Vincent Manikan v. Peters & Freedman, LLP, 981 F.3d 712

Manikan, a San Diego homeowner, fell behind on HOA dues; Peters & Freedman (P&F) recorded a delinquent-assessment lien and a 2012 Notice of Default and initiated nonjudicial foreclosure.
Manikan filed Chapter 13, listed the HOA as a secured creditor, and proposed a plan that provided for and paid the pre-petition arrearage; the trustee and creditor’s agent later filed notices that the claim was paid in full and the bankruptcy court entered a discharge.
After the debt was paid and after discharge, P&F hired Advanced Attorney Services (AAS) to re-serve the 2012 Notice of Default; the process server entered Manikan’s yard without permission, banged on windows, and prompted a police response.
P&F later admitted there was no balance owing when it commissioned the re-service.
Manikan sued P&F under the FDCPA (sections 1692d, 1692e, 1692f). The district court granted summary judgment for P&F, concluding Walls v. Wells Fargo precluded the FDCPA claims; Manikan appealed.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding Walls does not bar FDCPA claims that are independent of a bankruptcy discharge violation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the pre-petition HOA arrearage was discharged	Manikan: debt not discharged because it was repaid before discharge	P&F: debt provided for by the confirmed plan and discharged under §1328(a)	Court: debt was discharged—plan provided for the claim and payments were completed
Whether Walls bars FDCPA claims when the debt was provided for in bankruptcy but fully paid before discharge	Manikan: Walls does not apply; claim rests on independent wrong—attempt to collect a paid debt	P&F: Walls precludes FDCPA claims whenever debt was provided for in bankruptcy and discharged	Court: Walls only precludes FDCPA claims that are premised on enforcing a bankruptcy discharge injunction; it does not bar independent FDCPA theories based on full payment or abusive collection tactics
Whether Manikan abandoned his vicarious-liability claim for the process server’s conduct	Manikan: preserved vicarious-liability claim	P&F: Manikan failed to raise it below and thus abandoned it	Court: Not abandoned; district court did not rule on vicarious liability and the argument was not forfeited on appeal

Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 2002) (held FDCPA claims that are effectively suits to enforce a bankruptcy discharge must be pursued in bankruptcy contempt proceedings and cannot proceed under the FDCPA to circumvent the discharge enforcement scheme)
Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993) (interpreting "provided for" in §1328(a) to mean a plan makes provision for or deals with a claim)
Midland Funding LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017) (held filing a proof of claim that is facially time-barred is not actionable under FDCPA §§1692e or 1692f because the creditor holds a right to payment and bankruptcy protections limit civil-court intrusion into bankruptcy questions)
Garfield v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 811 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2016) (concluded Bankruptcy Code did not implicitly repeal the FDCPA)
Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2013) (same conclusion regarding coexistence of Bankruptcy Code and FDCPA)
Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 2004) (held FDCPA claims are not impliedly repealed by the Bankruptcy Code)