287 A.3d 301
Md.2022Background
- On July 9, 2020, Tyrie Washington and another person stood in an alley in Baltimore; upon seeing a marked police car they both fled. Washington then ran past an unmarked car, jumped fences, tried to hide behind a bush, and was ultimately stopped by Detective Alex Rodriguez. A handgun was recovered from Washington’s waistband after he was detained.
- Three detectives testified at the suppression hearing; two (Noesi and Lopez) reported observations (e.g., Lopez testified he saw a bulge) that were not communicated to Rodriguez, who based the stop solely on observing flight and evasive maneuvers.
- Detectives testified the incident occurred on the 3700 block of Oakmont Avenue, which they described as a high-crime block with recent drug, gun, and violent-crime activity (Lopez said he had seized ~10–15 handguns on that block within a recent three-month span).
- Washington moved to suppress the gun as the product of an unconstitutional Terry stop; the circuit court denied suppression, he entered a conditional guilty plea to preserve appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Maryland (formerly Court of Appeals) affirmed.
- The Court held that under the totality of the circumstances Detective Rodriguez had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Washington: unprovoked, headlong flight (including simultaneous flight by another person), repeated evasive acts (jumping fences, hiding), and occurrence in a particularized high-crime area supported the stop; the Court reiterated that flight alone is not per se sufficient and that fear of police is a legitimate, potentially exculpatory consideration.
- The Court treated Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment and declined to afford broader state constitutional protection or adopt an independent exclusionary rule in this case; Justice Hotten dissented, arguing the facts were insufficiently particularized.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Washington) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether unprovoked flight in a high‑crime area alone supplies reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop | Flight often reflects reasonable fear of police (especially among young Black men given documented misconduct), so flight alone should carry little or no weight | Wardlow permits headlong, unprovoked flight in a high‑crime area to be a strong factor supporting reasonable suspicion; flight plus contextual facts suffice | Court: No per se rule; flight is a factor to weigh under the totality of circumstances. Here—headlong, unprovoked, repeated flight with evasive maneuvers in a particularized high‑crime block—gave reasonable suspicion. |
| Whether the trial court should account for the possibility that flight is an innocent response to fear of police | Fear of police (and well‑publicized misconduct) is a legitimate innocent explanation and must be considered and can reduce the probative value of flight | Such concerns can be considered but do not negate commonsense inferences that flight may indicate wrongdoing | Court: Courts must consider that flight can be consistent with innocence; weight is case‑specific. The record here supported treating flight as suggestive of criminal activity. |
| Whether testimony that the location was a “high‑crime area” is a legally sufficient, objective basis to be factored into reasonable suspicion | The label is too vague and can mask race‑ or poverty‑based policing; requires scrutiny and specificity | High‑crime area is an accepted contextual factor if supported by particularized, recent, localized evidence | Court: State bears burden to prove the high‑crime nature with particularized facts (location, crime type, temporal proximity). Here detectives’ specific testimony about the block satisfied that requirement. |
| Whether Article 26 requires greater protection or a state exclusionary rule beyond the Fourth Amendment | Given local history of police misconduct, Article 26 should be interpreted more protectively, with a state exclusionary remedy | Article 26 is co‑extensive with the Fourth Amendment; no basis to expand or create a separate exclusionary rule here | Court: Article 26 remains interpreted in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment; no expansion or separate exclusionary rule adopted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (established investigatory stop test: brief detention permitted on reasonable, articulable suspicion criminal activity may be afoot)
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (unprovoked, headlong flight in a high‑crime area is a relevant factor that may support reasonable suspicion; not a per se rule)
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (totality of the circumstances governs the reasonable‑suspicion inquiry)
- United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (reasonable‑suspicion inquiry requires assessment of the whole picture and commonsense inferences)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (officer’s subjective motivations are irrelevant; objective reasonableness controls)
- Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341 (2008) (Maryland case: flight in a high‑crime area plus other indicia—e.g., clutching waistband—supported reasonable suspicion)
- Sizer v. State, 456 Md. 350 (2017) (Maryland case: presence in a high‑crime area and flight are factors that contribute to totality analysis; need nexus to the type of crime suspected)
- United States v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2019) (court emphasized considering racialized policing and DOJ findings in weighing flight as a factor under the totality of circumstances)
- Mayo v. United States, 266 A.3d 244 (D.C. 2022) (officer testimony calling an area high‑crime may be insufficient if conclusory; high‑crime testimony must be particularized)