Waldron v. Roark
298 Neb. 26
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In Feb. 2012, Deputy Lancaster County Sheriff James Roark and Deputy Amanda May entered Marilyn Waldron’s home in plain clothes to serve an arrest warrant for her grandson, Steven Copple.
- Waldron says officers forced past her at the door without a knock/announcement, identified themselves only after entry, and refused to show a badge or warrant when asked.
- During the search for Copple, Waldron followed deputies down stairs despite being told to stay; deputies attempted to handcuff her, and she was subdued, fell, and sustained injuries to her shoulders and broken glasses.
- Waldron sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging: (1) violation of the Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce rule; (2) unlawful arrest (no probable cause); (3) excessive force; and (4) municipal liability (policy or custom).
- The district court initially granted summary judgment to Roark; this court in Waldron I remanded because factual disputes existed. On remand the district court again granted summary judgment, this time on qualified immunity grounds; the Nebraska Supreme Court affirms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Knock-and-announce: Was entry without announcing unlawful and clearly established? | Waldron: officers entered without announcing or showing authority; knock-and-announce rule is established. | Roark: exigent circumstances (risk from Copple and inability to see him) justified no-knock entry; reasonable officer could believe entry lawful. | Court: No clearly established law that every reasonable officer would know these facts precluded exigency; qualified immunity for Roark affirmed. |
| Unlawful arrest: Was there probable cause to arrest Waldron for obstructing government operations? | Waldron: she did not know they were officers and therefore lacked intent to obstruct; no probable cause. | Roark: Waldron was physically impeding deputies executing an arrest warrant; a reasonable officer could conclude probable cause existed. | Court: Even assuming disputed facts, law not sufficiently "clearly established" that no reasonable officer would believe probable cause existed; qualified immunity affirmed. |
| Excessive force: Was Roark’s use of force in handcuffing excessive and clearly established? | Waldron: handcuffing/force (knee in back, falls, injuries) was excessive given her age and prior shoulder surgery. | Roark: Waldron was actively resisting, yelling, and obstructing; force was reasonable under tense, rapidly evolving circumstances. | Court: Although factual disputes exist, the contours of clearly established excessive-force law were not particularized to these facts; qualified immunity affirmed. |
| Municipal liability (Monell): Did Lancaster County have a policy or custom causing the injury? | Waldron: county unofficially permits officers to force entry, refuse to show badge/warrant, and use force despite medical history. | Roark/County: county policies do not authorize such conduct; plaintiff offers only speculation based on the incident. | Court: Speculation is insufficient to show a policy or custom; Monell claim fails. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (standard for clearly established law in qualified immunity analysis)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (courts may decide qualified immunity prongs in either order)
- Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (knock-and-announce is part of reasonableness inquiry)
- Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (standards for no-knock entries/exigent-circumstances exception)
- Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (reasonableness of officer belief for qualified immunity)
- Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875 (8th Cir.) (excessive-force inquiry facts may create material issues)
- Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability under § 1983 requires policy or custom)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (reemphasis that clearly established law must be particularized to facts)