Villarreal v. Arnold
1:17-cv-03141
N.D. Ill.Sep 11, 2017Background
- In 2009 Jonathan Arnold sued Leticia Villarreal; Villarreal later prevailed and Arnold’s suit was finally terminated in her favor (Seventh Circuit affirmed).
- Villarreal filed an earlier abuse-of-process case against Arnold that was dismissed with prejudice before her malicious-prosecution claim had accrued.
- Villarreal then sued Arnold for malicious prosecution, alleging he brought the 2009 suit maliciously, without probable cause, and to financially pressure her during concurrent California custody proceedings.
- She alleges Arnold sought to freeze her assets, that she lost investment properties to foreclosure, suffered emotional harm, and that the litigation interfered with her child relationship and income.
- Arnold moved to dismiss for res judicata and failure to plead the Illinois-required “special injury.” The court found res judicata inapplicable but addressed the special-injury requirement.
- The court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to plead a special injury that is distinct from ordinary litigation burdens.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether claim preclusion bars the malicious-prosecution suit | Villarreal argued her claim accrued only after favorable termination, so it could not have been brought earlier | Arnold argued res judicata should bar the new malicious-prosecution claim | Court: Res judicata does not bar the suit because the malicious-prosecution claim had not yet accrued when the earlier case was dismissed |
| Whether the complaint pleads the four elements of malicious prosecution under Illinois law | Villarreal alleged malice, lack of probable cause, favorable termination, and special injury (loss of income, foreclosures, custody interference, emotional distress) | Arnold argued plaintiff failed to plead the required special injury beyond ordinary litigation harms | Court: First three elements sufficiently alleged; complaint fails to plead the required special injury |
| What qualifies as a “special injury” under Illinois law | Villarreal claimed foreclosure-related income loss and custody interference constitute special injury | Arnold contended financial loss from defending a suit and emotional harms are ordinary litigation consequences and not special injuries | Court: Financial loss from foreclosure and emotional/custody harms are ordinary litigation consequences and not the kind of direct, quantifiable interference with person or property Illinois requires |
| Whether successive-harassing-suits theory applies | Villarreal invoked successive suits theory (harassment) to show special injury | Arnold noted only one underlying federal action was filed (no repeated, onslaught litigation) | Court: Successive-suits theory inapplicable; facts do not show repeated litigation sufficient to constitute special injury |
Key Cases Cited
- Ferguson v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill.2d 94 (Illinois 2004) (malicious-prosecution claim accrues only after favorable termination)
- Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology Int’l, 177 Ill.2d 267 (Illinois 1997) (elements of malicious prosecution under Illinois law)
- Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (U.S. 2001) (federal courts in diversity apply state claim-preclusion rules)
- Harmon v. Gordon, 712 F.3d 1044 (7th Cir. 2013) (definition and limits of Illinois “special injury” requirement)
- Bank of Lyons v. Schultz, 78 Ill.2d 235 (Illinois 1979) (interference with property rights can constitute special injury)
- Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995) (special injury must directly emanate from the alleged malicious prosecution)