Wade v. Nassau County
674 F. App'x 96
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Raymond Wade (pro se on appeal but represented by counsel below) brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the Eastern District of New York.
- The district court dismissed Wade’s complaint for failure to prosecute under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) after nearly two years of delay in the litigation.
- The delays were caused primarily by Wade’s counsel’s failures to comply with obligations and court scheduling, not by Wade personally.
- The district court warned that further delay could lead to dismissal and explored lesser sanctions against counsel (including referral to grievance committee and contempt), then dismissed without prejudice.
- Defendants had actively defended the case and the court found continued delay prejudicial and detrimental to docket management.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) was appropriate | Wade argued dismissal was improper because delays were caused by his attorney, not him personally | Defendants argued long delay and prejudice warranted dismissal | Affirmed: dismissal was within district court’s discretion after weighing factors |
| Whether the district court adequately considered lesser sanctions aimed at counsel | Wade contended court should have imposed sanctions on counsel instead of dismissing | Defendants maintained dismissal was justified despite counsel-focused delay because other factors favored dismissal | Held: court sufficiently explored lesser sanctions and threatened remedies against counsel; dismissal still permissible |
| Whether dismissal should be with prejudice given counsel’s role | Wade argued counsel’s misconduct should not extinguish his claim | Defendants argued dismissal (even without prejudice) was appropriate to address delay and prejudice | Held: dismissal was without prejudice; district court did not abuse discretion in dismissing given the circumstances |
Key Cases Cited
- Lewis v. Rawson, 564 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 2009) (sets out five-factor test for Rule 41(b) and cautions dismissal is a harsh remedy)
- United States ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d 248 (2d Cir. 2004) (no single Rule 41(b) factor is dispositive)
- Dodson v. Runyon, 86 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1996) (when plaintiff is counseled, plaintiff is generally bound by counsel’s acts; court should consider sanctions directed at counsel)
- Mitchell v. Lyons Prof’l Servs., Inc., 708 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 2013) (district court need not exhaust all alternative sanctions but must consider them)