W.J. Perroz v. Fox Chapel Borough
143 A.3d 520
Pa. Commw. Ct.2016Background
- William J. Perroz was a Fox Chapel Borough police officer (hired 1990) who suffered an on‑duty right shoulder injury in 2010, underwent surgeries in 2011–2012, and was honorably discharged by reason of disability in March 2014.
- Perroz applied for a disability pension under the Borough police pension Plan; the Plan defines “Total and Permanent Disability” to require qualification for federal Social Security disability benefits.
- The Plan Administrator denied Perroz’s application because Perroz did not apply for or claim entitlement to federal Social Security disability benefits; the Plan and the 2013 CBA incorporate the Plan’s definition of disability.
- Perroz appealed; a hearing was conducted before a privately retained hearing officer (Ira Weiss), whose findings were adopted by Borough Council in Resolution 600 denying benefits; Perroz appealed to the trial court, which affirmed.
- The trial court (and now this Court) reviewed under the Local Agency Law standards and held that Perroz is bound by the CBA/Plan definition he and his bargaining unit accepted; Norcini and related precedents preclude attacking voluntarily negotiated CBA pension terms as illegal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Perroz was entitled to a disability pension despite the Plan/CBA requiring qualification for federal SSDI | Perroz: Ridley Park controls — borough code/Act 600 require that an officer honorably discharged for disability be eligible for pension; definition should be inability to perform police work | Borough: Plan/CBA definition (requiring SSDI qualification) was bargained for and binding; Perroz cannot now disavow the negotiated term | Held: Court affirmed denial; Perroz is bound by the voluntarily negotiated Plan/CBA definition; Ridley Park inapplicable here because this is not an arbitration‑fashioned CBA term |
| Whether the hearing officer was not neutral (due process) because he was appointed/paid by the Borough | Perroz: Due process requires a neutral, detached adjudicator; appointment/compensation of the hearing officer by Borough creates an appearance of bias | Borough: Appointment and payment of an adjudicator by the agency is insufficient, by itself, to show bias where prosecutorial and adjudicative functions are separated | Held: Waived (not raised administratively); even on merits, no due process violation — separation of functions existed and mere appointment/compensation does not create disqualifying appearance of impropriety |
| Whether denying pension benefits here violates public policy (given state aid, offset rules, and line‑of‑duty injury) | Perroz: Public policy favors granting pension to an officer honorably discharged for inability to perform police work; state funding and offsetting of SSDI create inequity | Borough: Claim waived; voluntarily agreed CBA terms that provide lesser benefits are not void as against public policy absent statutory conflict or arbitration exception | Held: Waived; merits rejected — voluntarily negotiated CBA/Plan controls and public policy argument insufficient to overcome it |
| Standard of review / availability of relief under Local Agency Law | Perroz: (implicit) seeking de novo relief that would reinterpret statutory protections | Borough: Review limited to errors of law, constitutional violations, procedural defects, or lack of substantial evidence | Held: Review limited; no constitutional or procedural defect shown and findings supported; affirmance appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Ridley Park Police v. Borough of Ridley Park, 524 A.2d 998 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (borough may not adopt pension regulations to render officers honorably discharged for disability ineligible for pension)
- Norcini v. City of Coatesville, 915 A.2d 1243 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (an officer cannot later reject voluntarily negotiated CBA pension provisions as illegal)
- Krenzel v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 840 A.2d 450 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (appointing and compensating a hearing officer by the agency, standing alone, does not establish a due‑process violation)
- Paupst v. Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement Board, 788 A.2d 1067 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (PMRS agreement can control the applicable disability definition where parties are bound by PMRS terms)
- Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (U.S. 1972) (due process requires a neutral and detached adjudicator)
- Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (U.S. 1975) (combination of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions within an agency does not per se violate due process)