Watford v. Jefferson County Public Schools, 163 F. Supp. 3d 456

Background

Joyce Watford, a Jefferson County public school teacher, was disciplined several times and terminated on October 13, 2010; she grieved under the Board–Teachers Association CBA and pursued EEOC charges.
The CBA (Article 9 and Article 29) provides a tiered grievance/arbitration process and permits holding grievances in abeyance when an employee pursues another agency remedy.
Watford filed EEOC charges in 2011, 2012, and 2013; the Board held her grievance in abeyance while agencies considered her claims and later suspended arbitration when Watford filed this federal lawsuit during an arbitration hearing.
Watford sued, alleging Title VII/anti-retaliation violations and seeking to invalidate Article 9 as per se unlawful and to compel arbitration; she moved for partial summary judgment on retaliation (Counts IV and V).
Defendants moved for summary judgment; the Court considered whether suspension/termination of arbitration constitutes an adverse employment action and whether to compel arbitration or stay the litigation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether suspending or terminating arbitration because an employee files an EEOC charge constitutes an "adverse employment action" for Title VII retaliation.	Watford: withholding arbitration is a retaliatory, materially adverse action that chills protected activity and is a per se violation.	Defendants: election-of-remedies/abeyance provisions are reasonable, avoid duplicative proceedings, and do not foreclose statutory remedies; suspension is a defensive, non‑adverse measure.	Court: Suspensions under a CBA’s election‑of‑remedies provision are not per se adverse; follows Second Circuit approach and grants summary judgment to defendants on the retaliation claims.
Whether the Sixth Circuit would adopt the Seventh Circuit’s rule (Board of Governors) that withdrawing/arbitration termination is per se retaliatory.	Watford: Sixth Circuit would follow Seventh Circuit (Board of Governors) and treat CBA provisions that terminate arbitration upon filing EEOC charges as retaliatory.	Defendants: Sixth Circuit has not clearly adopted Board of Governors; cases cited are distinguishable or dicta; Richardson reasoning is persuasive.	Court: Sixth Circuit would likely follow Richardson/Second Circuit reasoning rather than Board of Governors; district court decisions adopting Board of Governors are unpersuasive.
Whether the court should compel arbitration or stay this litigation pending arbitration despite the CBA abeyance clause.	Watford: the federal claims and arbitration claims are sufficiently distinct, so court should compel arbitration or stay litigation in favor of arbitration.	Defendants: CBA permits holding grievances in abeyance and the arbitration and litigation claims arise from the same facts, so litigation need not be stayed.	Court: Denies Watford’s request to compel arbitration or stay the case because the arbitration and lawsuit arise from the same nucleus of facts and allegations.

Key Cases Cited

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (establishes the materially adverse standard for Title VII retaliation).
Richardson v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 532 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholds election‑of‑remedies provision and holds withdrawal from arbitration is not per se adverse).
E.E.O.C. v. Bd. of Governors of State Colleges & Univs., 957 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1992) (held that terminating in‑house grievance for filing ADEA claim was per se retaliatory).
Alexander v. Gardner‑Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (statutory right to sue exists alongside contractual arbitration rights).
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (clarifies interplay between arbitration and statutory rights).
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004) (defines materially adverse change in employment context).
Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2012) (examples of materially adverse employment actions).