150 Conn.App. 576
Conn. App. Ct.2014Background
- In Sept. 2011 Governor Malloy issued Executive Orders Nos. 9 and 10 establishing election procedures and working groups to select majority representatives for family child care providers and personal care attendants under the state subsidy programs.
- Elections pursuant to those orders concluded (family child care: Dec. 2011; personal care attendants: Mar. 2012); both groups selected SEIU as majority representative; working groups reported in Feb. 2012.
- Plaintiffs sued in Superior Court (Mar. 2012), alleging the executive orders exceeded the governor’s authority and violated separation of powers; they sought injunctive relief invalidating the orders.
- Defendant moved to dismiss as moot, noting pending legislation; in May 2012 the legislature enacted Public Act 12-33 (codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-705 et seq.), establishing collective bargaining for the same groups and validating preexisting election results as exclusive bargaining agents without new elections.
- Trial court granted the motion to dismiss as moot; plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court affirmed, holding the public act supplanted the executive orders and left no practical relief for the plaintiffs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness: whether the case remains justiciable after enactment of Public Act 12-33 | Executive orders have continuing legal effect and survive alongside the statute because the statute recognizes prior election results; therefore the controversy is not moot | Enactment of Public Act 12-33 replaced the executive orders for purposes of plaintiffs’ claims and provides the relief sought, leaving no practical remedy against the orders | Case is moot; the statute supplanted the executive orders and no practical relief can be granted against them |
| Whether the "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception saves the appeal | Plaintiffs contend executive orders can be ratified quickly by legislation to evade review, so the issue could recur and is of public importance | Defendant argues speculation is insufficient; plaintiffs gave no basis to show orders are inherently short-lived or likely to evade review repeatedly | Exception not satisfied: plaintiffs failed to show limited duration or reasonable likelihood of recurrence affecting same parties |
| Proper standard on motion to dismiss | Plaintiffs contend the trial court should have reached merits (whether complaint stated a cause of action) instead of dismissing on mootness | Defendant: mootness implicates subject-matter jurisdiction and is a proper ground to dismiss | Court correctly applied mootness inquiry on motion to dismiss because mootness implicates jurisdiction |
| Challenge to Public Act 12-33 | Plaintiffs argue the act’s recognition of the executive-order elections preserves legal effect; also argued (in briefing) the act might be unconstitutional | Defendant: the complaint challenged only the executive orders; the statute now governs and any challenge to it is outside the pleadings | Court declined to consider any constitutional challenge to Public Act 12-33 because plaintiffs’ complaint did not reasonably include such a claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Curley v. Kaiser, 112 Conn. App. 213 (Conn. App. 2009) (mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction and requires dismissal when no practical relief can be given)
- State v. Begley, 122 Conn. App. 546 (Conn. App. 2010) (definition and effect of mootness)
- Waterbury Hosp. v. Conn. Health Care Assocs., 186 Conn. 247 (Conn. 1982) (a case is moot when intervening circumstances eliminate the controversy)
- In re Priscilla A., 122 Conn. App. 832 (Conn. App. 2010) (elements of "capable of repetition yet evading review" exception)
- Hayes Family Ltd. P'ship v. Glastonbury, 132 Conn. App. 218 (Conn. App. 2011) (motion to dismiss attacks court jurisdiction)
- Sweeney v. Sweeney, 271 Conn. 193 (Conn. 2004) (mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction)
- Young v. Vlahos, 103 Conn. App. 470 (Conn. App. 2007) (pleadings interpreted as a question of law; court will not address claims not reasonably raised by complaint)