432 P.3d 516
Wyo.2019Background
- Defendant Brent Wall was convicted of first-degree sexual assault (fellatio) of his daughter MW after she reported multiple sexual acts on March 1, 2015; jury convicted on Count I, acquitted Count IV, deadlocked on Counts II–III, which were later dismissed with prejudice.
- DNA testing: oral swab produced a Y-STR profile consistent with Wall (lab statistic ~1 in 1,190); labial swab yielded a weak partial Y-STR profile (common). Serology was negative for semen; autosomal testing excluded MW on dildos.
- During trial a juror sent a note asking for clarification of “consistent” and “excluded”; the judge responded ex parte by giving a photocopy of a prior administrative jury instruction without notifying counsel or defendant.
- Trial counsel (Public Defender) sought funding for a defense DNA expert; funding was denied, counsel retained a consultant at his own expense but did not call an expert at trial and instead cross-examined the State’s DNA witness.
- Post-trial, Wall moved for a new trial claiming ineffective assistance (conflict of interest and failure to pursue intentional secondary DNA transfer theory) and the judge denied the motion; Wall appealed asserting (1) right to be present violation for the ex parte juror contact, and (2) ineffective assistance for conflict and inadequate pursuit of secondary transfer defense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ex parte juror contact | Court erred by responding to juror note without notifying Wall or counsel, violating his right to be present | Judge acted to protect jury integrity; instruction given was administrative and identical to prior instruction | Court held the ex parte contact was error but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (no prejudice) |
| Conflict of interest re: expert funding | Trial counsel feared losing Public Defender job and thus avoided calling an expert, placing counsel’s employment over Wall’s interests | Trial counsel independently retained a consultant, reasonably concluded expert testimony unnecessary, and made tactical choice | Court found no actual conflict of interest and no adverse effect on performance; no ineffective assistance |
| Failure to present expert on Y‑STR reliability | An expert would have undermined the lab’s Y‑STR statistics and database choice, producing reasonable doubt | Defense consultant and cross‑examination elicited favorable statistical concessions; available expert (Hampikian) did not contradict lab or opine unreliability | Court held counsel’s use of consultant and cross‑examination was reasonable; no deficient performance or prejudice |
| Failure to pursue intentional secondary DNA transfer theory | Counsel should have presented expert and father’s testimony showing MW could plant DNA, creating reasonable doubt | Hampikian’s testimony fit both secondary-transfer and State’s dilution theory; father’s testimony was biased/speculative and no corroborating evidence of access to items to plant DNA | Court held no reasonable probability of a different outcome; ineffective‑assistance claim denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1998) (distinguishing administrative communications to jurors from substantive instructions and applying harmless‑error standard for right‑to‑be‑present violations)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (State must show constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (defendant’s presence not required when useless or merely a shadow)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (standard for conflicts of interest requiring showing that an actual conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance)
- Griggs v. State, 367 P.3d 1108 (Wyo. 2016) (counsel’s internal office decisions on expert funding are relevant to—but do not control—ineffective assistance analysis)
- Skinner v. State, 33 P.3d 758 (Wyo. 2001) (defendant’s right to be present at critical stages and purposes of presence)
