Warren Lee Hill, Jr. v. Carl Humphrey
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 23335
| 11th Cir. | 2011Background
- Hill, a Georgia death row inmate, challenged Georgia’s mental retardation death-penalty rule in 1996 state habeas proceedings.
- Georgia had prohibited executing mentally retarded defendants since 1988 via O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131; Hill did not raise MR until five years after trial.
- The Supreme Court decided Atkins in 2002, prohibiting execution of mentally retarded offenders; Georgia courts later held its own reasonable doubt standard constitutional.
- Hill’s IQ testing spanned 77 (1991), 72 (1997), and 69 (2000); adaptive-functioning deficits were disputed; third prong onset before 18 was debated.
- Georgia Supreme Court Hill III (2003) upheld Georgia’s beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for MR, allowing states to define procedures for enforcement under Atkins.
- AEDPA review requires deferential scrutiny; the question is whether Hill III was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as of 2003.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Georgia’s reasonable doubt standard violates Atkins. | Hill contends Atkins prohibits execution of MR; insistence on DS undermines Atkins protections. | Georgia’s standard reflects state procedures; Atkins left regulation to states; no clear conflict. | Not contrary; AEDPA deference applies; no clearly established federal law forbids this standard. |
| Whether Atkins left burden-of-proof rules unknowable and thus not clearly established. | Atkins left burden unspecified; Georgia’s heavy burden erodes Eighth Amendment protections. | Atkins did not fix burden; states design procedures; no explicit rule invalidates Georgia’s method. | Not clearly established; deference upheld. |
| Whether Leland/Ford insanity-burden cases justify MR burden rules. | Leland/Ford show substantive due process limits on burdens; MR case analogous to insanity. | MR is distinct; Atkins controls; insanity cases are not directly applicable to MR burden. | Not controlling; MR context different; Georgia’s scheme remains constitutionally permissible under AEDPA. |
| Whether Atkins requires a substantive limit on states’ procedures enforcing the MR ban. | States must protect Atkins right via proper procedures; Georgia’s system eviscerates rights. | States have authority to design enforcement procedures; Atkins left procedural specifics to states. | Procedural leeway recognized; Georgia’s procedures not shown to be clearly unconstitutional. |
| Whether Hill’s post-conviction due process claim supports habeas relief. | Hill asserts post-conviction due process violations tainted MR determination. | Post-conviction due process claims are not habeas-releasable; merits-of-MR issues remain central. | No relief on post-conviction due process grounds; AEDPA deference governs MR ruling. |
Key Cases Cited
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (U.S. 2002) (prohibits executing mentally retarded offenders; defines substantive rule)
- Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (U.S. 1986) (states may enforce the prohibition via procedures, but with limits)
- Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (U.S. 1911) (constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly via procedural rules)
- Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (U.S. 1958) (due process requires adequate procedures guarding constitutional rights)
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (U.S. 2007) (AEDPA deference; rules for adequacy of procedures in capital cases)
- Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (U.S. 1996) (due process limits on proving competence to stand trial)
- Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (U.S. 1952) (insanity-burden case; due process considerations in burden of proof)
- Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (U.S. 1989) (prior to Atkins; MR executions were not categorically forbidden)
- Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825 (U.S. 2009) (Atkins left states to develop appropriate enforcement procedures)