Washington v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14854
9th Cir.2016Background
- William Washington, a California state prisoner, sought to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on a § 1983 complaint challenging medical care, prison conditions, and aspects of his criminal sentence; the district court denied IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) concluding he had three PLRA “strikes.”
- The district court relied on five prior federal filings by Washington: one mixed habeas/§ 1983 suit dismissed under Heck; two mandamus petitions challenging his sentence; and two § 1983 suits dismissed on grounds of Heck and/or Younger abstention.
- The central statutory provision is the PLRA three‑strikes rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), barring IFP status for prisoners with three prior dismissals that were "frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim," unless the prisoner is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.
- Washington argued Heck dismissals, Younger abstentions, and mandamus filings challenging criminal matters should not count as PLRA strikes; the district court treated several prior dismissals as strikes.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo and held the district court erred: (1) a mixed Heck/habeas dismissal does not automatically count as a strike unless the entire civil case was dismissed for a § 1915(g) qualifying reason; (2) Younger abstention dismissals and mandamus petitions challenging criminal matters do not count as PLRA strikes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a dismissal under Heck counts as a § 1915(g) strike | Heck dismissals are not per se frivolous/malicious or Rule 12(b)(6) failures; they should not count unless the bar is obvious and the entire action is dismissed for a qualifying reason | Dismissals under Heck should be counted as strikes because they dismissed the § 1983 claims | A Heck dismissal can be a strike only if the complaint shows an obvious Heck bar and the entire case (not just a claim) was dismissed for a qualifying PLRA reason; here the mixed Heck/habeas dismissal did not produce a strike |
| Whether Younger abstention dismissals count as strikes | Younger dismissals are jurisdictional/abstention dismissals and should not count as strikes | They may be treated as dismissals that qualify under § 1915(g) | Younger abstention (like Rule 12(b)(1) lack of jurisdiction) does not constitute a PLRA strike |
| Whether mandamus petitions challenging criminal proceedings count as strikes | Mandamus petitions appealing criminal matters are more like habeas/appeals and lie outside the PLRA’s scope | Mandamus dismissals can be strikes if treated as civil litigation | Mandamus petitions that effectively challenge criminal proceedings operate like habeas/appeals and do not count as PLRA strikes |
| Whether partial dismissals of claims within an action produce strikes | If any qualifying claim dismissed, it produces a strike | Any dismissal for a qualifying reason should be a strike even if other claims remain | Only a dismissal of the entire case for a qualifying § 1915(g) reason counts as a strike; partial dismissals do not automatically produce strikes |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (civil damages claims that would imply invalidity of conviction are barred until conviction is invalidated)
- Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007) (PLRA IFP framework and three‑strikes discussion)
- King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting habeas is distinct from civil actions for PLRA purposes)
- Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal courts must abstain when parallel state proceedings implicate important state interests)
- Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (exhaustion is an affirmative defense, not a pleading requirement)
- Cervantes v. Terhune, 493 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007) (interpreting § 1915(g) and defining when an action counts as a strike)
- Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing Heck dismissals as judicial traffic control and PLRA context)
- ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pacific R.R., 765 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2014) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal where an obvious bar to relief appears on the face of the complaint)