Vulcan Construction Materials, L.P. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission
700 F.3d 297
7th Cir.2012Background
- Dunne filed a discrimination complaint with MSHA under 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2) alleging Vulcan terminated him for safety-related activity.
- MSHA found the complaint not frivolous and Vulcan agreed to a temporary economic reinstatement of Dunne.
- Secretary later determined no discrimination occurred and there was no prosecution before the FMSHRC.
- Dunne then filed a discrimination action before the Commission under § 815(c)(3); Vulcan moved to dissolve the reinstatement order.
- ALJ denied dissolution; Commission denied, then Vulcan sought review in the Seventh Circuit.
- Court reverses the Commission, holding the temporary reinstatement ends when the Secretary’s involvement ends under § 815(c)(2).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the temporary reinstatement end under § 815(c)(2)? | Dunne argues it ends only upon final Commission merits order. | Vulcan argues it ends when the Secretary ends involvement, per plain language. | Temporary reinstatement ends when Secretary's involvement ends. |
| Should deference be given to the Secretary's interpretation of § 815(c)? | Secretary's interpretation should control, under Chevron/Skidmore. | Court should defer to Vulcan's plain-language reading; not persuasive. | No Chevron deference; Secretary's interpretation not persuasive. |
| Is the phrase 'final order on the complaint' tied to § 815(c)(2) or § 815(c)(3)? | Term refers to the Secretary's complaint before the Commission under § 815(c)(2). | Term encompasses the miner's underlying complaint as well as Secretary's action. | 'Final order on the complaint' pertains to § 815(c)(2) proceedings; not extended into § 815(c)(3). |
| Does structural wording (complaint vs. action) reflect congressional intent on temporary reinstatement duration? | Different words imply different durations; reinstatement should extend to § 815(c)(3). | Different terms reflect separate tracks; reinstatement ends with Secretary’s end. | Structural language supports end of reinstatement when Secretary stops involvement. |
| Should the Secretary’s position receive deference under Skidmore/Mead? | Secretary’s view should be persuasive deference. | Secretary’s position lacks power to persuade; not entitled to Chevron. | |
| Secretary’s view afforded no Chevron deference; only Skidmore persuasion; insufficient support. |
Key Cases Cited
- Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) (collateral-order-like analysis for review standards cited)
- Jim Walter Res., Inc. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n ex rel. Price, 920 F.2d 738 (11th Cir. 1990) (illustrates irreparable hearing concerns in reinstatement context)
- Phillips v. A & S Construction Co., 31 FMSHRC 975 (Sept. 2009) (early administrative interpretation of temporary reinstatement)
- Gray v. North Fork Coal Corp., 33 FMSHRC 27 (Jan. 2011) (Commission's stance on § 815(c) duration before final order)
- Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 499 U.S. 144 (1991) (deference for agency interpretations in OSH context; framework for deference)
- Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (limits Chevron deference for informal agency statements)
- Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (deference standards for agency interpretations; context-sensitive)
- N. Fork Coal Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety Health Rev Comm'n, 691 F.3d 735 (6th Cir. 2012) (recent circuit on deference to Secretary's position)