446 F.Supp.3d 20
E.D.N.C.2020Background:
- Kenneth Washington, a Marine stationed at Camp Lejeune (1979–1981; 1983–1984), used base water; his wife suffered miscarriages (1980, 1981) and gave birth in 1982 to a son who died after 32 minutes.
- In 2008 the Navy notified Washington that Camp Lejeune's water had been contaminated; he then submitted one or two Standard Form 95 administrative claims (one allegedly lost; another stamped received May 2010) asserting wrongful death from exposure to TCE/PCE.
- The Navy denied compensation under the FTCA in January 2019; Washington filed suit in June 2019 on behalf of his deceased son for wrongful death and IIED under the FTCA.
- The United States moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing (1) failure to exhaust administrative remedies for a wrongful-death claim and (2) that the FTCA discretionary-function exception bars jurisdiction.
- The complaint alleges the Navy caused/allowed toxic chemicals into the water, failed to monitor and heed warnings, failed to warn residents, and withheld information; plaintiff relies in part on BUMED 6240.3 directives.
- The Court denied the motion to dismiss, holding Washington presented a sufficient administrative claim and that the discretionary-function exception did not apply.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Administrative exhaustion: Was an SF-95 sufficient to present a wrongful-death FTCA claim on behalf of the decedent? | Washington: SF-95 (received May 2010) plainly alleged wrongful death, demanded a sum certain, and gave the Navy notice to investigate; father could file pre-appointment and appointment relates back. | Navy: SF-95 did not explicitly say "on behalf of" the decedent; Washington was not yet appointed administrator when he filed. | Court: SF-95 provided sufficient notice and sum certain; father could properly present the death claim and later appointment relates back under state law—presentation requirement satisfied. |
| Discretionary-function exception: Do BUMED directives or other law mandate conduct such that the exception is inapplicable? | Washington: BUMED 6240.3 contains a specific, non‑discretionary proscription—hazardous or unknown-effect substances shall not be introduced so as to reach consumers—so the exception does not shield the government; alleged decades‑long neglect is not policy‑based. | Navy: Decisions about water management, chemicals (TCE/PCE), remediation, and resource allocation involve discretion and policy choices protected by the exception; no regulation specifically mandated action with respect to TCE/PCE at the time. | Court: BUMED contains a sufficiently specific mandatory prohibition against introducing deleterious or unknown substances into drinking water; the conduct challenged was neglect (not protected policy choices); discretionary‑function exception does not apply. |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 1995) (FTCA jurisdictional requirements and discretionary‑function principles)
- Henderson v. United States, 785 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1986) (administrative‑claim filing is jurisdictional under FTCA)
- Rich v. United States, 811 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2015) (discretionary‑function exception inapplicable to government inattention/neglect)
- Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988) (two‑step test for discretionary‑function exception)
- United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991) (policy‑based inquiry for discretionary‑function analysis)
- Seaside Farm, Inc. v. United States, 842 F.3d 853 (4th Cir. 2016) (applying Berkovitz/Gaubert framework)
- Ahmed v. United States, 30 F.3d 514 (4th Cir. 1994) (requirements for presentation of administrative FTCA claims)
- Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (caution against invoking national‑security labels to bar claims)
- Coulthurst v. United States, 214 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (policy analysis may be inapplicable where government neglect, not policy choices, are alleged)
- Wood v. United States, 845 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 2017) (discretionary‑function protection for high‑level policy decisions)
