William J. Paupst (Paupst) petitions for review from the January 18, 2001 order of the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement Board (Board) that denied his application for service-connected disability benefits. We are asked to consider whether Paupst, a participating member of the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement System (PMRS), is entitled to receive disability pension benefits where he is permanently disabled from performing his duties as a police officer but is otherwise capable of gainful employment. We affirm.
On February 20, 1990, the Township hired Paupst as a full-time police officer. (Finding of Fact “F.F.” 3) While Paupst was so employed, the Township Board of Supervisors (Supervisors) and the Township Police Benevolence Association were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), effective January 1, 1993. (F.F.17, 18) The CBA governed the conditions and terms of Paupst’s employment with the Township, including the conditions and terms of his pension plan. {Id.)
By Ordinance Number 3-16-93A, the Township enrolled in the PMRS under Article IV of the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement Law (Law)
On January 4, 1994, Paupst slipped and fell on ice during the course of his employment and, as a result, tore his medial and lateral meniscus in his left knee. (F.F.4) Paupst’s filed a claim petition for workers’ compensation benefits and ultimately received a total of $33,441.86 in benefits. (F.F.7)
On January 21, 1997, the Supervisors found that Paupst was injured during the scope and course of his employment when he suffered a permanent injury to his knee. (F.F.5) The Supervisors further concluded that Paupst’s injury left him totally disabled from performing the duties and functions of a police officer and, accordingly, they discharged him. (F.F.6, 8)
Thereafter, Paupst filed an application with the PMRS for a service-connected disability pension. By letter dated July 27, 1998, the PMRS denied Paupst’s application because its examining physician opined that Paupst was capable of gainful employment as of January 21, 1997, the date of his discharge. (F.F.12) Since that time, Paupst has been gainfully employed and earned approximately $40,000.00 per year. (F.F.24)
Paupst appealed the denial of his application to the Board. Upon consideration, the Board adopted the hearing examiner’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own. Thus, it concluded that because Paupst was capable of gainful employment, he was not eligible for a disability pension. This appeal followed.
Article IV, Section 403(4) of the Law,
[ajfter a member has had the required number of years of total service as stat*1069 ed in the contract, he may, upon application ... be retired by the [B]oard on a disability allowance if he is under superannuation retirement age, and on a superannuation retirement allowance if he has attained or passed such age, if the physician designated by the [BJoard, after medical examination of the member ... shall certify to the [B]oard that the member is unable to engage in any gainful employment and that said member ought to be retired. Where the disability of a member is determined to be service-connected, as defined in this act, no minimum period of service shall be required for eligibility....
53 P.S. § 881.411(a).
Section 6 of the Agreement provides that a member who has more than ten years of credited service may, upon application, be retired on a disability pension if the Board physician certifies that the member is unable to engage in any gainful employment and ought to be retired. (F.F. 22; R.R. 58a) Section 6 further provides that where the disability is determined to be service-connected, no minimum period of service is required for eligibility. (Id.) When read together, the Law and the Agreement provide that a member, with either ten years of service or a service-connected disability, may be eligible for a disability pension where the Board’s physician certifies that the member is unable to engage in any gainful employment and should be retired.
Paupst contends that he is eligible for a service-connected disability because he met the criteria under Section 102 of the Law
That term, as it relates to disability retirement pursuant to Section 411 of the Law, is relevant only to the minimum period of service required for eligibility of benefits. Under Section 411, an applicant must undergo a medical examination by a Board-designated physician to determine if the applicant is able to engage in any gainful employment regardless of whether the disability is service-connected. In other words, a service-connected disability does not automatically entitle an applicant to benefits; the decisive factor under Section 411(a) is whether the applicant is unable to engage in any gainful employment.
Thus, we approach the crux of Paupst’s argument: whether the term “disability” should be defined as that which renders him incapable of performing his duties as a police officer, as opposed to that which renders him incapable of any gainful employment. In support of his position, Paupst cites Ridley Park Police v. Borough of Ridley Park, 105 Pa.Cmwlth. 474, 524 A.2d 998 (1987).
In 1985, the Borough of Ridley Park (Borough) and the fraternal order of police (FOP) entered into negotiations for a new CBA and reached an impasse over the definition of “disability” for purposes of pension entitlement. At least since 1976, the CBA provided that a police officer was
An arbitration panel found in favor of the Borough and the FOP appealed to the court of common pleas. The court of common pleas struck down the panel’s definition, and the Borough appealed to this Court. On appeal, the Borough argued that Section 1 of Act 600 did not prohibit such a definition of disability.
Section 1 of Act 600 authorized the Borough to establish a police pension and to prescribe its terms and conditions. To that extent, the Borough’s pension plan was governed by The Borough Code (Borough Code).
The Borough argued that police officers covered under the PMRS could retire on a disability pension only if they were unable to engage in any gainful employment and that the PMRS definition of disability should apply to borough officers as well. We rejected this position, citing our previous decision in Crawford v. Borough of Lewisburg, 42 Pa.Cmwlth. 260, 401 A.2d 385 (1979). In Crawford, we interpreted the language “affecting his ability to continue in service” in the Borough Code to mean that the Legislature “intended the disability to be one which rendered the officer incapable of performing his normal duties permanently.” Crawford, 401 A.2d at 388 (emphasis added). Therefore, we concluded in Ridley Park that because the Borough Code controlled, any alternate definition would be inappropriate.
Presently, Paupst contends that we should apply the definition of “disability” as determined in Ridley Park because Section 2 of what is commonly referred to as the Police Tenure Act,
Although the Agreement and the Law do not define “gainful employment,” Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “[wjork that a person can pursue and perform for money.” Black’s Law DictionaRY, 544 (7th Ed.1999). Other jurisdictions have recognized that gainful employment is work performed for remuneration. See Celi v. Trustees of Pipefitters Local 537 Pension Plan, 975 F.Supp. 23 (D.Mass.
As that term is commonly used, the Board’s conclusion that Paupst was gainfully employed because he earned approximately $40,000.00 per year since 1997 is supported by the record. Therefore, the Board properly denied his application for disability pension benefits.
And finally, Paupst contends that the Board and Township have the authority to enter into optional retirement plans under Section 104(11) of the Law.
Accordingly, we affirm.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day of November, 2001, the January 18, 2001 order of the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement Board is hereby AFFIRMED.
. On review, we are limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, an error of law was committed, or whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Green v. Pennsylvania Mun. Ret. Bd., 678 A.2d 432 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996).
. Act of February 1, 1974, P.L. 34, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 881.101-881.501.
. 53 P.S. § 881.402.
. 53 P.S. § 881.403(4).
. 53 P.S. § 881.102.
. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4.
.Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 566, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1201-1603.
. Act of Februaiy 1, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1656, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 45101-48501.
. 53 P.S. § 46190.
. Act of June 15, 1951, P.L. 586, as amended, 53 P.S. § 812.
. 53 P.S. § 881.104(11).