Dr. had support her claim that causation has been percentage employees of black who were proven supervisors involves possessed who successful under the CBPS at three unfettered employment discretion to make (1) stages: qualified selection as posi for a Watson, decisions. See at U.S. (2) tion from all apply; candidates who 108 S.Ct. 2777 (noting that Title VII selected for an qualified interview from all apply should to “an employer’s undisci (3) candidates; and posi selected plined system subjective decisionmak tion from all interviewed candidates. Dr. ing”); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Bradley compared the of black percentage (2d R.R., Cir.1999) (not 191 F.3d employees actually who succeeded each ing challenged promotion policy di level with percentage which expect he managers rected “to hire quali the most succeed, ed to percentage based on the candidate, fied but no other instructions employees black at the Site. He found that given” and that managers have unfet percentage applicants black who tered hiring discretion over po certain actually succeeded at step each was much sitions); Mozee v. Am. Commercial Ma expected. lower than he From that evi Co., rine Serv. 1042 n. 6 dence, which does not account for (7th Cir.1991) (explaining promotion variables, other argues Miss Anderson leadman, position to the which was a proven. that causation is prerequisite promotion to a manage agree. ment, We do not This evidence entirely does “was left management’s not show that discretion, the reason black applicants it seniority since fell outside the proceed failed to at the interview bidding system selection applicable hourly to most stage stage selection employment positions”); Rose v. Wells *18 Co., (9th their race. presentation Factors such as Fargo & 902 F.2d 1424 interview, Cir.1990) in the answers to interview (noting that Fargo “Wells admits demeanor, questions, ability and demon- process job the of elimination and strated the interview of course entered restaffing discretionary was otherwise and judgment into the of subjective”). the members of the The decision makers at the

267 the the trier of fact persuading of with the comply to required were Site intentionally discriminated core and defendant which, the use of CBPS, through at all time plaintiff the. remains against which all against competencies functional ” Murrell, 262 F.3d at evaluated, plaintiff.’ limits the with the must be applicants omitted). (internal citation decisionmakers. 257 to available discretion Miss on which cases Accordingly, the correctly stated district court As the of hardly supportive relies Anderson dis promote the 1997 failure to regarding com- only relevant the position, her claim, Anderson Miss parate treatment that the is process to the makes plaint she re that the suggest “does not comments white. makers were decision are false or interview form corded on her from evi- did not bar her actual court of misleading representations The district that there conclusion at 5. Fur Bradley’s Slip op. Dr. responses.” interview dence disparate impact ther, failed to address her might be evidence Miss Anderson stage interview disclosed hiring stages in terms of the qualifications two —the correctly rejected stage factors. weighted competency the selection —and prep- the claimed that his conclusion that on her the claim focuses Anderson instead the Hu- eligibles by qualifi list of aration of the of minimum satisfaction higher level, might be sub- department cations, man as her education Resources such objection. high racial a Title VII to with ject opposed to MBA as others education, more performance her school without argument, We assume duties, years of administrative secretarial has shown Anderson deciding, that Miss recognition, awards and her numerous court the district because prima facie case received recognition which exceeded as to Bradley’s conclusions Dr. did not bar court The district other interviewees. inter respect to the impact with disparate may these opinion that “[w]hile found its stage. So the selection stage view believes by which Anderson the criteria be circum proffered is whether question Anderson judged, been- should have she discriminatory impact evidence stantial that WSRC any has not offered evidence satisfy to is sufficient McDonnell up made particular individuals who or the Murrell v. proof. framework Douglas time, have, any applied at panel the CBPS Inc., Motel, Mecca Ocean Slip op. a set of standards.” such Cir.2001). Doug See McDonnell reasons, simply not pretext these For Green, 411 U.S. Corp. las it support to no evidence as there'is shown (1973). this Under 36 L.Ed.2d claim. regarding framework, first estab plaintiff must -point similarly fails Miss Anderson facie case of discrimination. prima lish a the con- support would any evidence that with respond must Then defendant rating higher that she deserved clusion legitimate, it acted with evidence that Murrell, evaluated any of the areas 262 on nondiscriminatory reason. assistant. administrative promotion this makes If the defendant F.3d at 257. provide fails evidence She also “present must showing, then abili- of her evidence panel overlooked ar prove that defendant’s evidence to applica- her contained in in the ties areas for unlawful pretext ticulated reason Rather, application, the 1997 as with Murrell, tion. F.3d at 257. discrimination.” quali- supposed greater focuses on shift she evidentiary burdens “Although the employ- years of of total fications terms McDonnell under and forth back Again, Miss ment or education. framework, burden ‘[t]he ultimate Douglas *19 268 (3) proffered suggest position

has not evidence to in question, qualified she was (4) legitimate by reason offered for position, WSRC for that the defendants hiring pretextual. its decision is rejected application under circum give stances rise to an inference of pretext So has not been shown for either unlawful Bryant, discrimination. See 333 the 1997 or 1998 claim the decision of 544-45; Carter, F.3d at 33 F.3d at If 458. the district court affirmed. is established, prima facie case is the bur den then shifts “to employer to articu VIII. late legitimate, nondiscriminatory some We turn next to Miss Anderson’s indi- reason” for promote. the decision not to disparate vidual treatment claims. Her 802, McDonnell 411 Douglas, U.S. at 93 first claim relates to her December 1817; S.Ct. Bryant, see 333 F.3d at 545. application position administra- After the employer states a reason for its tive assistant the Environmental Resto- decision, Miss Anderson opportuni has the Division, Project ration Administration De- ty to show that the stated reason is a partment. Miss Anderson claims that the discrimination, pretext for see McDonnell promote defendants failed to her on the 804, Douglas, 1817, U.S. 93 S.Ct. Clarke, basis of her race. Linda a white and the trier of fact must if determine employee, received the promotion instead proved has employer that the in of Miss Anderson. Her claim a dispa- tentionally against discriminated her be rate treatment claim. cause of her Bryant, race. 333 F.3d at 545 prevail disparate To on a treat 1137, 1141 (citing Phipps, Fuller v. 67 F.3d ment claim promote, for failure to Miss (4th Cir.1995)). Anderson must establish that she was Miss Anderson applied for the position favorably treated less because of her race. of administrative assistant in the Environ- See Int'l Broth. Teamsters v. United Division, mental Project Restoration Ad-

States, 324, 15, 431 U.S. 335 n. Department ministration in November of 1843, (1977); 52 L.Ed.2d 396 Carter v. 1997. She interviewed for the Ball, 450, Cir.1994). 33 F.3d 456 n. 7 15, December 1997. The panel interview In. order to prima establish a facie case of rated Miss Anderson on the six core com- racial in promotions discrimination under (teamwork, petencies leadership, communi- VII, § 1981 or Title Miss must cations, employee development, business follow the burden-shifting framework out results, management) and self and four by lined Supreme Court McDonnell (customer competencies focus, functional Green, Douglas 792, Corp. v. flexibility, problem solving, (1973). profession- S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d 668 See alism). Based on Bryant Inc., responses, her interview Reg. Aiken Med. Ctrs. (4th Cir.2003).4 panel gave F.3d Miss Anderson a 544-45 total con- Under framework, rating sensus Douglas employee McDonnell 136. The who promoted, Clarke, Anderson can prima establish a facie Linda case white wom- (1) an, showing that she is member of a received a total rating consensus (2) protected group, applied she ” Bryant

4. The court § noted that Bryant, "[i]n failure-to- or both statutes.' 333 F.3d this, promote cases such as 'the framework of (quoting Mallory at 545 n. 3 Refrig. v. Booth proof disparate treatment claims ... is the Co., (4th Cir.1989)). Supply VII, brought same for actions under Title

269 reasons, by the the primary employer, con annunciated Miss Anderson’s why she had more appeal plaintiff pro- that did not tentions the receive the Dennis, at experience and more the Sa education at motion. 290 F.3d 648-649 & n. than Mrs. Clarke and vannah River Site plainly apply “Reeves instructs us to a rating Miss was that Anderson’s consensus by contrary approach affirming Evans [to ] work low based on her evaluations permissible that it is for the trier fact to of numerous awards and commendations. infer ultimate fact of the discrimination Linda Clarke to panel The interview chose falsity from of employer’s explana- promotion because she was receive the Dennis, tion.” 290 (citing F.3d at 648 4n. quals. based on and in candidate “[b]est 2097). Reeves, 147, 530 U.S. at 120 S.Ct. show this terview.” Anderson must that Miss Anderson cannot establish pretext reason for racial discrimina her judging qualifica own criteria for her Hicks, Mary’s v. tion. See St. Honor Ctr. promotion. tions for the She com must 511, 502, 2742, 125 pete promotion quali for the based on the (1993). In v. L.Ed.2d 407 Reeves Sander by employer. fications established See Inc., Products, 530 Plumbing son U.S. Labs., 614, Beall Abbott v. 130 F.3d 620 147, 133, 2097, 120 147 L.Ed.2d 105 S.Ct. (1997) (“[A]bsent retaliatory of evidence (2000), Supreme explained Court that a motive, employer’s leave we to the discre plaintiff may pretext proving establish tion evaluating employ the method of an explanation for an defendant’s job performance.”); ee’s see also Jiminez “unworthy of employment decision is cre Coll., 369, Washington 57 Mary F.3d explanation or that the defendant’s dence” (4th Cir.1995) (“The in a 383 crucial issue Reeves also is false. The Court noted circumstances, unlawfully Title action is VII discrimi appropriate trier “[i]n conduct, reasonably natory fact can from the motive for of infer falsi a defendant’s of the ty explanation employer folly that the is not the wisdom its business discriminatory dissembling up to cover judgment.”). 147, at purpose.” 530 U.S. 120 S.Ct. 2097. assume, arguendo, that Miss We

We followed Reeves Dennis v. Columbia prima has facie case of Anderson stated Center, Inc., Colleton Medical 290 F.3d question racial discrimination. The on her (4th Cir.2002), 4 648-49 & n. promote thus first claim for failure to plaintiff that a in a failure to determined issue In pretext. turns on the order promote necessarily required case is not prevail, Miss must direct us to Anderson Technologies meet test Evans v. which indicates that the defen evidence Co., Applications & 80 Service F.3d promoting dants’ stated reasons Mrs. (4th Cir.1996), “must Miss a pretext Clarke over Anderson were qualified establish that she was the better for discrimination. Evans, position sought.” candidate for the (citing Dep’t had,an F.3d at v. Va. Gairola executive secre Servs., 753 F.2d Gen. bachelor, tary diploma and a of science Cir.1985); Lehman, Young v. degree management in human resource (4th Cir.1984)). for, applied position time she ni Environ administrative assistant rig- Dennis instructs that we should not Division, Project Ad mental Restoration idly apply compar- the Evans standard for close Department. She was plaintiffs with ministration ing qualifications those admin finishing her masters business person promotion, who received- the re- veracity of istration. The minimum educational may but we also consider the quirements high position. contrast, were a Miss Anderson had *21 diploma school to eight years and twelve of only eight years of experience as a secre- practical experience in a business or ad- tary Anderson, at the Site. While Miss area, degree ministrative or an associate in years with seven experience of secretarial discipline nontechnical or business with and typist stenographer, twelve as a or has years at least four practical to seven longer total tenure at the Site than Mrs. experience in a business administrative Clarke, she cannot choose the criteria area, or a degree bachelor’s in a nontechni- employer which an promotion makes a de- cal or discipline business and at least one Beall, cision. See 130 F.3d at 619-20. to years practical three experience in Regarding experience, the posting CBPS business, administrative, budgeting, or of the explained that experience program planning. Miss Anderson ex- was a minimum requirement, and not a ceeded requirements, the educational in deciding factor the application process. she had more education than Linda Furthermore, the deciding factor in the Clarke, only high who diplo- had school promotion decision was the rating for core However, ma. educational qualifications, and functional competencies that ap- each while listed the minimum requirements plicant who was interviewed received. section of the administrative assistant com- Mrs. Clarke highest score, received the petency posting system job based descrip- 190, and Miss Anderson received tion, the sec- were not among the factors that the score, ond-lowest 136. A comparison of panel interview used to determine each forms, rating the two compiled applicant’s by the consensus rating. As a result same panel, interview indicates that defendants’ decision to base the panel promotion found Mrs. Clarke to superior decision on the be the core and func- tional competencies candidate. Miss job attempts listed Anderson’s de- to scription and not show that system, on the educational levels CBPS which creates applicants, Miss Anderson rely cannot consensus rating system upon which on her educational background promotion based, to establish decision was discrim- that the defendants’ reasons promoting for against inates employees black also are Mrs. Clarke a pretext for discrimina- unsuccessful. This contention is based on Beall, 620; Jiminez, tion. See 130 F.3d at Dr. Bradley’s study comparing per- 57 F.3d at may 383. Miss Anderson not centage of black employees who are suc- choose the areas which she wants to cessful at three separate steps in the compete with Mrs. for pro- Clarke expected CBPS percentage of suc- motion; those areas are for the employer’s cessful black candidates based on the total choosing. percentage of employees black at the Site. As we previously, discussed study

Miss this Anderson fails contends that she has to consider the experience more various factors at that are the Savannah River promotion involved in a Site than Mrs. Clarke. At the decision. It time of her does application prove promotion the CBPS administrative discriminates against assistant black employees Environmental Restoration on the basis of Division, race, Project Depart- Administration Miss Anderson cannot use it to ment, years Mrs. Clarke avoid summary judgment had 15 of secre- on her 1997 fail- experience tarial prior beginning promote ure to work claim. We opinion are of at the Savannah River being Site. After the district court did not err in grant- Site, hired at the she had years ing seven summary judgment to the defendants experience at the time applied she for the on this claim. employer choosing when the of her teria involves claim next

Miss Anderson’s grounds. other See based its decision ad- promotion for a in 1998 application Jiminez, 620; Beall, F.3d at De- in the Business ministrative assistant Divi- Community Outreach velopment and was not selected Miss

sion. that she next contends Miss Anderson woman, Mrs. interview, a white by showing that pretext established Pearson, was selected Brenda Wolfe, manager to.receive hiring Virginia *22 contends Miss Anderson promotion. Develop- the in the Business promotion 1998 due promotion Division, the receive Community that she did not Outreach ment and pro- for the her race. Pearson Mrs. preselected promotion the deci- At the time motion. as we pretext turns on again The issue made, was a secre- Mrs. Pearson sion was has assume, that Miss Anderson arguendo, Wolfe, along tary reported who Miss racial facie case of prima established func- The individuals. eight with other Anderson appeal, Miss On discrimination. which Miss position for tions of the pretext be- she established contends that were, the selec- prior to applied Anderson back- stronger educational cause she has Pearson, being performed by tion of Mrs. Pearson, the defen- that than Mrs. ground secretary position as a her Mrs. Pearson for the Mrs. Pearson pre-selected dants reporting to Miss Wolfe. to Miss ratings given that the position, stage supervisor in the interview selection that a argument Anderson The they do for a employee because an may preselected discrimination have evidence per- Anderson’s evidence for to Miss not sufficient correspond promotion “is not also re- that the Anderson conclude” reasonably Miss jurors reviews. formance contention, hiring Mrs. we have re- for explanation which the defendants’ iterates Shalala, Mackey v. prextext. the CBPS discriminates Pearson was jected, that Cir.2004). (4th “If seeking pro- employees F.3d 468-69 black against for unfairly preselected was employee one at the Site. motions would work preselection the position, the stronger Anderson has Miss While all applicants to the detriment Pear- Mrs. background than educational Blue v. alike.” Unit job, white black and minimum re- son, as is listed education F.2d Army, 914 the ed States Dep’t of not a and is position the for quirement Cir.1990). (4th noted court Blue determining who re- deciding factor may that establish preselection that while Pearson re- promotion. Mrs. ceives treated, “unfairly it does was employee an had a because she promotion ceived the racial prove discrimination.” not itself the core and rating consensus on higher v. United (citing Casillas 914 F.2d at position competencies functional Cir. F.2d Navy, 735 States Burch, employee Judy the other than Miss 1984) (“Title the best not VII does ensure The selec- promotion. interviewed for selection only that will be selected— also for interviews applicants tion of impermissible free from will be process func- core on evaluation based discrimination.”)) educational competencies, on tional before, final conten Anderson’s Miss we Miss backgrounds. As noted promotion is that the 1998 regarding criteria on choose tion may not Anderson interview to her in ratings given Mrs. compete with which wishes she because pretext Moreover, stage establish she selection promotion. Pearson for the evaluation positive they not reflect on cri- do by relying pretext cannot establish during performance she received her drogen technology group. Again, re the issue argument question pretext. views. Miss Anderson’s turns asks us process by to review the which the defen must establish that there employees promotion. dants select genuine is a issue of material fact as to the any Miss Anderson has not introduced evi why defendants’ stated reason for she did dence that performance reviews were promotion place not receive a to SGL 30 hiring manager submitted to the who se SOP. The defendants have introduced affi- applicants lected for an interview. With davits from three compensation analysts proof out hiring manager had who recommended that Miss Anderson’s performance access to Miss Anderson’s re position remain a position SGL 28 SOP views, there is no basis to conclude instead of a SGL 30 SOP as hiring manager was even aware of the 1999. Miss Anderson does not direct us to positive suggests comments Miss Anderson evidence which had re these *23 analysts ceived on performance by her reached their evaluations. conclusions im- Furthermore, properly performance considering evaluation race instead of the actual responsibilities is review of an of employee’s performance Miss Anderson’s position. position, attempts her current Miss Anderson process rely while the on her of own affidavit to selecting person promotion genuine create a in fact, issue of material nothing but volves a that her employ consideration of how affidavit analysts’ controverts the analysis ee will perform position. in a different position of her words, suggests that other the ana- performance evaluation lysts by were motivated racism to refuse the interview stage, selection which qualify position her aas SGL 30 SOP analysis involves an of how the applicant position. meets the core and functional competen cies position open, are not Miss Anderson attempts to estab interchangeable. We do not sit as a “su pretext by lish comparing herself with two per-personnel department weighing the employees white who promotions received prudence employment made decisions” in place within years two of entering their by the defendants. DeJarnette v. Corn position. current argument This fails to Inc., ing, Cir.1998). pretext. establish Miss Anderson seeks to require

We cannot supervi different compare employees herself to who hold sors within the same organization must positions that are dissimilar to her own. reach the same conclusion on an employ The first white employee, Craig Stripling, qualifications ee’s and abilities. is an engineer associate promoted who was from SGL to28 SGL 30 after working as (cid:127) opinion We are of that the district court an associate technical support specialist for did not err in granting summary judgment less than years. second, two Michelle to the defendants on Miss Anderson’s 1998 Trill, a consultant, human resources promote failure to claim. promoted six times between 1989 and Miss Anderson’s final disparate treat- 1995. These two employees white worked ment promote failure to claim centers on separate divisions from Miss Anderson her failure to promotion receive a in place and had responsibilities. different Their from SGL 28 SOP to SGL 30 At SOP. promotions could be based on factors that sought time she promotion, this she was an may not present be in Miss Anderson’s administrative assistant the university position. The fact that the employ white relations group within hy- the chemicals ees promotions received and Miss subclasses, certify two one com failing not, job require- when the did

Anderson employees were Site who for the white of black posed responsibilities ments the CBPS and against from Miss under different discriminated employees pretext. who Anderson’s, employees not establish of black Site composed does one the RP3 against under were discriminated that the further claims Miss not a member Anderson is system. Miss em- two white of these rapid promotions As the two we of either of subclasses. poli- of a in violation Site occurred ployees above, all Miss discussed have in- pay do not receive employees cy that claims, based on whether Anderson’s in their have been they unless creases disparate treatment impact or disparate years. -more than two position current merit, and the district are without theory, on a state- this claim bases Miss Anderson summary judgment granted manager properly court made to her ment the claims. usually until given the defendants each were “promotions voluntarily for two has dismissed in a had been Miss Anderson employee statement, which con- after the years.” This claim which remained to four the one “usually,” coupled with mo qualifier ruled on defendants’ tains court district Stripling Trill and were disparate that Miss summary judgment, the fact tion for years experience two Accordingly, without promoted claim. pay merit treatment pre- not establish does positions, in their longer has valid Anderson no manager informed Miss Anderson’s text. in this Cox v. Bab case.In pending claims *24 his statement policy, usual but (4th her Co., Cir. 471 F.2d Wilcox cock & exist. exceptions do the fact reflects 1972), in v. Schlesin and later Goodman (4th Cir.1978), con we F.2d 1325 ger, 584 pro- did not receive Anderson Miss issue. almost the same sidered job responsi- place in motion because such an increase. not bilities did warrant Cox, that he was plaintiff alleged the In which any evidence us has not shown She under unlawful discrimination subject to pretext reason was suggests this of the defen- practices employment the pretext. See jury could infer from which plaintiff at 14. The dant. (noting jury that a 333 F.3d at Bryant, and class action brought both individual “the based on infer discrimination could to proceeded The district court claims. Bryant the deny to any reason lack of real in a claims plaintiffs individual try the case, the defendant has In this job”). advisory jury without trial with bench did why Miss Anderson a reason stated class action plaintiffs ruling on the first and Miss promotion, receive trial, the district the After bench claims. it. to controvert unable has Anderson been individual the plaintiffs dismissed court court that the district opinion are of We the defendant concluding that after claims judgment summary granting in did not err discrimination. illegal practiced had not dis- on Miss Anderson’s to the defendants court then 14. The district F.2d at promote failure treatment parate claims class action plaintiffs dismissed place claim. any individu- without plaintiff, because represen- claims, class proper not a al IX. rulings appealed both The tative. the district appeals Anderson court. this mo- denying plaintiffs’ court’s decision , the district we affirmed appeal On she appeal, On for class certification. tion individual plaintiffs court’s dismissal court the district erred argues that at Turning claims. F.2d 14-15. next ances similar to plaintiffs appeal], [the claims, plaintiffs to the class we noted person, present prosecute himself to - remanding awkwardness of class representative. the action as class Good- man, court claims the district where the 584 F.2d at 1332-1333. We followed plaintiff, “finally although adjudged not to procedure again Goodman and Cox Brown, be a of the class he member seeks to in Simmons v. 611 F.2d 65 Cir.1979). represent,” would nonetheless continue to prosecute the class claims in the district appeal, On Miss Anderson seeks to be a upon court remand. 471 F.2d at 15-16. representative class separate two sub

We remanded class claims to the dis- classes based on the defendants’ use of the trict court and instructed the district court systems. CBPS and RP3 Her claims have to hold the open docket for the class claims mooted, not been but instead have been case plaintiffs presented prop- other adjudged to be without merit. Miss against er claims the defendant. 471 F.2d Anderson has no give valid claims which at 16. her “the same interest” and cause her to Goodman, the district court denied injury” “suffer the same proposed as the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification class members she represent. seeks to grounds on the plaintiffs did not E. Freight Sys., See Tex. Motor Inc. v. comply requirements with the of Rule 23 Rodriguez,

of the Federal Rules of Civil (1977). Procedure. 52 L.Ed.2d 453 584 F.2d at 1327. At trial plaintiffs’ on the claim of Miss Anderson on claims, individual the district court found appeal respect with to the denial of certifi against the plaintiffs and denied their indi- cation of a class action clearly stated: vidual claims. 584 F.2d 1329-1331. On appeals the District Court’s appeal, plaintiffs challenged the dis- denial of certification of two subclasses trict rulings court’s on both the denial of employees African-American with *25 class certification and the dismissal of the (1) (2) claims based on the CBPS and individual claims. the RP3. We affirmed the plain- dismissal of the there, claim, respect With to the RP3 is tiffs’ individual claims and noted that the no indication or claim of successful plaintiffs day “have had their in court” to prosecution of that claim without the re- pursue their individual claims. 584 F.2d at jected testimony of Dr. Bradley, who was 1331. Turning issue, to the certification examined in open court the district the court determined that the district judge parties. and the The denial of the court prematurely acted in declining to district certify court to a class action with certify the class action because the district respect to procedure the RP3 according- is court ruled on the question certification ly affirmed. prior completion to the discovery. of Cox, F.2d at Following in Goodman respect claim, to With the CBPS we we remanded the class action express issue to the opinion no question on the district court but plain- instructed that the whether or part not some of Miss tiffs in appeal the might pursue not claim relating Anderson’s to the adminis- Instead, class claims on remand. the dis- tration of system that of career advance- trict court should retain the job case on the ment availability may or be a colorable docket for a permit claim, reasonable time to class although none has been shown proper plaintiff plaintiffs, or griev- with say here. We this because of the decision testimony, excluding the De- expert Dr. RP3 to respect court with

of the district assessment, draft and partment Energy denied the testimony in which it Bradley’s testimony “from the defen- summary judgment to the granting to exclude motion from stage, and dispa- the interview individual to on Miss Anderson’s qualified dants stage,” stage to the selection interview claims disparate and treatment impact rate motion to exclude granted the but it of a class action The denial affirmed. qual- stage to the testimony pool “from the is af- respect procedure to the RP3 with court held simply, the stage.” Stated ified firmed, action as is the denial of class that not evidence did show that procedure, with respect with to CBPS have might Department Resources Human part of the CBPS exception of those preparing in the list discriminated just This action is noted above. procedure job but openings qualified keep the to the district court to remanded if might be admissible evidence statistical time, docket for a reasonable same on the of discrim- possibility show the it to tended if to determine there with instructions applicants who selecting in those ination maintain a who to plaintiff another wishes selecting and be interviewed would principles under the estab- class action inter- job among from those person re- Goodman we have Cox lished viewed. ferred to. opinion no on whether express we While PART, IN IN VACATED AFFIRMED may fail for want the class action or not PART, IN- REMANDED WITH AND we remand to typicality, or commonality STRUCTIONS. of whether question court the the district to action should be permitted or a class NIEMEYER, concurring Judge, Circuit “qualified to the respect with

proceed part: dissenting interview in stage, part and from the the interview Upon re- stage.” stage to the selection Judge pleased am to concur Widen- I with plaintiffs if mand, proper opinion well reasoned thorough er’s of Miss grievances similar those court’s affirms the district insofar as it respect discrete with a re- agree I cannot with judgment. But procedure presents of the CBPS portion if there is another mand “to determine himself, a class as prosecute, himself maintain a class wishes to plaintiff who should court representative, district action.” is main- a class action then whether decide *26 named the then and whether tainable cognizable has no plaintiff Because the class. We represent should plaintiff claim, to represent is not in a she any, if weight, as to the express opinion no her claims because either a class of others testimony or whether Bradley’s Dr. give to are, or, they if others of the typical If no representative it is admissible. merit. likewise have no others’ claims a reason- forward within so comes plaintiff raises Judge Widener problem The time, the district court should able then would, my judgment, be in Part IX calendar action from the the class strike plain- other just as well some resolved final dismissal thereof. Good- and enter a case, or her tiff, alleging his this not in man, 1332-33. it as seeking prosecute to claim and own X. case, would I As for this class action. affirm- opinion with our consider it ended above, the district Accordingly, as stated court. the district judgment of Bradley’s ing the excluding Dr. decision court’s By remanding gitimate non-discriminatory this case the district rationale was plaintiff, only pretext racially court with no we can be mere for a discriminatory inviting new claims—different from those decision. rejected in have this case—to be we agree Because I cannot with either of plaintiff of a un- filed behalf new contentions, respectfully these I dissent specified This is not the others. situation particular part majority from that plaintiffs

where a claims have been dis- opinion. deficiency, missed on a technical and we allowing

would be another without I. deficiency to continue the case. Rath- Rights Under Title YII of the Civil Act er, plaintiffs we have a case where the of 1991: claims were dismissed because the claims It shall employment be an unlawful short, themselves were deficient. there practice for an employer' nothing perpetuate on remand. —(cid:127) (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to dis- I Accordingly, respectfully dissent from individual, charge any or otherwise to remedy Part IX and the remand contained against any discriminate individual with Otherwise, in Part X. I concur in this fine terms, respect compensation, to his con- opinion. ditions, privileges or of employment, be- race, color, cause of such individual’s GREGORY, Judge, Circuit dissenting sex, religion, or origin; national or part: (2) limit, segregate, classify his Although I agree with most of the ma- employees or applicants employment jority’s analysis, I write separately because in any way which deprive would or tend I cannot concur in disparate impact deprive any individual employment VII(B). analysis There, part contained in opportunities or adversely otherwise af- majority grant summary affirms a fect his status as an employee, because judgment against Ms. Anderson on her race, color, of such religion, individual’s disparate impact claim despite the fact sex, origin. or national produced that she evidence showing sta- (2005). § 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 incep- From tistically significant variation between the tion, it was clear that the act covered cases number of apply African-Americans who disparate party treatment —where one and the number who are successful at both intentionally was against by discriminated the second stages and third of the CBPS. employer race, color, on the basis of majority first finds that because Ms. sex, religion, or national origin. Int. See Anderson’s evidence challenging the sub- States, Bhd. Teamsters v. United jective nature of the second and third U.S. n. stages of the CBPS failed to control for all (1977) (“Undoubtedly L.Ed.2d 396 dispa- subjective variables potentially taken into rate treatment most obvious evil account hiring interview and deci- *27 Congress had in mind when it enacted sions, she failed to establish the causation VII.”). Title prima element of her facie burden. Sec- ond, majority However, finds that if even Ms. in the seminal Griggs case of Co., Anderson had in fact prima satisfied her 424, 431, v. Duke Power 91 burden, facie 849, her claims (1971), would fail because S.Ct. 28 L.Ed.2d 158 Court she requisite cannot make the McDonnell held proscribes that Act only “[t]he Douglas showing that Westinghouse’s le- overt practices discrimination but also that

277 Upon successfully presenting 2777. discriminatory op in S.Ct. form, in but are fair case, facie the burden then shifts prima F.3d a Jenney, 327 Peters v. See eration.” Cir.2003) (“Title (4th employer to “demonstrate that the to the 307, VII n. 17 321 job related for the challenged practice not intentional practices that prohibits in and position question consistent with disparate have a that ly discriminatory but § 42 necessity.” U.S.C. 2000e- racial business particular of a on members impact 2(k)(l)(a)(i); City see v. Peters Title VII Walls in As amended group.”). of F.2d 191 Cir. burg, 895 disparate impact recognizes explicitly now 1990)(“[T]he 2000e-2(k). must then demon employer § Section claims. U.S.C. a 2000e-2(k) ‘any given requirement [has] that strate as follows: states in relationship employment to the manifest (1)(A) practice employment An unlawful to avoid a question,’ finding order impact is established disparate on based discrimination.”). Finally, if the em even if—only subchapter this under that the showing makes a ployer sufficient (i) demonstrates complaining party a related,” “job practice is challenged em- particular a respondent a 'uses may prevail by showing the plaintiff exis dispa- causes a practice that ployment equally an effective tence of alternative race, color, on the basis impact rate im disparate practice that eliminates sex, and the origin or national religion, adopt to and the refuses pact employer that the to fails demonstrate respondent § this alternative. U.S.C. 2000e- job related challenged practice is 2(k)(l)(a)(2); Chicago, City see Allen with and consistent question (7th Cir.2003)(“If 311-12 necessity; or business showing, plaintiffs defendant makes this (ii) party makes the complaining demonstrating prevail can still subpara- described demonstration exists, practice employment alternative (C) an alternative respect with graph it.”). adopt and the defendant refuses respondent and the employment practice alternative em- adopt such refuses II. ployment practice. majority, I believe Contrary to the 2000e-2(k). §

42 U.S.C. satisfy prima in fact Anderson did Ms. treat analysis disparate to its Similar im- disparate for a Title VII facie burden laid out a ment, has Supreme Court Therefore, I will address claim. each pact im disparate shifting scheme burden in turn. analysis step of v. Fort Worth See Watson pact actions. 977, 994-95, Trust, Bank U.S. A. (1988). 2777, 101 Under L.Ed.2d 827 S.Ct. earlier, step first estab- As noted burden-shifting disparate impact case is the identifica- lishing prima a facie

scheme, plaintiff is for the step the first Here, or specific practice. of a policy tion disparate case of prima facie establish the second challenges To Ms. Anderson id. at impact. See Competency Based stages of the third showing, facie prima this make (“CBPS”)1 having a as (1) Posting System prac identify specific policy must African-American impact (2) disparate tice, disparity ex demonstrate that specifically (3) employees. Ms. ists, relationship a causal establish decision-making subjective 994-95, challenges the two. See id. between *28 12, #9, the CBPS. challenged steps # # 13 of Specifically, Ms. Anderson 1.

278 stage. majority in “as- entail an panel subjectively involved each interview rat- ing qualified arguendo” by challenging sumes candidates across a number subjective criteria. stage these Anderson identified a The second stages Ms. a screening stage, applications where the specific employment practice. applicants who are found to meet the Watson, In the Court addressed the is- requirements by Human minimum Re- disparate impact analysis sue of whether a department sources are forwarded to the applied subjective cri- properly could be manager of the department open- with the Watson, 989, teria.2 See 487 U.S. at ing. person, That by either themself or in There, S.Ct. 2777. the Court held that others, conjunction with two then screens “subjective discretionary employment or all applications competen- with “core practices may analyzed be under the dis- (teamwork, leadership, cies” communica- parate impact approach in appropriate tions, employee development, business re- 991, cases.” Id. at 108 S.Ct. 2777. “We management) sults and self and “functional persuaded that our in Griggs decisions competencies” mind, to find the most and succeeding largely cases could be nul- qualified candidates to interview for the if disparate impact analysis ap- lified were position. stage The third process plied only prac- to standardized selection the actual involves interviews of those can- Watson, 989, tices.” 487 U.S. at didates selected. Interviews are conduct- 2777. The Court continued on to conclude ed a three-person panel, during which that: each panel member of the evaluates the employer’s If an undisciplined system of in writing according candidate to the above subjective decision-making precisely has criteria and other relevant characteris- system pervaded same effects as a conducted, tics. After all interviews are by impermissible intentional discrimina- panel then selects who it believes is the tion, why it is difficult to see Title VTI’s person position. best proscription against discriminatory ac- Ms. Anderson required is not to chal- apply. tions should not In both circum- lenge specific a more aspect hiring stances, employer’s practices may be process, particularly when she is challeng- “adversely said to affect [an individual’s] subjective ing process. In Rose v. Wells employee, status as an because of such Co., 1417, 1420, Fargo & 1424-25 race, color, sex, religion, individual’s (9th Cir.1990), the Ninth Circuit held that § national origin.” U.S.C. 2000e- “[e]mployment where decisions as to which 2(a)(2). jobs would be eliminated and as to who 990-991, 108 Id. at S.Ct. 2777. would fill the remaining positions was es- case, In this I would find that sentially Ms. left to the discretion of the vari- Anderson satisfy did fact the first departments,” ele- ous bank policy such a ment of her prima facie burden. specific employment Ms. practice subject to challenged the second and third disparate impact analysis, even where the stages system, of the CBPS both of which managers were instructed to consider fac- Watson, 432, dispa- Court noted that its Similarly, 91 S.Ct. 849. in Albemarle impact jurisprudence 405, 427, rate always had Paper Moody, in- Co. v. (1975), employ- volved cases in which standardized S.Ct. 45 L.Ed.2d 280 the Court challenged. ment tests or challenges criteria were Id. at aptitude Finally, faced tests. Teal, example, Griggs 988. For the Court faced Connecticut U.S. challenges high (1982), diploma require- school S.Ct. 73 L.Ed.2d 130 the Court aptitude Griggs, ments and challenges tests. 401 U.S. at faced to written examinations. *29 subjec- undisciplined system of ployer’s performance. longevity and as

tors such case, making the making precisely while those has in this tive decision Similarly, third by in the second system pervaded as a the decisions effects same to were instructed the CBPS stages discrimination, intentional impermissible according to certain candidates evaluate why pro- to Title it is difficult see VII’s showed applicants the whether qualities, discriminatory actions against scription was guideline' qualities the any aptitude 990-91, 108 apply.” not Id. at should After subjective entirely evaluation. an clear focus of the Wat- 2777. The S.Ct. mea- truly quantify or all, one how does to which opinion degree is not the son or “communications” “teamwork” sure unfettered, but subjective discretion is subjective assess- making wholly without objective and fact that both instead the ment? can have subjective criteria deleterious cases attempt distinguish In its from indistinguishable are effects that Rose, I that believe such as Watson discriminatory practices. intentionally level majority overstates the the the reason the Court conclud- That was this case present in which the discretion discretionary em- subjective or ed “that Focusing process. the cabined may analyzed un- practices be ployment language describ- Court’s on the Watson in disparate impact approach der as employment practices subjective ing ’ cases.” Id. at appropriate and as an “undis- discretion” “unchecked 2777. S.Ct. subjective decision system of ciplined majority argues that be- making,” challenged I that Because believe in was not this case cause the discretion subjective in undisputably are practices unfettered, holdings Watson nature, apply I see no reason not ma- here. The applicable not Rose are case, and find that this rule Watson support for this jority finds employ- specific identified a Ms. Anderson makers were that the decision the fact practice. ment function- core and to consider instructed deci- making when their competencies al B. However, majority’s ’focus on sions. describing language

the Watson Court’s required to show was next Ms. Anderson as “un- subjective practices employment challenged a causal nexus between and as “undisci- discretion” checked The statute disparity. practice and subjective decision system of plined demon- plaintiff itself mandates The crux of the misplaced. is making,” particular “uses a employer strate that im- “disparate is Watson decision dispa- that causes practice employment ap- principle no less analysis is pact 2000e-2(k); § see impact.” 42 U.S.C. rate crite- subjective employment plicable to Atonio, 490 Packing Co. Cove Wards objective or standardized ria than 642, 657, 104 L.Ed.2d 109 S.Ct. U.S. case, a facial- because either “[i]n tests” (1989)(“a plaintiff does Title VII adopted dis- practice, without ly neutral disparate impact simply make out a case intent, may have effects criminatory line,’ that, there ‘at the bottom by showing intentionally from indistinguishable force. As in the work racial imbalance is Watson, 487 discriminatory practices.” matter, must demon- general Later U.S. at specific of a application it strate that re- the Court then opinion, the Watson has employment practice that particular an em- or stating peated position, “[i]f this *30 280 disparate impact compared

created the under at- view was to those selected for tack.”)- appointment. J.A. 1645. matter, recognized

As an initial it is well this, Despite the district court concluded may employed that statistical evidence be majority and the concludes that because disparate to show the exis- impact cases Ms. statistical Anderson’s evidence failed disparity. City tence of a See New York may control for all variables that have Beazer, 568, 584, Transit Auth. v. impacted the decisions at the chal- made 1355, (1979); 99 S.Ct. 59 L.Ed.2d 587 lenged it stages, is insufficient to establish (“A Walls, plaintiff may 895 F.2d at 191 Specifically, majority causation. pri- use to establish a statistical evidence states: VII.”). ma facie violation of Title As the “This evidence does not show that the Watson, Court noted in “dispari- the term applicants proceed black failed to reason ty” has “never been framed terms of at the interview stage posi selection Watson, any mathematical formula.” 487 n tio stage selection was their race. 994-95, Further, U.S. at S.Ct. Factors such as in presentation “suggested Court has never terview, questions, answers to interview particular number of standard deviations demeanor, ability demonstrated in can plaintiff determine whether a has the interview of course entered into the prima made out a complex facie case in the judgment of panel the members of the discrimination,” employment area of but as to the posi candidate who received a endorsing case-by-case has instead a ap- being tion that was filled.” 3, proach. Id. at n. 108 S.Ct. 2777. Ante at 266. presented Ms. testimony Ph.D., of Dr. Bradley, However, Edwin CEO statistical evidence does not Quantitative Specifi- Research Associates. every have to control for single variable in cally, Bradley Dr. found that at the second order to be Supreme sufficient. As the screening stage, a statistically significant Court stated in Friday, Bazemore v. (-6.64 under-representation standard devi- U.S. 92 L.Ed.2d 315 ations) (1986), of African-Americans existed when “it analy- is clear that a regression pool applicants meeting the mini- sis included less than all ‘measurable mum qualifications for postéd position may prove variables’ serve to a plaintiffs compared applicants to the actually case. A in a Title VII suit need selected for an interview. J.A. 1645. prove Sim- not discrimination with scientific Dr] ilarly, Bradley certainty; found that at the third rather his prove burden is to screening stage, statistically significant a discrimination .a preponderance of the (-2.38 under-representation standard devi- evidence.”3 Id. at 106 S.Ct. 3000. ations) of Therefore, African-Americans existed when requiring Ms. Anderson to ac- pool applicants selected for an inter- every possible count for may variable that 3. The Court's major decision in has been accounts for the Bazemore factors 'must be con- allowing regression analyses read as that ac unacceptable sidered as evidence of discrimi- ''major” e.g. count for the factors. See Smith Normally, nation.' failure to include varia- Univ., Virginia Commonwealth 84 F.3d analysis’ probativeness, bles will affect the not (4th Cir.1996) ("While the omission of admissibility. Importantly, its it is clear that regression analysis may variables from a ren regression analysis a that includes less than analysis probative der the less than it other may 'all prove measurable variables’ serve to be, said, might hardly wise it can be absent case.”) plaintiff's infirmity, analysis some other that an which beyond qualifications at least the minimum goes sessed the outcome impacted

have Further, position. all candi- plain- posted for the Supreme Court formulations stage three im- dates who received interview disparate in Title burden VII tiffs Watson, only minimally qualified where the were case pact case. were also found subjective prac- question, but challenge to faced a Court *31 department manager the relevant to be tices, plaintiff that the required the Court applicants. all Yet degree qualified suffi- the most of of a kind and “offer evidence this, despite Bradley in Dr. found a statisti- practice question to show that cient of cally significant under-representation for applicants the exclusion of has caused comparing the of their mem- African-Americans when jobs promotions because or pools to the successful candidates group,” impor- applicant in bership protected a stage. have at the end of each that its formulations tantly noted dis- “consistently stressed that statistical facts, I am at a loss to Given these sufficiently substantial must be parities majority understand how the finds that an inference of causa- they that raise such fail to that Ms. Anderson’s statistics show Watson, at 108 S.Ct. tion.” 487 U.S. applicants in select for stages question Albemarle, the Similarly, in Court 2777. pattern signif- hire or a racial promotion in to show “that the required plaintiff icantly pool from that of the of different applicants for hire question tests in select present more applicants. These statistics signifi- pattern in a racial promotion or just disparity Westinghouse’s a than pool of cantly from that different force; that the they present evidence work Albemarle, at applicants.” U.S. the exclu- challenged stages have caused Dothard, 2362; also see S.Ct. of their sion of African-Americans because (“[T]o a establish at protected in a class. And this membership discrimination, plain- of a prima facie case evidence, of the nature of the by virtue facially that the neutral only tiff need show itself, for the ma- hiring process controlled question applicants select standards jor hiring process in the that could factor discriminatory pat- significantly in a hire for, namely qualifica- that of be controlled tern.”). despite the fact that example, tion. For candi- only qualified three the most stage that Ms. Anderson opinion I am of the interviewed, Bradley Dr. found Bradley’s dates are because Mr. satisfied her burden under-repre- African-Americans were testimony is sufficient show actually of those who sented the class question applicants select for hire stages interviewing. after signifi- appointments received pattern in a racial promotion no this court is under pool recognize of I cantly from that of the different plaintiffs’ statis- fact, obligation to “assume that the district court rec- applicants. Watson, 487 tical evidence is reliable.” Bradley’s analysis Dr. demon- ognized that However, 996, 108 2777. variation U.S. at S.Ct. “statistically significant a strated a that there is statis- party a shows number of African-Americans where between the of tically significant under-representation who are suc- apply who and the number successfully completing African-Americans step and third of cessful at both the second subjective stage hiring- of a challenged 12228. As the process.” J.A. the CBPS Af- qualified a number of process, despite up, is set all candidates who process CBPS candidates,4 I to see fail pos- rican-American process stage made it to two of qualified applicants. among the most stage to be Especially third where all Afri- at the were considered interviewees can-American pur- disparate impact has and continues with its how an of causation inference analysis. According majority: facie to the establishing prima case poses shown. disparate impact has not been question proffered is whether faulting Ms. Anderson Additionally, by circumstantial evidence of discriminato- variables, controlling not for certain ry impact satisfy is sufficient faulting her for majority is in essence Douglas McDonnell framework controlling for the exact factor that she proof.... this framework Under challenging causing disparate as here first fa- prima must establish subjective aspects stages impact Then, cie case of discrimination. —the majority states that two and three. The respond defendant must with evidence in the inter- presentation such as “[f]actors legitimate, that it acted with a nondis- *32 view, questions, de- answers to interview criminatory reason. If the defendant meanor, in ability and demonstrated the showing, plaintiff makes this then the that in interview” are factors entered the “present prove must evidence to that the decisions, hiring ultimate and that there- pre- defendant’s articulated reason was any fore in to show causation order statis- text for unlawful discrimination.” tical evidence control for these fac- must noting Ante at 267. After that under However, tors. Ante at these are all Douglas McDonnell the ultimate burden evaluations, subjective exactly and what proving intentional discrimination remains majori- challenging. Ms. Anderson is The plaintiff, majority on the the finds that Ms. ty points did out that Ms. Anderson Anderson failed to that Westing- show account for the evaluation of core and legitimate nondiscriminatory house’s rea- competencies. again, functional But the pretext son was mere for intentional dis- competencies, evaluation of the core crimination. competencies, relevant functional is conclusion, reaching majority In this largely subjective evaluation. While ignores Supreme in Court’s decision faulting controlling Ms. Anderson for not Griggs, impact square- of which was to factors, majority these never ex- ly reject in the notion that order to state a plains how such control would even be for employment claim discrimination the earlier, possible. I questioned As how claimant a showing must make of intent. does or quantify one “teamwork” “leader- Griggs, “good As the Court stated in intent ship,” such it that can be controlled for in discriminatory or absence of intent does very setting. statistical nature of employment procedures not redeem or subjective challenged process makes testing operate mechanisms that as ‘built such impossible. control in minority groups headwinds’ for and are such, As identi- because Ms. Anderson job measuring capability.” unrelated to specific practice, fied a demonstrated the Griggs, at 401 U.S. 91 S.Ct. 849. existence of a disparity and established a two, causal nexus between the I would Disparate impact disparate treat- hold that Ms. Anderson did fact state a two legally ment are distinct causes of prima facie disparate impact. case of action Title Disparate under VII. treat- requires ment plaintiff prove to that

III. discriminatory the defendant had intent Despite its belief that Ms. Anderson motivation. v. See Watson Fort Worth Trust, satisfy burden, 977, 986, failed to prima facie Bank and (1988). majority arguendo assumes that she 101 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. contrast, By finding that Ms. Anderson had failed impact seeks ferret disparate Westinghouse’s that are the that employment practices to show articulated out of. intentional dis- equivalent pretext, majority in es- functional reason they significant because cause crimination that Ms. had failed sence held protected groups, but However, adverse effects prove intent. the context discriminatory motive. have no deliberate claim, disparate impact of her Ms. 986-87, impor- 2777. It is Id. obligation Anderson was under no Supreme that while the Court tant to note prove intent. As the statute itself makes burden-shifting schemes has enunciated clear, employer where the demonstrates disparate disparate for both treatment job challenged practice related that critical differ- possess the schemes impact, question and consistent prevents applying one from ei- ences necessity, may with business context. See Lex K ther test the other prevail by showing still the existence of an Larson, Employment Discrimination equally practice effective alternative (2d 2004) (“The principal § ed. 8.01[2] disparate impact eliminates the and that the McDonnell category of suits to which adopt employer refuses alter- is that Douglas apply formula does not 2000e-2(k)(l)(a)(2). § native. 42 U.S.C. Griggs the 1971 case of exemplified *33 require Nowhere does the statute a show- Co.”). noted in Duke Power As the Court ing pretext, pretext points because to Watson,“[t]he char- factual issues and the Therefore, majority’s applica- intent. inevitably of the evidence are some- acter tion of such burden to Ms. Anderson plaintiff what different when the is ex- is error. empted prove from the need to intentional Watson, discrimination.” IV. 2777. 108 S.Ct. more than a mere Disparate impact is Green, 411 Douglas Corp. v. McDonnell smoking out intentional discrim- method of 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 U.S. 93 S.Ct. attacks a set of Disparate impact ination. (1973), Supreme sets forth the Court’s stan- deleterious behaviors that the intent dealing shifting formula for with

burden definition, capture. By dard fails in intentional dis problem proof only practices attacks those standard McDonnell crimination cases.5 Under the employ- disparate impact a on the have formula, Douglas shifting after burden by protected opportunities ment of classes case, prima establishes a facie plaintiff are not practices Title when those VII then must shift to the em “the burden justifi- legitimate a business supported legitimate, non ployer to articulate some end-goals can be cation or where the same employee’s discriminatory reason manner. achieved a less deleterious rejection.” employer artic Id. Should the nation, prac- a struggles of this Given reason, must plaintiff such a ulate impact on disparate that has a adverse tice show opportunity be afforded an then class, yet has no either protected merely reason was the articulated justification, or can be discriminatory legitimate deci business racially for a. pretext manner, is not 804-05, achieved in a less harmful 1817. sion. Id. at Larson, necessity recognizing the in most instances Employment Lex K. Discrimina- See evidence, are, (2d 2004) laid ("Employers reliance on circumstantial § ed. 8.01[1] tion whole, evi- proof under which direct sophisticated profess down rules of too on the discriminatoiy neces- intent is not paper dence of prejudices on or before witnesses. their case.”). prima sary making of a facie Douglas, to the Supreme in McDonnell Court allow to stand. practice that we should recognition by society

Ultimately, this is effects, their practices,

that these To continue right.

harmful in their own forward, society any such

moving healing under Title

practices attacked VII must be equal spent to that vigor

with a level of

combating intentional discrimination. today, majority has holdings

With its must plaintiff

made the mountain a climb claim disparate impact

to state a harder majority in only

surmount. Not has the prove here to required plaintiff

essence certainty, they

causation to a scientific in-

have also forced the to show juris- despite statutory and

tent the clear

prudential contrary. to the As I dictates results,

cannot concur either of these with respectfully

I dissent. *34 BRYSON,

In Re: Leland M.

Claimant-Appellant. America,

United States of

Plaintiff-Appellee, Bryson, Jr., M. Defendant.

William

No. 03-1501. Appeals,

United States Court of

Fourth Circuit.

Argued: March 2005. 6,May

Decided:

Case Details

Case Name: Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: May 4, 2005
Citation: 406 F.3d 248
Docket Number: 03-1150, 03-1151
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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