Virginia E. Alldredge and Julia A. Luker, as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Venita Hargis v. The Good Samaritan Home, Inc.
2014 Ind. LEXIS 452
| Ind. | 2014Background
- Decedent Venita Hargis died November 26, 2006 from a head injury sustained while a resident at Good Samaritan Home; plaintiffs allege the injury was caused by another resident pushing her.
- Plaintiffs (Hargis’s co-personal representatives) learned of the alleged assault on November 24, 2009, after a former employee disclosed it; they opened an estate in December 2010 and sued on October 27, 2011.
- The Indiana Wrongful Death Act requires a personal representative to commence suit within two years of death. Good Samaritan moved to dismiss/for summary judgment arguing the two-year period is a non-claim condition precedent that cannot be tolled by fraudulent concealment.
- Plaintiffs invoked the Fraudulent Concealment Statute and common-law fraudulent concealment, and argued Van Dusen’s discovery-rule approach should give them two years from discovery to file.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for defendant (finding plaintiffs untimely). Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding plaintiffs had two years from discovery to file and remanding to allow proof of common-law fraud. Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Fraudulent Concealment Statute (or fraud) can toll the Wrongful Death Act’s two-year filing period | Fraudulent Concealment Statute requires two years from discovery; common-law fraud or statute tolls the two-year period | Wrongful Death Act’s two-year period is a non-claim condition precedent not subject to tolling by fraud or statute | The Fraudulent Concealment Statute (and common-law fraud where proven) can toll the two-year wrongful death filing period; reversed summary judgment and remanded |
| Whether courts should treat wrongful-death filing period as a statute of limitations vs. condition precedent for tolling analysis | Plaintiffs: discovery-based tolling applies (Van Dusen principle) | Defendant: the two-year limit is a statutory condition precedent that cannot be tolled | Court applied presumption against allowing a defendant to profit from its fraud and extended statutory tolling principles to wrongful death claims |
| Whether precedent (Guy/Glus) permits tolling/non-claim estoppel | Plaintiffs: Guy and Glus support tolling/estoppel when defendant fraudulently conceals | Defendant: legislative intent to make wrongful death time bar absolute (relying on prior Ct. App. views) | Court followed Guy/Glus presumption that fraud vitiates time bars unless legislature clearly intended otherwise |
| Whether Southerland controls to deny tolling here | Plaintiffs: Southerland is distinguishable because discovery occurred after the statutory period had run | Defendant: Southerland supports that wrongful death filing period is non-tollable | Court rejected Southerland’s restrictive reading and separated common-law “reasonable time” concept from statutory tolling under the Fraudulent Concealment Statute |
Key Cases Cited
- Raymond v. Simonson, 4 Blackf. 77 (Ind. 1835) (historical observation on difficulties in limitation statutes)
- Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. 101 (Ind. 1956) (fraud vitiates time bars; common-law fraud can preserve otherwise time-barred claims)
- Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (U.S. 1959) (equitable estoppel may prevent a defendant from asserting a non-claim time bar when defendant’s fraud misled plaintiff)
- Van Dusen v. Stotts, 712 N.E.2d 491 (Ind. 1999) (discovery rule applied to toll a statutory period in medical-malpractice context)
- Malachowski v. Bank One, Indianapolis, 590 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1992) (explaining statutory fraudulent concealment moves accrual to discovery date)