Washington v. State
5/16
| Md. | Nov 1, 2016Background
- Trendon Washington was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit murder (sentenced to life); jury deadlocked on underlying murder and other charges.
- Washington petitioned for postconviction DNA testing of a bloody broom and dustpan seized at the crime scene.
- The Circuit Court dismissed his CP § 8-201 petition for lack of standing, concluding conspiracy to commit murder is not a "crime of violence" under CR § 14-101 and thus not covered by CP § 8-201(b).
- The Court of Appeals accepted direct appeal under CP § 8-201(k)(6) and framed issues on statutory eligibility, due process, and equal protection.
- The Maryland Legislature in 2015 expanded CP § 8-201(b) to incorporate crimes of violence listed in CR § 14-101; CR § 14-101 expressly lists murder and attempt but does not list conspiracy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Washington) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether conspiracy to commit murder is eligible under CP § 8-201(b) | CP § 8-201(b) should be read in light of the statute’s purpose and related provisions to allow a life-sentenced conspirator to petition | CP § 8-201(b) plainly limits petitions to persons convicted of crimes of violence under CR § 14-101; conspiracy is not listed | Conspiracy to commit murder is not petition-eligible under CP § 8-201(b) |
| Whether CP § 8-201 violates procedural due process by excluding conspirators | Denial deprives him of a residual liberty interest to seek postconviction DNA testing necessary to show innocence | Maryland’s statutory procedures for DNA testing are robust and satisfy Osborne standard; no constitutional right to testing exists | CP § 8-201 satisfies Due Process; no procedural due process violation found |
| Whether CP § 8-201 violates equal protection by distinguishing conspirators from murderers | Life sentence parity means similarly situated; statute’s exclusion is arbitrary (citing Cheeks) | Conspiracy differs in nature (no required physical presence); Legislature has rational basis to limit testing to crimes where DNA is likeliest to be dispositive | Statute does not violate Equal Protection under rational-basis review |
| Whether the State’s duty to preserve evidence creates a petition right | Preservation duty (CP § 8-201(j)) and definition of scientific identification evidence imply petition rights | CP § 8-201(j) applies only where there is a conviction of enumerated crimes (murder etc.); no duty arose from mere charge or co-defendant’s conviction | No preservation-triggered petition right; duty to preserve not implicated for Washington |
Key Cases Cited
- Dist. Atty’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (Supreme Court: states may define postconviction DNA procedures; Alaska’s scheme met due process standards)
- Arrington v. State, 411 Md. 524 (2009) (Maryland precedent on review standards and CP § 8-201 appeals)
- State v. Cheeks, 310 P.3d 346 (Kan. 2013) (Kansas Supreme Court held unequal access to testing violated equal protection where sentence parity made groups similarly situated)
- McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010) (upholding New York’s postconviction DNA procedures against due process challenge)
- Morrison v. Peterson, 809 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding California’s postconviction DNA statute, including chain-of-custody and reasonable-probability standards)
- Cunningham v. Dist. Attorney’s Office for Escambia County, 592 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding Alabama’s postconviction DNA procedures under the Osborne framework)