Waltrip v. TS Enterprises, Inc., 398 P.3d 815

Background

Waltrip, injured at work in 2001, sought workers’ compensation; DLIR awarded some benefits in 2007 but denied claims (e.g., RSD). Both parties appealed to LIRAB; hearings occurred in 2009–2010 and LIRAB issued a Decision and Order on July 25, 2011, largely adverse to Waltrip.
Waltrip filed two post-decision motions pro se: an August 23, 2011 "Request to Reconsider" and a September 23, 2011 "Request to Vacate and Restart Proceedings," the latter including new psychiatrist letters dated after the hearing.
LIRAB denied both post-decision requests (August denial and September denial). Waltrip filed a notice of appeal(s) to the ICA; timing and characterization of the appeals varied (initial notice, then amended notice).
The Special Compensation Fund moved to dismiss parts of the appeal as untimely; on May 31, 2012 the ICA partially dismissed (as to the July 2011 Decision and the August denial) but retained jurisdiction to consider the September denial; later (Aug. 28, 2014) the ICA issued an SDO vacating LIRAB’s September denial and remanding for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (construing the September filing as an unauthorized second motion for reconsideration).
The Hawai‘i Supreme Court accepted certiorari to resolve procedural questions about (a) its jurisdiction to review the ICA’s partial dismissal order, (b) whether the ICA erred by issuing a partial dismissal, and (c) whether the ICA correctly treated the September Request as an unauthorized second reconsideration instead of a motion to reopen under HRS § 386-89.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Hawai‘i Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review the ICA’s May 31, 2012 Partial Dismissal Order	Waltrip filed certiorari within 30 days of the ICA’s final Judgment on Appeal; the Court can review the ICA’s entire disposition, including the earlier partial dismissal	Fund argued the Partial Dismissal Order was not timely challenged (application was filed >30 days after May 31, 2012) so the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over that order	Court held it had jurisdiction to review the ICA’s Partial Dismissal Order and SDO because Waltrip timely filed certiorari within 30 days of the ICA’s final judgment; thus the Court could review the ICA’s earlier partial dismissal as part of the full disposition.
Whether the ICA erred by issuing a partial dismissal (rather than denying Fund’s motion in full and addressing dismissal in the SDO)	Waltrip implied the ICA should have denied Fund’s motion in full and resolved issues in the SDO	Fund and ICA relied on case-management authority to issue a partial dismissal under HRS § 602‑57(3) to manage the appeal efficiently	Court held ICA did not err; it may issue piecemeal rulings to manage cases and properly referenced the partial dismissal in its subsequent SDO.
Whether the ICA correctly dismissed Waltrip’s appeal as untimely as to the July 2011 Decision and Order Denying August Request	Waltrip contended she was misinformed about deadlines and pro se status warranted liberal construction	Fund argued Waltrip’s notice of appeal was filed one day late under the statutes and rules	Court affirmed the ICA’s dismissal of the appeal from the July 2011 Decision and the Order Denying August Request as untimely.
Whether LIRAB or the ICA correctly treated the September Request as an unauthorized second motion for reconsideration (thus depriving LIRAB of jurisdiction) rather than as a motion to reopen under HRS § 386‑89	Waltrip argued (through her filing and psychiatrist letters) the September Request should be liberally construed as a motion to reopen based on post-hearing evidence of changed physical/mental condition and thus properly filed to the Director	ICA characterized the September Request as a second motion for reconsideration on the same grounds as the August Request, over which LIRAB lacked authority; Fund/Employer had not challenged jurisdiction below	Court held the ICA’s result (dismissal) was correct but on different grounds: the September Request reasonably could be construed as a motion to reopen under HRS § 386‑89 (based on new psychiatrist letters and timing) — but such a motion must be filed with the Director, not LIRAB; remand required LIRAB to dismiss the September Request for lack of jurisdiction and advise Waltrip she may seek to reopen with the Director.

Key Cases Cited

Dupree v. Hiraga, [citation="121 Hawai'i 297, 219 P.3d 1084"] (discussing liberal construction of pro se pleadings)
Doe v. Attorney General, [citation="135 Hawai'i 390, 351 P.3d 1156"] (pro se administrative pleadings construed liberally)
Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (U.S. 2015) (courts should not recharacterize filings to "construe away" jurisdiction; misbranded motions should be read to identify a route to relief)
Coon v. City & County of Honolulu, [citation="98 Hawai'i 233, 47 P.3d 348"] (agency statutory construction review)
Igawa v. Koa House Rest., [citation="97 Hawai'i 402, 38 P.3d 570"] (standards of review for administrative findings and conclusions)
In re Water Use Permit Applications, [citation="94 Hawai'i 97, 9 P.3d 409"] (definition of substantial evidence and "clearly erroneous" standard)