Viniegra v. Town of Parker Municipal Property Corp.
241 Ariz. 22
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- On April 14, 2012, Luis Viniegra slipped and fell at a funeral on property owned/operated by the Town of Parker Municipal Property Corporation; he suffered serious injuries and began immediate treatment.
- Viniegra timely submitted a statutory notice of claim under A.R.S. § 12-821.01; the Town’s risk administrator (Berkley) opened a claim and received medical bills, but the Town never responded.
- Plaintiffs filed suit on April 10, 2014 — nearly two years after the injury — asserting negligence and an implied promise by the Town/Berkley that he would not need to sue.
- The Town moved to dismiss under A.R.S. § 12-821 (one-year limitations for actions against public entities); the superior court dismissed with prejudice and denied reconsideration. Plaintiffs appealed.
- Plaintiffs argued (1) equitable estoppel should toll § 12-821 because the Town’s handling of the claim induced delay, and (2) § 12-821 is unconstitutional as applied, violating equal protection and the Arizona anti-abrogation clause.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed: equitable estoppel did not apply; § 12-821 is a constitutional regulation (not an abrogation) and survives rational-basis review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Town is equitably estopped from asserting § 12-821 | Viniegra says Town’s solicitation/opening of a claim and handling by its risk adjuster induced him to forbear filing suit | Town says no admission of liability, no settlement negotiations, no promise to toll limitations; notice deemed denied after 60 days | Not estopped — no evidence Town admitted liability or made specific promises that reasonably induced delay; notice was effectively denied and accrual occurred at injury |
| When did the cause of action accrue for § 12-821 purposes | Viniegra contends accrual should await end/extent of medical treatment and knowledge of damages | Town contends accrual occurred when Viniegra knew he was injured and who caused it (the date of the fall) | Accrual occurred at the injury date; continuing treatment or unknown dollar damages do not toll accrual |
| Whether § 12-821 violates the Arizona Constitution’s anti-abrogation clause | Plaintiffs claim one-year limit for public entities effectively abrogates the right to sue compared to two-year private-party limit | Town argues the statute regulates the right (a limitation) rather than abolishes it; it provides a reasonable window to sue | § 12-821 is regulatory, not abrogative; it provides a reasonable time and does not violate art. 18 § 6 |
| Whether § 12-821 violates equal protection by treating public-entity claims differently than private-party claims | Plaintiffs urge heightened scrutiny, arguing a fundamental right is burdened | Town argues rational-basis review applies because the statute regulates (not abolishes) the right; the classification furthers legitimate state interests | Rational-basis applies; statute is rationally related to legitimate interests (avoid stale claims, permit investigation, budgeting), so equal protection claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352 (2012) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals)
- Nolde v. Frankie, 192 Ariz. 276 (1998) (elements for equitable estoppel against statute of limitations)
- McBride v. Kieckhefer Assocs., Inc., 228 Ariz. 262 (App. 2011) (settlement negotiations without admission of liability do not ordinarily support estoppel)
- Porter v. Spader, 225 Ariz. 424 (App. 2010) (equity may bar a limitations defense when defendant’s fraud/concealment misleads plaintiff)
- Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa County v. Gaines, 202 Ariz. 248 (App. 2002) (upholding constitutionality of § 12-821 as regulation rather than abrogation)
- Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 176 Ariz. 340 (1993) (distinguishing regulation of causes of action from unconstitutional abrogation)
- Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69 (1984) (framework for equal protection analysis and tiers of scrutiny)
