Walter Leroy Moody, Jr. v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections
682 F. App'x 802
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Walter Leroy Moody, Jr. was convicted in federal court (1991) of pipe-bomb murders; later indicted and tried in Alabama (1996) for capital murder and assault; he represented himself at the state trial and was sentenced to death following a jury recommendation.
- Moody had a long litigation history, including prior pro se appearances and participation in a related federal trial, and had been represented by retained/appointed counsel before moving to proceed pro se in 1994.
- The Alabama trial court held extended colloquies warning Moody of the dangers of self‑representation, inquiring into his education, age, and experience, and repeatedly asking whether he stood by his request to waive counsel.
- The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals concluded Moody knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and found he rejected standby or hybrid representation; it affirmed the conviction and death sentence.
- Moody sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing his Faretta waiver was invalid; the district court denied relief and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, applying AEDPA deference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Moody knowingly and voluntarily waived the Sixth Amendment right to counsel | Moody: waiver was not knowing/voluntary due to trial‑court misinformation, equivocation, and later attempts to seek counsel | State: trial court conducted sufficient colloquies; record shows clear, repeated waiver and rejection of standby/hybrid counsel | Affirmed: state court reasonably found waiver knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under Faretta and AEDPA deference |
| Whether courts must apply a perpetual presumption against waiver after a valid Faretta waiver | Moody: Zerbst presumption against waiver should apply continuously, so later events require re‑evaluation | State: once valid waiver occurs, later requests do not create clearly established Supreme Court law requiring reappointment; Marshall forecloses a rule favoring perpetual presumption | Held: No clearly established Supreme Court rule requires reappointment after a valid waiver; AEDPA precludes relief on this ground |
| Whether trial court mischaracterized standby/hybrid counsel and thereby invalidated waiver | Moody: misstatements about standby counsel meant he did not understand alternatives | State: trial court adequately warned of risks; hybrid representation is not required and record shows Moody equivocated or rejected standby counsel | Held: Even assuming some inaccuracies, totality of record and Moody’s conduct support valid waiver; no habeas relief warranted |
| Whether state factual findings are unreasonable under AEDPA | Moody: factual findings (e.g., that he unequivocally waived counsel) are contradicted by record | State: factual findings are supported by extensive colloquies and Moody’s writings/requests; AEDPA presumes correctness of state findings | Held: State factual determinations were not objectively unreasonable; AEDPA deference bars relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (establishes right to self‑representation and requirement that waiver be knowing and intelligent)
- Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (presumption against waiver of fundamental rights)
- Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (waiver must be knowing, voluntary, intelligent; inquiry depends on case‑specific factors)
- Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58 (2013) (addresses interplay between Faretta waiver and later requests for counsel)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (limits on hybrid representation; role of standby counsel)
- Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152 (2000) (no right to self‑representation on direct appeal; standby counsel may be appointed over objection)
- Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (states may deny self‑representation to defendants lacking competency to conduct defense)
- Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (standard for state court decisions contrary to or unreasonably applying Supreme Court law under AEDPA)
- Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (distinguishes unreasonable application from incorrect application under AEDPA)
- Miller‑El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (state factual findings presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence under § 2254(e)(1))