Villanueva v. United States, 893 F.3d 123

Villanueva (formerly Zebrowski) was convicted of unlawful firearm possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and had prior convictions including Connecticut first‑degree assault (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‑59(a)(1)).
At original sentencing (2000) the PSR recounted that Villanueva shot the victim; the district court applied the ACCA's 15‑year mandatory minimum and imposed a 262‑month sentence.
After Johnson (2015) invalidated ACCA's residual clause, Villanueva pursued collateral relief; the Second Circuit authorized a successive § 2255 to test whether his assault convictions still qualified under the elements (force) clause.
The district court (2016) found it more likely than not that the original sentence rested on the now‑invalid residual clause and concluded the Connecticut assault statute lacked an element of "physical force," vacating the sentence and resentencing Villanueva to time served.
The government appealed, arguing the Connecticut first‑degree assault statute does require the use of violent physical force (under the modified categorical approach), so the conviction remains an ACCA predicate.
The Second Circuit majority disagreed with the district court, held the assault conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate under the elements (force) clause, vacated the district court’s rulings, and remanded for resentencing; Judge Pooler dissented.

Issue	Government's Argument	Villanueva's Argument	Held
Whether Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a‑59(a)(1) (first‑degree assault by causing serious physical injury by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument) qualifies as a "violent felony" under ACCA's elements (force) clause	The statute requires causing serious physical injury by a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument; under Castleman, causing injury (even indirectly, e.g., via a substance) involves use of physical force and, because the statute requires serious injury, it meets ACCA's "violent" force requirement	The statute can reach causation without force (e.g., poisoning or other non‑forceful causation); Connecticut courts do not require a force element; thus it lacks the ACCA "physical force" element	Majority: Conn. § 53a‑59(a)(1) qualifies as an ACCA predicate because causing serious physical injury by a dangerous instrument/substance involves violent physical force under federal law (relying on Castleman). Dissent: Castleman was cabined to the domestic‑violence misdemeanor context and does not control ACCA force analysis; Chrzanoski favors Villanueva

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (elements clause requires "violent force")
Castleman v. United States, 572 U.S. 157 (causing bodily injury—even indirectly—can satisfy "physical force" in the misdemeanor domestic‑violence context)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (categorical and modified categorical approaches govern predicate‑offense analysis)
Chrzanoski v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding certain Connecticut assault convictions do not have a force element for crime‑of‑violence purposes)
United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2018) (discussing Castleman and elements/force analysis)