Watford v. Jefferson County Public Schools
870 F.3d 448
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Joyce Watford, a teacher, was terminated by Jefferson County Public Schools on October 13, 2010; she filed a grievance that same day under the school system’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
- The CBA (between Jefferson County Board of Education (JCBE) and Jefferson County Teachers Association (JCTA)) requires grievances to be held in abeyance if the employee pursues a complaint with another agency (e.g., files an EEOC charge) and generally requires exhaustion of the grievance procedure before alternative remedies.
- Watford filed EEOC charges alleging discrimination and later alleged the CBA’s abeyance provision was applied in retaliation when her arbitration was postponed; the EEOC found reasonable cause that JCPS held her grievance in abeyance in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge.
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on Watford’s retaliation claims regarding the grievance/arbitration being held in abeyance, holding the abeyance was not an adverse employment action; Watford appealed.
- The Sixth Circuit majority reversed: it held that holding grievances in abeyance upon filing an EEOC charge is materially adverse (would dissuade a reasonable worker from filing a charge) and that the CBA’s abeyance provision is retaliatory on its face; JCTA can be liable as a joint participant in negotiating the CBA.
- Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing Sundance is dicta, that holding in abeyance is materially different from terminating grievances, that a reasonable employee would not be dissuaded (given arbitration’s limits and union control), and that the CBA is not facially retaliatory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is JCTA a labor organization liable under Title VII/ADEA for agreeing to the CBA? | JCTA, having signed the CBA, can be liable as a joint participant for contractual provisions that discriminate or retaliate. | JCTA argued it is not a “labor organization” or that it advocated for Watford and did not seek abeyance. | Court: JCTA is within the definition and, having negotiated the CBA, can be liable; jurisdictional attack forfeited. |
| Does holding grievance/arbitration in abeyance upon filing an EEOC charge constitute an adverse employment action (retaliation)? | Watford: yes — it materially disadvantages and would dissuade a reasonable employee from filing EEOC charges because it delays/blocks an effective remedy. | JCBE/JCTA: no — abeyance is not termination; remedies remain available later; a reasonable employee would prefer EEOC remedies and arbitration timing is speculative. | Court: yes — abeyance materially adverse under Burlington; no material difference between termination and abeyance for deterrent effect; reverse summary judgment. |
| Is the CBA facially retaliatory (per se invalid)? | Watford: the abeyance clause conditions internal remedies on refraining from EEOC charges, so it is facially retaliatory. | Defendants: the provision is a neutral election/ordering of remedies and serves legitimate administrative purposes. | Court: CBA violates anti-retaliation provisions because it conditions grievance/arbitration on not filing EEOC charges; treated as retaliatory on its face. |
| Is Richardson (2d Cir.) persuasive to uphold abeyance as reasonable defensive measure? | N/A (plaintiff opposes) | Defendants point to Richardson to support employer control over internal handling as non-retaliatory if reasonable. | Court: Richardson inconsistent with Burlington; not followed. Dissent would follow Richardson. |
Key Cases Cited
- EEOC v. SunDance Rehabilitation Corp., 466 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 2006) (termination of grievance proceedings because of an EEOC charge constitutes retaliation)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (retaliation standard: materially adverse actions that would dissuade a reasonable worker)
- EEOC v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs., 957 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1992) (CBA provision terminating grievance when employee seeks relief elsewhere deemed retaliatory)
- Richardson v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 532 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (election-of-remedies provision treated as reasonable defensive measure; relied upon by dissent)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (statutory definitions in Title VII/ADEA not necessarily jurisdictional)
- Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (employment-related benefits cannot be distributed discriminatorily)
- Fox v. Eagle Distrib. Co., 510 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2007) (ADEA retaliation provisions analyzed similarly to Title VII)