Walker v. State, 432 Md. 587

Petitioner Karl M. Walker, Jr., a 38‑year‑old paraeducator, wrote numerous affectionate notes to an 8‑year‑old student (“C”) over several months; notes contained fantasies of kissing, holding, jealousy over a boyfriend, and requests to be “my girl.”
A student teacher found one note in C’s desk; the principal searched C’s desk, found additional notes, and (with principal’s consent) police searched Walker’s unlocked, pod‑style work desk and seized a box containing notes C had given Walker.
Walker was indicted and convicted after a bench trial under Md. Code, Crim. Law § 3‑602 for sexual abuse of a minor and attempt; the trial judge relied on the totality of the notes, hugging/hand‑holding, and psychological impact on C.
Walker challenged (1) the search of his desk as a Fourth Amendment violation (arguing a reasonable expectation of privacy) and (2) sufficiency/meaning of “sexual exploitation” under § 3‑602 (arguing the notes were not criminal sexual exploitation and statute is vague).
The Court of Appeals affirmed: it held Walker lacked a subjective expectation of privacy in the unlocked, centrally located desk; and that the notes and related conduct were sufficient to constitute sexual exploitation under § 3‑602 and the statute is not void for vagueness.

Issue	Walker’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Whether Walker had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his school desk (Fourth Amendment)	Desk was assigned exclusively to him, used for years, no school policy authorizing searches; therefore privacy protected	Desk was unlocked in an open pod area, accessible to students/staff, labeled drawers and Walker did not lock or use provided locker	No — Walker failed to prove a subjective expectation of privacy; search did not implicate Fourth Amendment
Whether non‑explicit affectionate notes and related conduct constitute “sexual exploitation” under § 3‑602	Notes were inappropriate/romantic but not sexual exploitation; statute should be limited to pornography/prostitution or physical sexual acts; statute vague (rule of lenity)	Statute is broad; exploitation includes taking advantage of a child for the defendant’s benefit; context and content of notes can show sexual exploitation even without touching	Yes — viewed in context (38‑yr‑old to 8‑yr‑old, fantasies, jealousy, kisses, requests to be his girl) a rational fact‑finder could find sexual exploitation; conviction stands
Whether § 3‑602 is unconstitutionally vague	Vagueness prevents fair notice; statute fails to define “exploitation”	Statute’s broad terms are interpretable by reference to case law and common meaning; protects children from varied abusive conduct	No — statute gives fair notice and is not void for vagueness; rule of lenity not triggered

O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality framework on public‑employee workplace privacy; ownership/control and office context can reduce expectation of privacy)
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (employee may have privacy interest in office/records even if shared)
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Fourth Amendment applies when there is a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable)
Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400 (1999) (statutory language indicates broad inclusion for sexual molestation or exploitation; defined exploitation as taking advantage of a child)
Crispino v. State, 417 Md. 31 (2010) (non‑contact acts—e.g., French kissing—can constitute sexual abuse of a minor)
Cooksey v. State, 359 Md. 1 (2000) (child sexual abuse may be a single act or continuing course of conduct)
Faulkner v. State, 317 Md. 441 (1989) (minimal expectation of privacy in employer‑owned locker subject to company searches)
Tribbitt v. State, 403 Md. 638 (2008) (statute’s general terms are illustrative, not exhaustive, interpreting § 3‑602 broadly)
Schmitt v. State, 210 Md. App. 488 (2013) (videotaping a minor undressing in her room constituted sexual exploitation under § 3‑602)