Wade Robertson v. Rise Pichon
849 F.3d 1173
9th Cir.2017Background
- On April 27, 2006, Robertson left a bar intoxicated, drove, made an illegal left turn, and was stopped by Palo Alto police; officers observed alcohol on his breath and performed field sobriety tests indicating impairment.
- Officers found a billy club in Robertson’s truck; Robertson later told an officer it belonged in the truck and asked whether possession was a misdemeanor.
- At booking Robertson refused both breath and blood chemical tests and told an officer “I want my attorney” after reading a DMV form; he was subsequently given Miranda warnings and later questioned about the billy club.
- Charged with DUI (Cal. Veh. Code §23152), a refusal enhancement (Cal. Veh. Code §23577/§23612), and possession of a billy club (Cal. Pen. Code §12020(a)(1)); convicted on all counts.
- State courts denied suppression and affirmed; Robertson filed a federal habeas petition confined by the COA to whether admission of his statements about the billy club violated Edwards v. Arizona.
- The Ninth Circuit (en banc precedent and AEDPA deference framed analysis) affirmed, holding the state court’s rejection of the Edwards claim was not objectively unreasonable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Robertson’s statement “I want my attorney” invoked Miranda/Edwards so that subsequent questioning about the billy club was barred | Robertson: He was in custody when he invoked counsel in response to requests to submit to chemical tests, so Edwards barred further police-initiated interrogation and statements should be suppressed | State: Request to submit to chemical tests is not a custodial interrogation under Miranda/Edwards; his statement was an anticipatory invocation not triggering Edwards protections for later interrogation | Held: AEDPA deference upheld state court; request to test is not Miranda interrogation (Neville/Muniz) and anticipatory invocation did not reasonably trigger Edwards — admission of billy-club statements was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent |
| Ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure to object to admission of billy-club statements | Robertson: Counsel failed to object due to legal error and thus provided deficient performance | State: Tactical reasons (avoid futility or permit jury to hear exculpatory framing) plausibly explain decision; Strickland presumes strategy | Held: No COA — state court reasonably applied Strickland; not debatable |
| Instructional error re: refusal-enhancement element (lawful arrest) and prejudice | Robertson: Trial court omitted an element (lawful arrest) and violated Apprendi/Chapman; error was prejudicial | State: Overwhelming evidence supported legality of arrest; any omission harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Held: Reasonable jurist could agree Appellate Division’s Chapman harmlessness conclusion; AEDPA bars relief |
| Exclusion of surveillance photos/evidence and related claims (right to present a defense, prosecutorial misconduct, Second Amendment challenge) | Robertson: Exclusion hampered impeachment of officer; prosecutor misstated evidence in closing; statute criminalizing billy club violates Heller/McDonald/Caetano | State: Trial court’s Cal. Evid. Code §352 balancing was permissible; prosecutor’s remarks did not infect trial; no clearly established Supreme Court law extending Heller to billy clubs at that time | Held: State court rulings not unreasonable under AEDPA; no viable Crane/Darden/Heller-based relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (prophylactic rule: once counsel invoked, police-initiated custodial interrogation must cease)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (custodial interrogation requires Miranda warnings; right to counsel/protect against compelled self-incrimination)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (Miranda protects against express questioning and its functional equivalent)
- South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (police request for blood-alcohol test in DWI context is not interrogation under Miranda)
- McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (invocation of right to counsel must be a request to deal with custodial interrogation; no anticipatory invocation outside custodial interrogation)
- Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23 (Miranda/Edwards not clearly established to require suppression where initial noncustodial encounter preceded custody)
- Sessoms v. Grounds, 776 F.3d 615 (9th Cir.) (discussed for invocation ambiguity in custodial interrogation)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (breath tests may be searched incident to arrest; addressed test-administering limits)