Village of Mundelein v. Bogachev
952 N.E.2d 91
Ill. App. Ct.2011Background
- Mundelein charged Bogachev with DUI under 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2).
- Bogachev demanded a speedy trial on Feb 20, 2009, triggering a 160-day limit under 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b).
- Multiple continuances occurred, with several continuances granted on the court's own motion.
- A motion to suppress was filed Mar 13, 2009, and the court granted a rescission petition May 22, 2009.
- Trial priority was set; subsequent continuances occurred on Jul 28 and Sep 8, 2009, with trial ultimately set for Sep 29, 2009.
- Bogachev moved to dismiss claiming violation of the speedy-trial rule; the circuit court and appellate court ultimately sided with Bogachev on the speedy-trial issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hampton applies to 103-5(b) speedy-trial; duty to object. | Village argues Hampton applies to 103-5(b) as a fairness rule. | Bogachev argues Hampton is limited to 103-5(a). | Hampton does not apply to 103-5(b); 103-5(b) has no duty to object. |
| Whether delays from April 3, 2009 to May 22, 2009 were chargeable to Bogachev. | Village contends court-initiated delays should be charged to Bogachev. | Bogachev contends the delays were not attributable to him; he did not cause them. | Delays were not charged to Bogachev; record supports non-attribution. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cordell v. Illinois, 223 Ill.2d 380 (2006) (interpretation of 103-5(a) duty to object; Healy context; amendments shifted burden to defendant when outside 120-day limit)
- People v. Hampton, 394 Ill.App.3d 683 (2009) (apply Cordell to out-of-custody speedy-trial claims under 103-5(a))
- People v. Ladd, 185 Ill.2d 602 (1999) (silent record may not attribute delay to defendant; scope of pretrial motions affecting delay)
- People v. Healy, 293 Ill.App.3d 684 (1997) (earlier standard before 1999 amendment of 103-5(a))
- People v. DeCarlis, 88 Ill.App.3d 634 (1980) (delay attributable to defendant based on silent record; distinguishable from current statute)
