Waldron v. Roark
298 Neb. 26
| Neb. | 2017Background
- On Feb. 22, 2012, Deputy Lancaster County Sheriff James Roark and Deputy Amanda May entered Marilyn Waldron’s house in plain clothes to serve an arrest warrant for her grandson, Steven Copple. Waldron says they pushed past her when she opened the door.
- Waldron claims Roark did not knock or properly announce before entry (no-knock entry), that she did not know they were officers, and that deputies used excessive force handcuffing and arresting her, causing injury.
- Roark contends he saw Copple in the house, knew Copple had prior weapons offenses, and believed exigent circumstances justified immediate entry; he also contends probable cause existed to arrest Waldron for obstructing government operations and that force used was reasonable.
- At first summary-judgment proceedings, the Nebraska Supreme Court (Waldron I) found genuine factual disputes on knock-and-announce and excessive-force issues and remanded. On remand the district court again granted summary judgment to Roark based on qualified immunity.
- On further appeal the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed qualified immunity de novo and held Roark entitled to qualified immunity on the knock-and-announce, unlawful-arrest (probable cause), and excessive-force claims; it also rejected Waldron’s Monell/custom claim against Lancaster County.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Roark violated the Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce rule by entering without announcement | Waldron: Roark entered without knocking/announcing; no exigency justified a no-knock entry. | Roark: He reasonably suspected exigent circumstances (safety, Copple’s prior weapons offenses, possible flight/destruction of evidence) so no-knock entry was lawful. | Court: Even assuming no announcement, qualified immunity applies because law was not "clearly established" that an officer in Roark’s situation would know the entry was unlawful. |
| Whether Roark had probable cause to arrest Waldron for obstructing government operations | Waldron: She didn’t know they were officers and thus lacked intent required for obstruction. | Roark: Waldron physically impeded deputies; a reasonable officer could believe she knew they were officers and intended to obstruct. | Court: Qualified immunity—law not clearly established that a reasonable officer would know no probable cause; Roark entitled to immunity. |
| Whether Roark used excessive force in handcuffing/arresting Waldron | Waldron: Force (knee in back, pulling causing falls, injuries) was excessive given her age/shoulder surgery and compliance requests. | Roark: Waldron was actively resisting, screaming, ignoring commands, and officer could reasonably use force to effect arrest. | Court: Qualified immunity—contours of excessive-force law not clearly established in these facts; reasonable officer could have believed force lawful. |
| Whether Lancaster County is liable under Monell for a policy or custom causing the injury | Waldron: County has an unofficial custom permitting such conduct; actions reflect county policy. | Roark/County: Written SOPs do not condone the conduct; no evidence linking acts to an official policy or custom. | Court: No evidence of policy/custom; Monell claim fails. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (clearly established-law standard for qualified immunity)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (courts may address either prong of qualified immunity first)
- Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (knock-and-announce principle is part of Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis)
- Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (no-knock entries allowed when reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances exists)
- Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (reasonableness of officer belief assessed under qualified immunity)
- Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires an unconstitutional policy or custom)
- Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. discussion of excessive force issues; relied on but distinguished)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (recent Supreme Court emphasis that clearly established law must be particularized)