Waldron v. Roark, 298 Neb. 26

Waldron sued Roark under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations arising from Roark and May entering Waldron’s home on February 22, 2012 to serve an arrest warrant on Copple.
Waldron alleged knock-and-announce violations, unlawful arrest, and excessive force during handcuffing and restraint.
The district court granted Roark summary judgment on qualified immunity and Waldron appealed; this court previously remanded for further development on qualified immunity.
On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment concluding Roark possessed qualified immunity on knock-and-announce and excessive-force claims, and that Waldron’s official-capacity claim failed.
The Nebraska Supreme Court analyzes the case under the qualified-immunity framework, addressing whether Waldron’s rights were clearly established in the particular circumstances.
The court ultimately held Roark entitled to qualified immunity on both the knock-and-announce claim and the excessive-force claim, and found no evidence of a Lancaster County policy or custom causing Waldron’s damages.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Roark entitled to qualified immunity on knock-and-announce?	Waldron contends Roark violated clearly established knock-and-announce rights.	Roark acted under exigent circumstances; no-knock entry was reasonable.	Roark entitled to qualified immunity.
Arrest of Waldron without probable cause or warrant was unlawful?	Waldron argues lack of probable cause; arrest improper.	Roark had probable cause to arrest for obstructing government operations; fault lies in mistaken belief of legality, not clearly established rights.	Roark entitled to qualified immunity.
Was there evidence of a Lancaster County policy or custom causing Waldron's damages?	County policy or unofficial custom permitted such actions.	No admissible evidence showing an official county policy or custom; speculation not enough.	No evidence of policy or custom; Waldron's claim fails.
Roark entitled to summary judgment in official capacity?	Roark’s official-capacity claim should proceed to trial.	District court correctly granted summary judgment in Roark’s official capacity.	Affirmed; not argued on appeal by Waldron.

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (clearly established standard; breathing room for officials)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (unlawful-not-unavoidable; modify two-prong approach)
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (contextualized, not broad, clearly established inquiry)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability; policy/custom requirement)
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (reaffirmed need for fact-specific, not general, clearly established law)
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (2012) (contextual factors for reasonable force; on-point framework)