Walter Quijada-Aguilar v. Loretta E. Lynch, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15456

Petitioner Walter Quijada-Aguilar, a Salvadoran national, was convicted in California in 1992 of voluntary manslaughter (CPC § 192(a)) and sentenced to 11 years.
Removed to removal proceedings in 2005; conceded removability and applied for withholding of removal (INA), CAT protection, and CAT deferral.
The IJ denied withholding and CAT relief; the BIA conducted independent review, affirmed the denial of CAT relief, and held the § 192(a) conviction was categorically a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), making it an aggravated felony and a per se "particularly serious crime" (sentence ≥5 years) for INA withholding purposes.
Quijada-Aguilar appealed to the Ninth Circuit, challenging only the BIA’s categorical determination that § 192(a) is a crime of violence and arguing the BIA improperly declined to consider family-affiliation evidence for CAT deferral.
The Ninth Circuit found § 192(a) broader than the federal § 16 definition because California allows conviction for reckless killings (People v. Lasko), and remanded for reconsideration of CAT deferral considering aggregate risk including family affiliation.

Issue	Quijada-Aguilar's Argument	Lynch (Gov't) Argument	Held
Whether CPC § 192(a) (voluntary manslaughter) is categorically a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16	§ 192(a) can be satisfied by reckless conduct and thus is not a categorical match to § 16, which requires intentional use (or substantial risk of intentional use) of force	At time of conviction (1992) voluntary manslaughter required intent to kill; look to law as interpreted at conviction time	Held for Quijada‑Aguilar: § 192(a) is not categorically a crime of violence because California law admits reckless manslaughter (People v. Lasko); petitioner not per se ineligible for INA withholding on that basis
Whether the BIA properly denied CAT deferral by refusing to consider family‑affiliation evidence	BIA erred: CAT analysis must consider aggregate risk of torture from all sources including family affiliation; petitioner did present such evidence	BIA treated petitioner as having waived family‑affiliation argument by focusing on criminal‑deportee status before the BIA	Held for Quijada‑Aguilar: remand required so the BIA evaluates CAT deferral considering aggregate risk including family affiliation

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (superseding categorical approach to compare state offenses with federal generic definitions)
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (clarifying categorical approach and limits on modified categorical use)
People v. Lasko, 999 P.2d 666 (Cal. 2000) (California Supreme Court holding voluntary manslaughter can be based on reckless conduct; intent to kill not required)
United States v. Gomez‑Leon, 545 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2008) (§ 16 requires intentional use of force or substantial risk that force will be intentionally used)
Fernandez‑Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (reckless use of force does not qualify under § 16)
Covarrubias Teposte v. Holder, 632 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2011) (review standards for categorical approach to state statutes)
Ruiz‑Morales v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Taylor categorical approach in immigration context)
Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2011) (CAT claims require considering aggregate risk from all sources)
Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (standard of review where BIA conducts independent review)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (Supreme Court authority on binding effect of state high‑court interpretations)