Waseem Khan v. Attorney General United States, 979 F.3d 193

Petitioner Waseem Khan, an LPR admitted in 2000, pled guilty in 2006 to possession of <1/2 oz. marijuana under Connecticut law; Connecticut later decriminalized that offense and Khan’s conviction record was destroyed under state law.
Khan was separately convicted in 2010 of two third-degree larceny counts; removal proceedings commenced in 2017 and he sought cancellation of removal, which requires seven years of continuous residence after admission.
The federal "stop-time rule" (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)) halts accrual of continuous residence when the noncitizen "has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) that renders the alien inadmissible." Khan’s marijuana conduct occurred within the relevant seven-year window.
The IJ and BIA held that the post-conviction vacatur (resulting from decriminalization) was a post-conviction event and did not erase immigration consequences under BIA precedent; they concluded Khan’s continuous-residence period stopped when he committed the marijuana offense.
The Third Circuit affirmed: it held the stop-time rule looks to (1) commission of the offense (a historical fact) and (2) whether the offense rendered the noncitizen inadmissible at the relevant time; a later vacatur due to decriminalization does not undo those facts, so Khan was ineligible for cancellation of removal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a post-conviction vacatur based on state decriminalization prevents an offense from triggering the stop-time rule	Khan: vacatur erased the conviction so the offense no longer triggers stop-time	Government: stop-time depends on (a) commission of offense and (b) being rendered inadmissible under federal law; later vacatur for post-conviction events does not negate that	Vacatur for decriminalization does not prevent stop-time; the offense still stopped accrual of continuous residence
Whether the stop-time clause requires only commission or also that the offense "renders" the alien inadmissible, and whether later changes affect that determination	Khan: the later vacatur means he was not rendered inadmissible and thus requirement unmet	Government: statute contains two distinct requirements (has committed; renders inadmissible); rendering is determined by conviction/admission at the time and is not undone by subsequent state-law vacatur	The clause sets two separate requirements; conviction-based inadmissibility fixed at the time still qualifies even if later vacated for post-conviction reasons

Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020) (stop-time rule has two distinct requirements and applies to inadmissibility offenses for LPRs)
Santos-Reyes v. Attorney General, 660 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2011) ("commit" focuses on historical conduct for stop-time)
Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2005) (applied Pickering to adjustment-of-status context regarding effect of vacatur)
Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012) (immigration consequences are governed by the legal regime at the time of conviction)
Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798 (2015) (compare controlled-substance schedules at time of conviction for immigration analysis)
Briseno-Flores v. Attorney General, 492 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2007) (commission of an inadmissibility offense stops accrual of continuous residence)
Heredia v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2017) (interpreting the "renders inadmissible" clause as a limiting second requirement)
Calix v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir. 2015) ("that renders" clause qualifies the prior clause and limits which offenses cut off accrual)
NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017) (statutory-construction principle: give effect to every clause and word)
United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (1992) (use of verb tenses can indicate separate statutory requirements)