Walker v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC
142 F. Supp. 3d 63
| D.D.C. | 2015Background
- Pro se plaintiffs Jovan and David Walker sued Nationstar, Wells Fargo, Citibank, a law firm (Buonassissi, Henning & Lash, PC), three named attorneys, and others, alleging wrongful foreclosure of their Maryland property (1201 Cotswold Court, Abingdon, MD).
- Plaintiffs asserted claims under the False Claims Act (qui tam), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), an asserted private right to enforce a multidefendant Consent Judgment (United States v. Bank of America), various state-law theories, and a due-process claim.
- Nationstar and Wells Fargo moved to dismiss; several other defendants had not appeared or been served.
- The court found plaintiffs proceeding pro se could not maintain a qui tam FCA action and that private parties cannot state a due-process claim absent governmental action.
- The Consent Judgment did not create an enforceable private right for third-party mortgagors; those claims were dismissed with prejudice.
- The remaining FDCPA and state-law claims had no meaningful connection to the District of Columbia (property and events in Maryland), and plaintiffs failed to allege facts supporting venue or that defendants were "debt collectors." The court dismissed the action (mostly without prejudice).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ability of pro se relator to bring FCA qui tam suit | Walker contends §3730(b)(1) allows a person to bring FCA suit and asserts general pro se right | Defendants: FCA qui tam involves U.S. interests; relator must have counsel—pro se relator cannot represent the United States | Court: Pro se plaintiffs cannot maintain FCA qui tam action; FCA claims dismissed without prejudice |
| Due process claim based on private actors | Walker alleges private defendants violated procedures tied to foreclosure and Consent Judgment | Defendants: No governmental actor; private conduct cannot give rise to constitutional due-process claim | Court: Dismissed due process claims without prejudice for lack of governmental action |
| Enforceability of Consent Judgment by non-parties | Walker asserts private right to enforce the Consent Judgment from United States v. Bank of America | Defendants: Consent Judgment limits enforcement to named parties/monitoring committee; no third‑party right | Court: Consent-Judgment claim not actionable; dismissed with prejudice |
| Venue and viability of FDCPA claim | Walker filed in D.C.; asserts FDCPA and state claims | Defendants: Transaction and property are in Maryland; no DC personal jurisdiction or venue; defendants (including Nationstar) are not FDCPA "debt collectors" because servicing began pre-default | Court: Venue improper in D.C.; plaintiffs failed to show defendants are debt collectors; FDCPA and state-law claims dismissed without prejudice (no transfer because federal claim weak) |
Key Cases Cited
- Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 274 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2003) (pro se relator may not prosecute FCA qui tam action)
- U.S. ex rel. Fisher v. Network Software Assocs., 377 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2005) (district precedent barring pro se qui tam relators)
- Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (private parties cannot violate due process absent state action)
- McCain v. Bank of Am., 13 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2014) (Consent Judgment did not create private right of action for third parties)
- Rafferty v. NYNEX Corp., 60 F.3d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (only parties to consent judgment may enforce it absent third-party enforcement clause)
- Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 995 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (only government can seek enforcement of its consent judgment unless judgment provides otherwise)
- Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (standard on dismissal vs. transfer for improper venue)
- Laukus v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2010) (district court may "peek at the merits" when deciding whether transfer is in the interests of justice)
- Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1976) (analogy to requiring counsel where party sues on behalf of others)
- Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1975) (pro se litigant cannot represent others; counsel required)