Wayne A. Campbell v. State of Indiana, 19 N.E.3d 271

In 2001 Wayne A. Campbell entered neighbors’ home and seriously injured two people; he was tried and convicted on multiple counts (attempted murder, burglary, aggravated battery, battery).
After retrial and appeal, some convictions were affirmed; one burglary conviction was reduced on double jeopardy grounds.
During the 2003 trial the jury began deliberating, asked for a definition of “intent,” and the court (with agreement of counsel) read Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI) 9.05 defining “intentionally.”
Campbell later sought post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for (1) failing to object to any supplemental instruction given after deliberations began and (2) failing to object to the pattern instruction’s second sentence as an incorrect statement of law.
The post-conviction court denied relief; the Court of Appeals affirmed but noted tension in authority over the IPI language. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to resolve the jury-instruction issue.
The Supreme Court held: supplemental instruction during deliberations was permissible under modern practice and statute; IPI 9.05 (including the second sentence emphasizing intent to cause a result) is a correct statement of law; therefore counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to any supplemental instruction given after deliberations began	Campbell: courts should not give additional instructions after deliberations; counsel should have objected	State: courts have authority and flexibility (jury rules/statute) to assist jurors and may give instructions in presence of parties	Denied — supplemental instruction was proper as jury sought a point of law and court followed statute/Jury Rule procedures
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the second sentence of IPI 9.05 as an incorrect statement of the law	Campbell: the sentence incorrectly adds an extra burden (must intend to cause the result) beyond statutory definition	State: the instruction properly emphasizes the State’s burden to prove conscious objective to cause the result; pattern instruction is permissible	Denied — IPI 9.05 (including the sentence) is a correct statement of law and not objectionable

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-part ineffective assistance test)
Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. 2000) (presumption favoring statutory language in jury instructions)
Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674 (Ind. 2004) (post-conviction burden and standard of review)
Ronco v. State, 862 N.E.2d 257 (Ind. 2007) (permitting greater leeway to assist jurors during deliberations)
Corley v. State, 663 N.E.2d 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (Court of Appeals held similar language was unsupported)
Johnson v. State, 605 N.E.2d 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (Court of Appeals upheld instruction that required intent to cause the result)
Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d 766 (Ind. 2013) (approving pattern instructions that synthesize statutory wording)