Warnether Muhammad v. Caterpillar Inc.
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17438
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- Muhammad, a Caterpillar employee, reported repeated racial and anti-gay slurs (oral and graffiti) by multiple coworkers in 2006; he complained to his supervisor (Edwards) and human resources.
- Caterpillar repeatedly repainted offensive restroom graffiti in August 2006, warned the shift, and after the warning the graffiti ceased.
- On October 12, 2006 Edwards suspended Muhammad indefinitely after a confrontation about Muhammad leaving his workstation (to use restroom and check the bid board); Muhammad grieved, returned, was later suspended/terminated, settled, rehired, laid off, and rehired again.
- Muhammad sued under Title VII alleging racial and sexual-orientation harassment and retaliation for complaining; district court granted summary judgment for Caterpillar; Muhammad appealed.
- The Seventh Circuit reviewed whether (1) Title VII covers harassment based on sexual orientation or sex-stereotyping here, (2) Caterpillar’s remedial response to reported harassment was reasonable, and (3) the October suspension was retaliatory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Title VII covers harassment based on sexual orientation or related sex-stereotyping | Muhammad: coworkers’ anti-gay remarks reflect sex-based discrimination (male not acting like a male) | Caterpillar: Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based solely on sexual orientation; no evidence of sex-based motive | Title VII does not reach sexual-orientation harassment here; Muhammad offered no evidentiary support for sex-based theory |
| Whether employer is liable for coworker racial harassment | Muhammad: company should have done more (identify/punish perpetrators) | Caterpillar: it took prompt, reasonable remedial steps (repaintings, warnings, supervisor involvement) | Employer response was reasonable and halted harassment; no liability for failure to punish past perpetrators |
| Whether employer is liable for coworker harassment generally where reporting mechanism existed but plaintiff failed to report subsequent incidents | Muhammad: isolated subsequent slur and continued hostility support liability | Caterpillar: plaintiff failed to report the later isolated incident; reporting mechanisms were used and effective | Employer not liable when victim fails to use available reporting mechanisms and employer reasonably responds |
| Whether Edwards suspended Muhammad in retaliation for complaining about harassment | Muhammad: suspension followed his complaints to shift supervisor (temporal proximity/improper motive) | Caterpillar: suspension resulted from Muhammad’s conduct (insubordination/refusal to discuss without union rep); no direct evidence of retaliatory animus | Retaliation claim fails: complaint re sexual orientation is not protected; for racial component plaintiff adduces only speculation/temporal proximity which is insufficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir.) (distinguishing sexual-orientation harassment from Title VII sex discrimination)
- Berry v. Chicago Transit Auth., 618 F.3d 688 (7th Cir.) (employer not liable if it takes prompt, reasonable action likely to prevent recurrence)
- Durkin v. City of Chicago, 341 F.3d 606 (7th Cir.) (victim’s failure to use reporting mechanism can preclude employer liability)
- Montgomery v. American Airlines, Inc., 626 F.3d 382 (7th Cir.) (employee must report nonobvious policy violations so supervisors can intervene)
- Porter v. Erie Foods Int’l, 576 F.3d 629 (7th Cir.) (focus is on reasonableness of steps to prevent future harm, not punishment of past perpetrators)
- Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974 (7th Cir.) (same principle regarding reasonable employer response)
- Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc., 743 F.3d 230 (7th Cir.) (retaliation proven under direct or indirect methods)
- Cerutti v. BASF Corp., 349 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir.) (direct method allows direct or circumstantial evidence of impermissible motive)
- Morgan v. SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990 (7th Cir.) (circumstantial evidence must allow trier of fact to infer impermissible motive; “convincing mosaic” concept)
- Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Villages Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900 (7th Cir.) (assembly of circumstantial evidence may support discrimination claim)
- Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) (speculation/guesswork insufficient to survive summary judgment)
- Good v. Univ. of Chicago Med. Ctr., 673 F.3d 670 (7th Cir.) (cannot rely on conjecture to avoid summary judgment)
- Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir.) (retaliation fails if the underlying opposition concerns conduct not proscribed by Title VII)
- Magyar v. Saint Joseph Regional Med. Ctr., 544 F.3d 766 (7th Cir.) (retaliation claim requires opposition to conduct covered by Title VII)
- Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA), LLC, 751 F.3d 499 (7th Cir.) (temporal proximity alone rarely sufficient to prove causation)
- Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656 (7th Cir.) (similar warning about limits of temporal proximity evidence)